

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE UK'S
CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY
SECTOR REFORM (POLICING) IN
IRAQ**



BY

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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 This report has been prepared in response to the Secretary of State for Defence's commission to assess the resourcing and effectiveness of the United Kingdom's contribution to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in relation to policing both within MND(SE) and also to the development of national policing policy in Baghdad

1.2 Following consultation with other key stakeholders, notably the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, DFID, the Home Office and ACPO substantial terms of reference were agreed¹. These can be grouped into three overarching issues, namely

- The strategic direction and integration of the SSR (policing) effort;
- The efficiency and effectiveness of the SSR (policing) effort, including the Carabinieri, in MND(SE);
- The effectiveness of the existing training arrangements.

1.3 I have not chosen to treat the views and contribution of the Iraqis themselves as a heading in its own right. I see this as such an important issue that it should permeate all consideration.

1.4 It is also important that the reader understands some of the broader contextual issues such as the legacy of the distrust from the previous regime, tribal culture and the obligations that go with it, the impact of high unemployment and in particular, the Iraqi judicial system which is based upon an investigative judiciary rather than the common law model used in the UK and which is prone to being overlooked.

The strategic direction and integration of the SSR (policing) effort.

1.5 Hitherto there has been no overarching blueprint for policing in Iraq, but I am encouraged this has now apparently been recognised at Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) and that a broad strategic plan is now being prepared. Iraqi participation is vital to its long-term success and I am pleased to note the emphasis that CPATT now apparently places on joint working. In particular, the new strategy will need to focus on conceptual issues such as the role and place of policing in a newly democratic Iraq as much as it does the logistical detail of ensuring the right assets are in place. If not there is a risk that, in contrast to received business wisdom, 'function will follow form' and the opportunity to achieve a coherent vision for reform lost.

1.6 There has been a tendency to focus on numbers and upon measuring quantitative inputs rather than qualitative outcomes, a good example of which is the focus on the recruitment and training of 135,000 police. The lack of focus upon quality has led to the employment of undesirable elements including hardened criminals and those whose first allegiance is to one of the militias. This situation has been further compounded by the recruitment of significant numbers of additional police units often termed 'pop up' battalions

¹ <http://www.dod.defence.gov.uk>

² A copy of the full terms of reference can be found in Annex 3 Introduction

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that sit almost entirely outside the existing recruitment and training regimes. The scale of the problem is such that in some provinces these units actually outnumber the regular IPS! Almost certainly condoned, if not encouraged by the Ministry of Interior, little is known about these new units, but it would be wise to assume some are little more than personal militias. Of course, should evidence later emerge that they are committing abuses the media may well infer they were trained by the coalition. It is my recommendation that the Iraqis should be encouraged to build on existing activity and develop a robust, centrally managed vetting system for IPS recruits as soon as possible and to take immediate action to 'root out' corrupt and sub-standard elements within the IPS. In progressing this the UK will need to provide support and expert guidance.

1.7 The apparent failure to anticipate these problems has reinforced my concerns that insufficient attention is being paid to intelligence as a strategic issue and the focus upon items and intelligence needs to be broadened to place a premium on understanding local power structures, signal events and key environmental impact factors. It is my recommendation that the UK should encourage MNF-I to transfer responsibility for criminal and counter insurgency intelligence to CPATT and further, that its subsequent development activity reflect the community intelligence ethos.

1.8 Notwithstanding my concern at the implied lack of corporacy at a strategic level, the situation in MND(SE) is far more encouraging and I found real evidence that the early disconnect between the military and CivPol efforts is already becoming a thing of the past. All are signed up to the 'Southern Iraq: IPS Transition Plan' and real progress is now being made. It is equally the case that the working relationship with CPATT has improved noticeably and the embedding of a number of UK officers there has been a success. Looking to the future I see merit in the additional deployment of an ACPO² level (1star equivalent) officer to CPATT. This has also highlighted the utility of ensuring the police service has a voice at the mission planning and execution stage. It is my recommendation that for this and future deployments a senior police officer of Chief Superintendent rank should be embedded within PJHQ.

