

PHIQ DC

15 Jan 03

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**BRIEFING TO PRIME MINISTER**

**INTRODUCTION**

1. This is an unofficial account of the briefing by CDS and DCJO(Ops) to the PM earlier this evening. An official account will be published by COSSEC.
2. The briefing was attended by SofS, Min(AF), PUS, COS, DCDS(C), CDI and DG Op Pol from the home team. The PM was accompanied by Jonathan Powell (COS to PM), Sir David Manning (Foreign Policy Adviser), Alistair Campbell (Dir Coms & Strategy), Baroness Sally Morgan (Dir Govt Relations), John Scarlett (Chairman JIC) and Mathew Ryecroft (No.10)

**BRIEFING**

- 3.

**DISCUSSION POINTS**

- 4.

- Success. On being briefed about the plan the PM asked, quite simply, "will it work?" CDS stated that it would; he had gained increasing confidence in the plan since IU had become more engaged in discussions

- Worst Case. The PM wanted to know what the COS thought was the worst case scenario. After much discussion about destroying the oil infrastructure, use of WMD and hunkering down in Baghdad and fighting it out, it was felt that the worst case was inter-Nicene fighting between Sunni and Shiah, as well as the Kurds/Turks/Iraqis
- Aftermath. This led onto a general discussion on aftermath, with the PM asking what the Iraqi view on it was. CDS stated that the thinking on this issue was "woolly" at this stage, with work only just beginning. The PM stated that the "Issue" was aftermath - the Coalition must prevent anarchy and inter-Nicene fighting breaking out.

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BRIEF TO PM - 1715 WED 15 JAN 03

CDS Welcome and introductions.

## BACKGROUND ON DISPOSITION OF OUR ARMED FORCES TODAY.

Prime Minister, before we address Iraq, it may be useful if I set out our possible contribution there against our current Armed forces activity and deployments **world-wide and home.**

On your chart these are shown in 5 groups: Theatres (yellow), Garrisons (red), Maritime Activity (blue), Defence Diplomacy (light blue), and Home Base (green). The size of the dot broadly represents the size of the team and the key deployments have the forces assigned flagged beside them.

- The total **trained strength** of the Armed Forces is 1822001 (Navy 36800, Army 96500, RAF 48900).
- There are approximately **40,000 troops<sup>2</sup> (22% of total)** currently deployed on existing operations around the world.
- In addition to this an estimated further **20,000 (10% of total) warned for existing operations** and approximately **20,000 (10% of total) in the process of recovering from operations.**

<sup>1</sup> As at 1 Apr 02 Defence Analysis Statistical Agency

<sup>2</sup> Op FRESO - 17897, Northern Ireland - 13,610 (in Province), 723 (out of Province), Cyprus - 420, Georgia - 7, Balkans - 2961, Falkland Islands - 1253, North Africa, Middle East and Gulf - 3089, Sub-Saharan Africa - 32 (Total - 39992)

- While hard to break out as a firm figure, because many of the staff are double hatted, significant numbers of **personnel are in the UK providing support** for these forces
- In the **worst case situation** requiring a full UK contribution to operations against IRAQ, we estimate that **up to 50% of the Armed Forces** could be on operations.
- There is a clear concern about the potential implications of this effort on our ability to generate Rapid Reaction Forces in the longer term, should the operational tempo continue at its current and forecast pace.

### POTENTIAL OPERATIONS

- Sierra Leone
- Macedonia, Balkans [and Sudan] (EU Ops)

### *THEATRES (yellow dots)*

*In the Gulf, Op RESINATE: 18 combat aircraft, 9 combat support aircraft, SSN, 2*

*DD/FF, 5 MCM Gp, 2 Survey Vessels and 1 AO – Total 2200*

*Sierra Leone - IMATT - 101*

*Afghanistan – Op VERITAS / ISAF - 1716*

*Balkans: Bosnia 1400, Kosovo 1550, Macedonia 20, Total – approx 3000*

### GARRISONS (red dots)

*Brunei (1,117), Ascension, Falklands (428), Cyprus (2033), and Gibraltar (60).*

### MARITIME (blue dots)

*Maritime Patrols*

*South Atlantic and FI APT(S) - OPV,*

*Standing NATO Forces Med and Atlantic enroute*

*Gulf as briefed*

*Counter Narcotics Patrol in Caribbean operations (APT(N) FF deploys 23<sup>rd</sup> plus RFA*

