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Subject:

The following submission was made via the Iraq Inquiry website:

1 December 2009

To Iraq Inquiry

Submission from

Former

Directorate of Force Development

1. From 1999 until 2005, I was the in the Directorate Level post) within the Policy area of MoD. of Force Development, (a

- 2. I was, in early2003, responsible for an item of work on the aftermath of invading Iraq Much to my surprise, it was said at the time, that this was the most substantial piece of work to date on the topic. It took my team under 10 days to complete at a cost of about 40 man days. It looked at the size and structure of the Iraqi armed forces that we would find acceptable post conflict. The main criterion we used was regional stability. Naively, it did not occur to us that all the army would be disbanded. Our recommendation was that there was only a need to disband a very small proportion of the army: the Special Republican Guard. The work did find its way into some of the war-plans issued to the US in-theatre HQs.
- 3. Part of the work was a collection of previous related case studies such as the fall of Nazi Germany. We pointed out that, in 1945, the German army and other security forces were kept in tact to provide internal stability.
- 4. We were informed about this time that DFID, who we thought should have been working hard on the aftermath, was forbidden to work on the project. The subsequent suggestion was that the Minister had forbidden such work to be done as she did not believe in the conflict. I have no proof of this, it was just rumour.
- 6. Just after the conflict, our Directorate was involved in helping a country near Iraq to secure its borders but the contact with the country was stopped because of US pressure. Apparently, they did not like talking to that particular country.
- 7. I had previously commissioned work with Dstl to carry out Historical Analysis of similar conflicts. By mid 2005 this was suggesting that it was going to be unlikely that we would achieve our Policy objectives in Iraq.
- 8. I was responsible for the scenarios we used to examine all our future force structure needs. Prior to 9/11, and for some time afterwards, none of our structures were predicated on taking and holding hostile territory. The most aggressive actions we considered were restoring territory that had been illegally invaded. The resulting force structure effects were very significant. Well before the invasion, it took us only a few hours to list these. The key ones were good hostile intelligence from their own local people on our movements and the need to protect our logistics and lines of communication from terrorist type attacks. These factors should have been obvious to planners.
- 9. I had constructed many Political-Military wargames prior to the invasion. These contrate on the political/policy aspects of campaigns rather than the warfighting ones: the aim being to get a better links between the two. In my view such games would have brought to the fore many of the problems we subsequently encountered as they force the players to look at the situation from all sides particularly those of hostile actors. It frees the players from thinking "logically" from a western viewpoint. I found no

appetite for playing such games prior to the invasion. In future, these ought to be a critical part of early planning.

FROM:

By: Email:

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