1.9 From the Iraqi perspective two strategic issues need to be addressed. The first is to address the question of the extent to which the government in Baghdad has, and should have, the ability to exert control over the IPS whilst second is the need to tackle the already identified concerns in relation to the presence of rogue elements within the IPS, vetting procedures and disbandment of the 'pop up' battalions. Much will depend on the quality of the incoming Minister of the Interior and it is my recommendation that the US and UK use whatever influence is available to them to ensure that the next Minister of the Interior has a sound appreciation of the scale of the challenges and moreover is willing to take decisive action to addresses them

² The membership of the Association of Chief Police Officers comprises Chief Constables, Deputy Chief Constables and Assistant Chief Constables and their equivalent in the Metropolitan and City police services. It can be argued the ranks equate to Lt Colonel, Major General and Brigadier respectively.

1.10 The theme linking these two issues is the need to establish effective governance structures that can impose uniform standards and operating practices and it is my recommendation that the coalition treats the creation of governance capacity within, and close liaison between, the Ministries of Interior, Defence and Justice as a priority and invests in such accordingly. A likely catalyst for ensuring the Ministry of Interior takes ownership of policing is the creation of the long awaited National Policing Plan. This must be an Iraqi owned and produced document and it is my recommendation that the US be encouraged to allow the Iraqi government lead responsibility for the National Policing Plan. This should be led by the new Minister of Interior in consultation with the 18 provincial Chiefs of Police. In progressing this the coalition must of course provide expert advice and guidance and perhaps the suggested draft.

1.11 My consideration of the various strategic challenges has highlighted a wider question, namely what our definition of success should be. The focus on providing advanced technical, 'one size fits all' solutions that would be recognisable in any western country is not always what is needed. Instead our goal should be to create a body that is fit for purpose, that respects human rights and democracy and which bears favourable comparison with its peers in the region. In achieving this it is my recommendation that greater flexibility to design and implement bespoke solutions be delegated to the brigade level SSR (policing) function. This needs to be accompanied by a shift in the focus of monitoring activity so that quantitative data and staff/equipment audits are complemented by a greater focus on qualitative assessments.

The efficiency and effectiveness of the SSR (policing) effort, including the Carabinieri, in MND(SE)

1.12 It was encouraging to note that, founded on the Police Military Co-ordination Groups, a high level of cooperation exists between the military, CivPol and ArmorGroup. In many respects this resembles the 'jointery' that evolved to work so effectively within Northern Ireland and it is my recommendation that the existing joint working arrangements, delivered through the Coordination Group, is regularised as standard operating practice for the delivery of SSR within MND(SE).

1.13 It is also clear the Transition Plan drives activity and this is evident in the fact that SSR (policing) now accounts for 47% of the military's work. Nevertheless tensions, both in theatre and within Whitehall, still exist over where primacy for the SSR (policing) effort rests. Put simply the shift in thinking that should have followed the assumption by MOD of primacy for SSR in Iraq has not yet permeated all activity. Within a framework where the GOC has overall responsibility for the direction of SSR police reform, the implementation of such should rest with CivPol, with military colleagues supporting and facilitating the actual service delivery where appropriate. The efficiency of these arrangements would, I believe, be significantly further improved if the head of the UK CivPol contingent (the Chief Police Advisor - Iraq, or CPA-I) were embedded with the GOC within MND(SE) where he or she would equate to a brigade commander and it is my recommendation that the CPA-I's successor should be re-deployed and should function within the

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MND(SE) command structure where he or she will be able to direct the SSR (policing) effort.

1.14 One area in which I am particularly concerned that the coordination of activity is not what it should be is in relation to the judicial dimension. Too little import has been given to the significance of the investigative judiciary to Iraq's legal system; in contrast to states whose legal system is based on common law they are much more involved in the intricacies of criminal investigations. In providing training in the investigation of serious crime to police CPATT/MND(SE) it may just be that this is not fully taken into account. Moreover, it is also clear that CPATT is not the sole source of training for judges. The EU JUSTLEX mission is also a significant player and yet there is very little evidence to suggest the two training programmes have been coordinated. It is my recommendation that the judicial dimension should be fully integrated within the SSR effort and I further recommend that an audit of all training be undertaken to ensure that a clear picture exists and that, as far as is possible, all such training is consistent with, and aligned to, the overall goal of SSR (policing).

1.15 My impression of the CivPol and ArmorGroup staff and their contribution is positive. However, whilst their overall number was probably commensurate to the situation as it was in 2006 this may no longer be the case. The closer working relationship with the military is generating more requests for support than it is possible to accommodate and, given 2006 has been designated the 'Year of the Police', this pressure will likely only increase. It would be my view that an additional investment in CivPol/ArmorGroup advisors would give a timely impetus to the SSR (policing) effort.