*Fishery Patrol - 4 Patrol Vessels*

*Nuclear Deterrent.*

**DEFENCE DIPLOMACY (light blue dots)**

*Over the festive season and New Year, we have had STTT and BMATT deployed or deploying in: Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia (8), South, West and East Africa (28), and the Czech Republic (50).*

*We have personnel supporting UN missions: UNOMIG (Georgia - 7) UNIKOM (Kuwait - 11), UNFICYP (Cyprus - 415), UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone - 22), UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritera - 4), MONUC (DR Congo - 6), Jt Mil Msn (Sudan - 1) - Total around 500*

**HOME BASE (green dots)**

*NI -14,338.*

*FRESCO - 17,956. (19,000 earmarked)*

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## TURNING NOW TO THE SPECIFIC BUSINESS OF IRAQ

- The aim of today's brief is to:
  - Explain the state of Iraq contingent military planning.
  - Outline the proposed UK contribution.
  - Apprise you of decision time scales, particularly with respect to the movement of armour.
- US, like UK, believes the best way of applying pressure to Saddam (**force on mind**) is convincing, coherent military build-up **leaving him in no doubt as to consequences of non-compliance** with UNSCR 1441.
- US military machine, represented by Gen Franks, declared to the President of the US that he is working to produce a **'loaded and cocked' winning capability from 15 Feb.**
- If required, US then able to commence air campaign and some ground offensive operations (poss inc UK) **from 3 March** and the main effort starting within 2 weeks on 19 Mar, but the US are looking to bring this forward.
- The plan aims to generate a thorough shock **from multiple directions, in every environment, as near simultaneous as possible**, as intelligence indicates that Saddam's regime is a **house of cards** which such a shock should collapse.

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- By 15 Feb the US will have [redacted] troops in theatre, building to around [redacted] by mid March. The total US deployment figure is expected to be around [redacted] though this final figure continues to grow. At the start of operations, the US expect to have available:

**Maritime:** Carrier Battle Groups comprising [redacted] combat aircraft, [redacted] ships, with a load out of approximately [redacted] Tomahawk, and [redacted] personnel. The amphibious shipping includes [redacted] assault ships, [redacted] marines, and [redacted] specialist aircraft.

**Total:** [redacted] people.

**Land:** armoured brigades totalling [redacted] tanks, [redacted] infantry brigades, [redacted] artillery brigades, and [redacted] personnel in support.

**Total:** [redacted] people.

**Air:** [redacted] air wings comprising [redacted] combat and combat support aircraft across Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

**Total:** [redacted] people.

**Special Forces** Some [redacted] personnel throughout the region.

This will be commanded by General FRANKS, Cdr US CENTCOM, at the US Contingent Forward Headquarters at Camp As Sayliyah, Qatar, with maritime, land and air component commanders at Bahrain, Camp Doha, and Prince Sultan Airbase, Saudi Arabia.

UK CONTRIBUTION

The UK will provide support to the US through our fixed bases abroad in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, in UK from Fairford, Mildenhall and Lakenheath. I will now outline the UK's potential force contribution, before going on to explain how we have arrived at this size and mix of units:

**AIR: which you have agreed**

**68** Combat aircraft, **41** Support aircraft (**Total 109**) and            personnel.

**MARITIME: Which has been announced and some of which has deployed.**

Amphibious Group of 5 ships, led by the carrier ARK ROYAL, carrying HQ 3 Cdo Bde, 40 + 42 Cdo and supporting elements.

Escorting and protecting task force: 6 DD/FF and 5 RFA (ARGUS as PCRS) capable SSN.

6 x Mine Counter-measures Vessels, world leaders in this field.

**Total: 22 ships, 2 s/m, 2 RM Cdos,            personnel.**

**LAND: Which is the current focus for discussion in MOD.**

Commanded by HQ 1(UK) Armoured Division.

7 Armoured Bde:

16 Air Assault Brigade:

and, as already mentioned, the Cdo elements from the ATG.

For mobility, 16 AA and 3 Cdo will have III support helicopters

Total            personnel.



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SF:

Overall Total : \_\_\_\_\_

## SUPPORT:

To transport this force to theatre we have so far chartered **50 ships** and anticipate chartering **200 wide body passenger and freight aircraft.**

Reserves; In the first tranche, we have sent 1650 mobilisation orders in order to generate **1500** reservists, and the final total is still evolving.

