

Notes provided by Lieutenant General (Retired) Sir Freddie Viggers

The notes provided below were written by Lieutenant General Sir Freddie Viggers in preparation for his hearing and submitted to the Iraq Inquiry on 8th December 2009. These notes were referred to during the hearing on 9th December 2009 and Lieutenant General Sir Freddie Viggers indicated that he was content for these notes to be made public.

The headings used for the notes below reflect those given to the witness prior to the hearing as an indication of the matters which the Inquiry wishes to cover during the session. This is detailed in paragraph 7 of the [Witness Protocol](#).

Where abbreviations were made in the original notes; these have been expanded.

Your role

Notice of and preparation for your posting to Iraq

I was warned off in April 2003 to fill a new post in the emerging senior coalition military command structure in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Baghdad, to start work in May. I arrived in the CPA shortly after the arrival of Coalition Forces in Baghdad, post the invasion and as the Reconstruction phase was beginning.

I acted as the 2* (Major General) Deputy Commander to the 3* Commander of Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), Lt Gen Sanchez. He assumed the role after the departure of Lt Gens McKiernan (who had commanded the Land Force Component during the invasion) and Lt Gen Wallace (Commander of the US V Corps)

Your role in Baghdad

I acted as the senior British Military Representative in Iraq (SBMR-I), and as the Deputy Commander CJTF-7. My focus was on the military aspects of the reconstruction Plan being delivered by the CPA. Initially, I worked from the US military HQ based at Baghdad Airport and, eventually, I was based in Green Zone once we had found a secure UK base there. My task was to provide the link between military HQ in the CPA and the heads of various civil functions in the CPA. There was a separate Deputy Commander for Operations in the CJTF-7 HQ – Major General Wadjkowski- who was based in Corps HQ at the Airport

I provided military advice and information to the British Ambassadors, primarily to John Sawers inside the CPA. I also liaised with Ambassador Chris Segar who was based at the British Embassy in Baghdad but outside the Green Zone. Later (much later and too late), I advised and supported Ambassadors Sir Jeremy Greenstock and Sir Hilary Synnott.

I was the national focus for the expanding British military presence in Baghdad. This started at about 15 personnel, and increased during my time to about 100. I did not command the troops of the British Division in Multinational Division South East (MND(SE))

I also carried out a limited liaison function with the UN HQ and other NGOs in Baghdad, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Lines of reporting – to the coalition and to the UK

Coalition

I had daily meetings and discussions with Gen Sanchez and his senior staff (Chief of Staff (Brigadier Haan), the Deputy Commander Operations, the Political Adviser and senior staff officers). I attended the daily 0630 morning briefs and numerous planning meetings through the days and weeks.

I attended Ambassador Bremer's daily 0700 morning briefs with Gen Sanchez and various planning meetings particularly those affecting security. I worked closely with Ambassador Bremer's Chief of Staff (Kennedy) and his Principal Adviser (McMannaway) and with the key players involved in security functions (especially Walt Slocomb (responsible for building the new Iraqi Army) and with Bernard Kerik (responsible for building the Iraqi police).

Later, I had close contact with Andy Bearpark on the coordination of planning on reconstruction initiatives in the CPA (eg power generation and distribution; currency exchange); and with Deputy Chief Constable Doug Brand (seconded from the South Yorkshire Police Force and working with Kerik).

I began weekly meetings with senior UN figures including De Mello (killed in VBIED attack on UN HQ) and his Deputy. My dealings with the ICRC took place every 3 weeks or so.

UK

I reported direct to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in the MOD and to Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) in the Permanent Joint HQ (PJHQ) in Northwood. I also dealt closely in the MOD with the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) (Lt Gen Pigott, then Lt Gen Fry).

I maintained daily contact with the GOC (MND(SE)) or his Chief of Staff.

I submitted twice weekly reports to MOD in time for video conferences and Chiefs of Staff meetings, reporting on CPA-wide issues, not just

military activity or events in MND(SE). These were sent direct to CDS and CJO, copied to MND(SE) and the British Military representative in the US CENTCOM HQ in Tampa.

Frequent liaison with CJO and his staff in PJHQ and with the MOD Iraq Policy Unit was carried out by phone, weekly video conferences and visits.

I had daily meetings with Ambassador Sawers and Greenstock and met approximately weekly with Ambassador Segar.

I submitted an end of tour report on return to UK in September.

Your relationship with the Senior British Civilian in Iraq, the British military in the South, the CPA and the UN

See above

The overall Campaign Plan and the UK's role and contribution

There was no Coalition civil-military plan for the post invasion phase; there was no work up of the CPA staffs prior to deployment. UK elements in CPA deployed incrementally over first 5 months (as did other nations' contributions). CPA was never fully staffed in my time.

The overall civil-military Campaign Plan developed as experience and exposure to the scale and realities of the task emerged. Military aspects of the overall plan – primarily about security and building Iraqi Army/security forces – were developed under Gen Abizaid (Commander CENTCOM) and Gen Sanchez but we were not able to synchronise this fully with civilian aspects (governance, reconstruction, the economy, medical, education etc) until much later.