1.16 It is, however, also my view that the effectiveness of CivPol and ArmorGroup staff has hitherto been limited by movement restrictions and conditions of service. I was very disappointed to discover that movement restriction remains a contentious issue. The FCO is still applying its own criteria which can be characterised as 'risk averse' and in taking this issue forward it is my recommendation that the decision to place areas 'out of bounds' should rest with the GOC.

1.17 At a wider level it is further apparent that the Strategic Taskforce on International Policing's aim at boosting UK police input to overseas missions is yet to be fully realised and it is my recommendation that the Strategic Taskforce be re-convened with the goal of creating a genuine police expeditionary capability operating within a framework that provides maximum support to overseas SSR (policing) deployments.

1.18 It is nevertheless clear that the SSR (policing) effort has achieved real results in all four southern provinces. MND(SE) is alert to problems posed by the 'pop up' battalions and the presence of rogue elements within the IPS, especially in relation to the Basra intelligence agencies and commendable plans are in place to expedite a solution. While it was to be hoped that such action should have had complete Iraqi 'buy-in' I am aware of the very recent reaction of the Governor of Basra to a number of recent significant arrests. It

is my firm view that we must remain robust and resolute in the face of any such local resistance.

1.19 Whilst all four southern provinces are different, and should be treated as such, a number of common themes are evident. In particular, the Tactical Support Units and the Provincial Joint Operating Centres should be seen as successes. The latter have also been instrumental in the gradual emergence of 'jointery' between the IPS and the Iraqi Army and the successful handling of the recent general election should be seen as a useful validation of the state cooperation between the security agencies. Mutual suspicion still nevertheless exists and it is my recommendation that the UK exert its influence to further embed and encourage the concept of joint operating between the IPS and the Iraqi army in areas where the security situation makes this appropriate.

1.20 The general opinion of the average Iraqi recruit is positive, albeit from a low base. The majority would seem to be well intentioned and could yet flourish should the rogue elements be excised from the organisation and robust vetting procedures set in place. Moreover, from a distance it is also easy to overlook the commitment of many Iraqis and my meeting with some IPS officers was a humbling experience.

1.21 Most progress has been achieved in Muthanna, where a relatively high degree of IPS self-sufficiency is evident. The province is already at Tactical Over-Watch and whilst the transition criteria have not yet been met in full I judge it is ready for transition to Operational Over-Watch. Much the same is also true for Maysaan, albeit here the coalition is far less welcome and it may be the case that a continued presence there would be counter-productive. In the circumstances Maysaan too should also be capable of moving to Operational Over-Watch at the earliest opportunity. I acknowledge the anxieties that exist in relation to border security. The reality is that the DBE are increasingly capable and, given that our presence on the border is already minimal, I do not believe that the consequent draw-down would be detrimental.

1.22 Basra's problems have already been documented and it remains by far the most problematic province. A number of key SSR (policing) initiatives have been delayed by the ongoing difficulties with the intelligence agencies and these can only be progressed once the rogue elements have been dealt with. As a consequence, I judge it very unlikely that Basra province will meet the transition criteria by May 2006, as was originally envisaged.

1.23 Dhi-Qar is the most benign of the four southern provinces and here too the Italians and in particular, the Carabinieri, have made good progress. With regards to the issue of whether or not the Carabinieri '3rd force' model is more suited to conditions in Iraq my judgement is that it is not. I took the opportunity to raise this with a number of the senior IPS officers and they were unanimously of the view that the current arrangements were both the most appropriate and the most familiar to them. Whilst the Carabinieri has delivered tangible achievements it can be argued that the SSR (policing) effort

in Muthanna has achieved verifiable results that are at least as impressive, but with significantly fewer resources and within a less benign environment.

1.24 My findings in relation to the Carabinieri should not be taken as being critical of their contribution. They are a significant resource and any offer of additional support from the Italians should be grasped without hesitation. It is likely that during 2006 DhI-Qar will meet the transitional requirements for the move to 'Operational Over-Watch' and this will in turn create an opportunity to re-deploy the Carabinieri. Political considerations are such that it is very unlikely the Italian government will allow them to be deployed outside their own command structure, nor to security operations in one of the more problematic provinces such as Basra. However, it is my view they would be ideally suited to assume responsibility for training and preparing the Border Police (DBE) for its roles in guarding Iraq's frontiers. This would be a challenging and worthwhile role as there is evidence to suggest that the scale of smuggling, and the organised criminality that supports it, is such that it poses a significant threat to Iraqi society.