SOME CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS that have brought us to this point:

- Our interest is to be ready to engage from the outset. Therefore, we have assumed a need to be ready when US are and therefore their timelines have driven ours.
- Need to ring fence **19,000 personnel contingent for fire-fighting** duties has limited our flexibility.
- While TU Pol and Mil recognise need to keep pressure on Saddam, TU people not yet convinced with result that **TU access for land, and possibly air forces, is too limited, too late.** Consequence has been, consequent on your approval, to switch the UK's Land Force contribution to South, and therefore to undertake a different part in the overall plan.

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- This has resulted in the need to take our land forces the extra 3000 miles from E Med to Gulf, and the need to flow this force through the limited ports in, to the restricted land mass of Kuwait.

## DCJO(OPS) FOR TACTICAL LAY DOWN.

### CDS

Wrap up with some points:

1. **Shock.** As Gen Fry has said, the US plans relies on **immediate effect instead of weight of effort** to achieve the desired impact. It is not the gentle start of 1991, it provides an **immediate shock**, and once committed it will not be possible to revert to an attrition campaign. This will raise **issues of targeting** which you may wish to return to in discussion.
2. **Oil.** Media are likely to focus on UK's AO in the south encompassing two thirds of Iraq's oilfields, particularly if there are no centres of WMD in the AO. Working hard on IO campaign to ensure oilfields not destroyed by Iraqi forces, and that the Coalition's use of them to provide support to the Iraqi people is understood.
2. **Aftermath.**
  - Aftermath operations might be short but are more likely to **endure for years**. Worst case e.g. Bosnia - 10 years since UK's 1<sup>st</sup> fces deployed. MoD **planning now in co-operation with DFID and other OGD** to ensure the most effect means are used to restore normalcy. Of course, **humanitarian operations** will commence as soon as the first ground is taken and we are preparing for that.

- Forces not remaining for Aftermath will take time to recuperate and regenerate ready for use

3. Sustainability.

For the UK, we can keep our contribution in place for a similar period. From then on, the military sword hanging over Saddam will begin to lose its edge. This is therefore a one shot coercion campaign.

4. Winning concept. Two essential points:

- 1<sup>st</sup>. Saddam must believe that force will be overwhelming and **he cannot survive in power**. In parallel, must give **genuine hope to Iraqi opposed to regime** that an end to it is possible.
- 2<sup>nd</sup>. Coalition action must be swift for a number of reasons:
  - A drawn out campaign risks becoming a **battle of attrition conducted against a backdrop of dwindling public support.**
  - To **prevent Saddam using spoiling tactics** such as use of WMD, or causing an ecological disaster by torching of oilfields as he did at the end of the Kuwait war.
  - To **minimise risk of unintended consequences**, such as
  - The regional states expect a quick resolution to the Iraq problem.

5. US Support. US have seen UK participation as essential from outset. To this end they have accommodated our constraints at every turn to ensure we are part of their coalition and to

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guarantee a serious military task for our forces. In fact, the current plan for UK forces makes them a **lynch pin crucial to success of the overall plan**. It must be emphasised that the plan as outlined, with the UK's recent shift of focus from the north (EU) to the south, relies heavily on the promise of US enabling assets.

## TIMELINES

If we are to match the US timetable to be ready in theatre, we will need your permission by Fri in order to be ready to start deploying Land Force equipment to the Gulf from 24 Jan. The first armoured units will start loading in GE on 30 Jan. The submission for this will be passed up tonight.

## Visual aids:

Seating plan

Simplified map with all key point mentioned as used in brief, eg MSR, oil, Kurds etc

Measles map showing current dispositions of UK forces word wide.

Timelines and Flow chart (COS only).

## KEY POINTS FOR DISCUSSION PERIOD

### POL/MIL Issues

US C2, UK C2 and interactions at strategic, operational and tactical level.

Battle Rhythm - Whitehall

Information Campaign and Media (NB Alastair Campbell has lead).

Coalition Contribution

Targeting.

### Enablers

UORs

Money: authorised, spent to date, potential total

Reserves

HNS, Overflight, Suez

Cyprus, Diego Garcia

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## War-fighting and Risks

Conventional and WMD Threat

Casualty Assumptions

Medical measures: vaccines, field hospitals, repatriation issues.

Blue-on-blue/CID

FLAM, PGM, collateral damage

War-fighting in Summer

War fighting in CBW environment

## Other

Lessons learned from Previous operations (now learned / action in hand / un-resourced)

Security of UK Home Base.