We lacked clear statements from Capitals on Coalition political – military objectives, timelines, what the end state should look like or how we were to get there. At the outset, we had no clearly stated definition of what “success” would look like for the Iraqis, the region or the international community. So we suffered from lack of clarity about Ends, Ways and Means. The Plan emerged piecemeal and was prone to dislocation by breaking news and by events

At the outset, the CPA had no machinery or processes to turn policy decisions into coordinated delivery at national level and in the regions. CPA was disjointed, stove piped and reactive. This improved over the first few months as the different elements of the CPA became familiar with combined working

This was exacerbated by confused lines of responsibility between the CPA and other key players, eg Office of Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) (until it left), and by lack of contact with the UN and other NGOs

Planning in London was too focussed on events in Basra and MND(SE) and did not appreciate the importance of full coordination with broader Coalition plans for the rest of country; eg oil, power distribution, Shia communities in Basra and in Baghdad (Sadr city).

Your strategy and objectives

To establish the UK presence and role in the CJTF-7 military command structure.

To provide a positive contribution in CPA and CJTF-7 planning and activities.

To report developments across the spectrum of CPA activity.

To identify how/where the British contribution could be best focussed as required.

To inform and alert UK on the CPA's developing plans and intentions.

To ensure that British elements outside MND(SE) had the wherewithal to execute their roles and tasks.

The UK's responsibilities as an "Occupying Power"

A question for FCO, MOD and the lawyers

Interactions with the US

These grew in effect as personalities became familiar with working together in a civilian-military structure

Some of the civilian agencies inside the CPA were suspicious of, and did not see /understand how the military could contribute. Reluctant to engage in detailed planning prior to launching a task.

Priorities (eg security, reconstruction, finding WMD) and how those were decided

Everything was a priority –security, the rebuild, creating the political architecture, capture Saddam, stop the sabotage and smuggling, sustain flows of vital supplies to nation, get the economy going, remove the weapons (tons, of all types)

Security was the overriding and increasingly difficult task – understand the linkages and pressures; secure and improve the infrastructure; understand and deal with the effects of internal and external influences;

deal with the lack of security architecture - no Iraqi Army, police, judges, courts, jails, border controls, communications.

The military contribution to reconstruction was vital – coordination with the civilian agencies inside the CPA, and with Contractors had not been thought through at the outset.

I was not involved in the WMD issue, other than coordinating support to Iraq Survey Group activities when requested.

Impact of media and public opinion

There was a complete failure to establish a coherent information campaign.

There was inadequate analysis of Arab media outlets or a coherent plan to get the facts onto the street (Arab and in capitals)

The situation in Iraq

Your understanding, at the time, of the political and security situation on the ground when you arrived

The Coalition failed to appreciate (or find out about) the state of the country, prior to the invasion: the effects of UN sanctions, fear of Saddam and the Ba'athist regime; broken infrastructure, impatience, revenge, inadequate life support, poor/non-existent communications, access to weapons, conflicting internal and external international and regional agendas.

The Coalition failed to understand the dynamics of the country – Shia/Sunni/ Kurd tensions and malevolent influences inside the country and the region; or to exploit the potential benefits that could be achieved through other influencers, especially the Sheiks

Capitals were slow to realise that it was not “job done” but “job just started”. The post-invasion honeymoon was very short lived, and measured in days. It took too long for Capitals to get it.

The CPA was trying to achieve multiple and un-sequenced missions, all at the same time: build itself; try to run the country day-to-day; kick start the economy; deliver “democracy”; maintain security within the country and along its borders; deal with increasing terrorist and criminal activity; create confidence in the international effort among Iraqi organisations and on the street. Iraqis were impatient and suspicious, eg where was the oil revenue going.

The CPA was understaffed by quality and quantity.

There was an unwillingness in Capitals to take forward the mission with urgency, eg poor follow through of requests to act/provide.

In London, there were too many lines of reporting and accountability: Cabinet-FCO-MOD-DfID. No single Minister in charge.

Incoherent policy making and decisions, eg disbanding what was left of the Army and not paying the excluded military; removing the top 4 layers of the Ba'athist party with no alternative sources of leadership/management (left highest Iraqi military rank as major).

The long screwdriver from Washington, eg Rumsfeld's stream of orders and instructions and unwieldy budgetary controls.

The way in which that developed during your time in Iraq and the implications for the military

Slow and halting reactions, eg manning the Governorate teams; releasing the money for local projects.

Security forces took the brunt of Iraqi impatience and frustration.

Too many tasks were laid on the military without the resources or authority to deliver: security, training and mentoring, governance, law and order.

Security situation in MND(SE)

For the GOCs MND(SE) to advise.

Role of the Iraqi Security Forces and building their capability

For others to advise.

Conclusions and Recommendations

First 6 months post invasion showed:

No Campaign Plan to link the various lines of civil-military activity from the outset.

Complete lack of cultural and environmental awareness of the country in coalition Capitals and in the CPA.

Failure to appreciate how long the task would take, or the right road to travel.

Need to train and prepare for the aftermath harder than train for the invasion.

Lack of clear lines of Political - Military responsibility and accountability in and between capitals.

Poor linkage between policy decision making and delivery on the ground.

Lack of a coherent Information Campaign inside the country and internationally.

DfID was a serious bar to progress. This should not be a separate autonomous department of government. It should be an agent of the FCO, as it was (when called the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) during the Bosnia campaign.

We have to work out how better to deploy and use the non-kinetic arsenal: money, information, facilities, machinery, and expertise.

We need more and better education and training of officials in capitals who have a role in directing the political and political - military aspects of the Strategy in this kind of Campaign. This must include Ministers and senior civil servants. It is not a job for amateurs. We must make more and better use of non-governmental expertise and agencies in planning and directing the Campaign.

Planning and decision taking in Capitals needs to match the tempo of events and the pace of life on the ground.