The effectiveness of the existing training arrangements

1.25 Training is one of the areas where the lack of an overarching blueprint for SSR (policing) is most evident. I am concerned that there does not, at any stage, appear to have been a sustained effort to undertake a training needs analysis and the training regime that presently exists, while now vastly improved originated, if I have been accurately briefed, is based on the U.N. policing solution offered in the Balkans, post-conflict there. Matters have been made worse by the apparent lack of consistency in training provision across Iraq. I was also surprised that overall responsibility for developing the basic recruit training syllabus resides at the Joint International Police Training Centre (JIPTC) in Jordan. This has made it difficult to contextualise training and it is my recommendation that the US is encouraged to transfer responsibility for the BRT syllabus from JIPTC to CPATT in Baghdad. In the intervening period I further recommend that the necessary processes are set in place to allow those officers who are able to travel to undertake fact-finding visits in theatre.

1.26 Whilst JIPTC is a superb facility I have real concerns that, though superficially impressive, the basic recruit training provided there is not fit for purpose: it is mechanistic and has not been sufficiently 'proofed' against conditions in Iraq. In many respects the skills we are attempting to train are too sophisticated and it is my recommendation we should encourage a revision of the BRT syllabus to achieve a better focus upon basic policing and survival skills.

1.27 Training is also prone to the same emphasis upon numbers that is apparent in other strands of the SSR (policing) effort it would seem few if any students fail for academic reasons – this despite the fact that some may be semi or wholly illiterate.

1.28 The UK provides JIPTC's largest single coalition contingent. Regrettably its influence in the running of this facility is not commensurate with

the level of investment, albeit recent changes may now also allow for UK staff to fill more managerial posts. The biggest risk is that we will be unable to find suitable candidates and this must not be allowed to happen.

1.29 The situation at the Baghdad Police Academy, the JTA and the regional training centres is far more encouraging. Here, the UK contingent has played a key role and in particular, has established a real niche for themselves in training specialised skills, notably in relation to forensics, intelligence and major crime investigation.

1.30 There would, however, be value in re-evaluating our priorities. In particular, the decision to deliver BRT at the JTA Shaibah may necessitate an increase in the number of UK trainers deployed there if the training targets are to be met and the UK's lead role maintained. This will largely depend upon our ability to re-deploy existing staff to match the new priority.

Conclusion

1.31 In many respects the challenge facing us in Iraq appears more daunting from London than it does in theatre. This I attribute to the inevitable difficulty that exists in grasping some of the key contextual factors. The lack of a blueprint for SSR (policing) reform has not helped this dynamic and neither has the absence of a clear appreciation of what success looks like. This helps to explain my assessment that just as the view before the events of 19th September was probably too optimistic so it is that the view post the events of that day was too pessimistic. Critical to achieving a balanced view of the situation is the need to align expectations to the reality of the situation we are facing in Iraq. Lowering expectations, especially amongst a partisan media, will not be easy but it is important to recognise that we can point to real achievements.

1.32 In my interim report I took a stance that could be described as cautiously optimistic. My most recent visit has confirmed me this in view, but has also given me a greater appreciation of the significance of the threats posed by rogue elements in the Basra intelligence agencies and also by the 'pop up' battalions. If not addressed they will imperil the entire SSR (policing) effort. Moreover, whilst they are rightly the focus of considerable coalition activity, the ultimate solution rests with the Iraqis and in particular, the Ministry of Interior. Assuming the next Minister lives up to the burden of expectation the key to success will be the creation of effective governance structures and in this we can indeed make a difference.

1.33 Notwithstanding the reservations I have expressed about the quality of training, intelligence and the other factors that inhibit the SSR (policing) effort, Iraq is on the right path and there is a good news story to be told. From an admittedly low base, Iraq's security forces are now recognisable as such and early signs of self-sufficiency are becoming apparent. Indeed in some areas we may not be far from reaching the point of diminishing returns. The UK can take pride in its contribution.

1.34 The IPS will not resemble a western police force at any point in the near future, but the basic format, modelled on the UK experience, but which needs to fully accommodate Iraq's 'Napoleonic style' legal system, is sound and should be allowed to evolve. This last point is, I feel, particularly important as it reflects growing Iraqi control of their own destiny. I am encouraged that this point has been recognised by the coalition for it is my firm view that the only elements of the SSR (policing) programme that will endure beyond the coalition's departure will be those which enjoy genuine Iraqi ownership and support.

1.35 Of course, success is far from guaranteed. Despite the greater coherence, focus and Iraqi participation in the SSR (policing) effort we are not there yet and, at a wider level much, if not all, depends on the construct, appeal and resolve of the new government. As such, if it would be deemed of value, I am very happy to return to Iraq to assess further progress when the new Government and particularly the new Minister of the Interior has been installed.

2. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1

It is my recommendation that the Iraqis should be encouraged to build on existing activity and develop a robust, centrally managed vetting system for IPS recruits as soon as possible and to take immediate action to 'root out' corrupt and sub-standard elements within the IPS. In progressing this the UK will need to provide support and expert guidance.

Recommendation 2

It is my recommendation that the UK should encourage MNF-I to transfer responsibility for criminal and counter insurgency intelligence to CPATT and further, that its subsequent development activity reflect the community intelligence ethos.

Recommendation 3

It is therefore my recommendation that for this and future deployments a senior police officer of Chief Superintendent rank should be embedded within PJHQ.

Recommendation 4

It is my recommendation that the US and UK use whatever influence is available to them to ensure that the next Minister of the Interior has a sound appreciation of the scale of the challenges and, moreover is willing to take decisive action to addresses them.

Recommendation 5

It is my recommendation that the coalition treats the creation of governance capacity within, and close liaison between, the Ministries of Interior, Defence and Justice as a priority and invests in such accordingly.

Recommendation 6

It is my recommendation that the US be encouraged to allow the Iraqi government lead responsibility for the National Policing Plan. This should be led by the new Minister of Interior in consultation with the 18 provincial Chiefs of Police. In progressing this the coalition must of course provide expert advice and guidance and perhaps the suggested draft.

Recommendation 7

It is my recommendation that greater flexibility to design and implement bespoke solutions be delegated to the brigade level SSR (policing) function.

Recommendation 8

It is my recommendation that the existing joint working arrangements, delivered through the Coordination Group, is regularised as standard operating practice for the delivery of SSR within MND(SE).

Recommendation 9

It is my recommendation that the CPA-I's successor should be re-deployed and should function within the MND(SE) command structure where he or she will be able to direct the SSR (policing) effort.

Recommendation 10

It is my recommendation that that the judicial dimension should be fully integrated within the SSR effort.

Recommendation 11

It is my recommendation that an audit of all training be undertaken to ensure that a clear picture exists and that, as far as is possible, all such training is consistent with, and aligned to, the overall goal of SSR (policing).

Recommendation 12

It is my recommendation that the decision to place areas as 'Out of Bounds' should rest with the GOC, not the FCO.

Recommendation 13

It is my recommendation that the Strategic Taskforce be re-convened with the goal of creating a genuine police expeditionary capability operating within a framework that provides maximum support to overseas SSR (policing) deployments.

Recommendation 14

It is my recommendation that the UK exert its influence to further embed and encourage the concept of joint operating between the IPS and the Iraqi army in areas where the security situation makes this appropriate.

Recommendation 15

It is my recommendation that the US is encouraged to transfer responsibility for the BRT syllabus from JIPTC to CPATT in Baghdad.

Recommendation 16

It is my recommendation that the necessary processes are set in place to allow those officers who are able to travel to undertake fact-finding visits in theatre.

Recommendation 17

It is my recommendation we should encourage a revision of the BRT syllabus to achieve a better focus upon basic policing and survival skills.

3. INTRODUCTION

3.1 I present hereunder the findings of my assessment of the effectiveness of the UK's Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme and the sufficiency of the resources allocated to this task. In so doing I have not only focused upon the effort in MND(SE), but have also examined the linkages to the shape and effectiveness of MNF-I national policing policy in Baghdad. Whilst I have endeavoured to focus on the salient issues, readers will know that the situation in Iraq is so fluid that by the time this report has been properly analysed at least some of my findings may already have been overtaken by events.

3.2 I feel honoured to have been invited to conduct this review and hope it can be a catalyst for securing closer co-operation amongst key stakeholders.

Terms of Reference

3.3 The terms of reference were drawn from correspondence and direct communication between representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for International Development and the Home Office. They were agreed as follows:

- The strategy for the development of the IPS in MND(SE) and confirms that it is aiming for a solution that establishes an IPS which is appropriate for Iraq.
- That the proposals for the UK's IPS SSR strategy in MND(SE) are realistic and workable and to make resourcing recommendations.
- The effectiveness and applicability of the UK's IPS training effort in MND(SE).
- How the CivPol and ArmorGroup contracts can be better managed to make the most effective use of this resource.
- The effectiveness of the International Police Advisers in terms of numbers, rank/quality, conditions of service, unity of command/C2 arrangements and force protection/movement restrictions.
- The effectiveness of the relationship between the CPATT contingent and UK personnel in MND(SE).
- The effectiveness of the relationship between coalition police support structures and Iraqi police structures at the national level.
- The effectiveness of the relationship between US and UK police support structures at the national level within Iraq.
- The effectiveness of the relationship between the UK police assistance team and other elements of the overall British effort in Iraq.
- The quality of activity reporting.
- Progress in delivering a national policing strategy and the position of MND(SE) in relation to it.
- Iraqi aspirations (especially progress in delivering a national policing strategy for the IPS) and determine the extent to which these are being satisfied by the Coalition and identify any shortcomings in the UK's contribution.

3.4 At the outset it was recognised that those elements of IPS reform strategy which require the close engagement of the Iraqi government (notably tackling the influence of the militias on the IPS and rooting out inappropriate members in the IPS) would, in large part, need to await the hopefully imminent installation of a new Iraqi government.

Key questions

3.5 During the course of my review, and based upon my preliminary assessment of the key issues, the original terms of reference evolved into a clear focus upon the following overarching issues, namely:

- The strategic direction and integration of the SSR (policing) effort;
- The efficiency and effectiveness of the SSR (policing) effort, including the Carabinieri, in MND(SE);
- The effectiveness of the existing training arrangements.

3.6 I have not chosen to treat the views and contribution of the Iraqis themselves as a heading in its own right. I see this as such an important issue that, for me, it should permeate all consideration.

3.7 This report will address each of the questions in turn and will also seek to identify the critical success factors that will be vital if the rule of law is to endure beyond the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq. It builds upon my interim report of 13th December and, where appropriate, my earlier findings have been consolidated within this document.

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 The methodology underpinning this report can be broken down into four distinct elements:

- Analysis of written documents supplied in advance of my visits
- Interviews with key opinion formers
- Interviews with front-line staff and service deliverers
- Analysis of supplementary material provided during my visits.

4.2 In discharging this commission I was able to visit Iraq on two occasions, the first being between 20th to 25th November, when I was able to visit CPATT, the Ministry of Interior and the UK Embassy in Baghdad as well as visiting MND(SE) and the UK Consulate in Basra itself; and the second between 3rd to 8th January when, in addition to meeting key FCO and military figures, I was also able to visit three of the four southern provinces, including the Carabinieri in Dhi-Qar. In addition, I was able to visit the Joint International Police Training Centre (JIPTC) in Jordan. Throughout both visits I placed a premium upon being able to interview a cross-section of key Iraqi government and IPS figures.

Acknowledgements

4.3 I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the assistance and hospitality extended by the UK, US, Italian and Iraqi military, diplomatic and security/policing establishments throughout my two visits to the country. The coalition staff I met exhibited a strong sense of duty, courage, professionalism and public service as well as a commitment to positive change. This was replicated amongst many of the key Iraqi personnel that I was fortunate to meet. This report is intended to contribute to a process which will enable them to make an even greater contribution to SSR (policing) in Iraq.

4.4 I would also like to place on record my appreciation of the tireless work of Chief Constable Paul Kemaghan, Chief Constable of Hampshire, and ACPO lead for International policing. Since the end of the conflict he has been ceaseless in his effort to maximise the UK input to policing in Iraq (and indeed elsewhere). He has been a most valuable source of advice to me.

4.5 In completing this commission I have received valuable support from Assistant Inspector of Constabulary Huw Jones and Chief Superintendent Ian Quinton from HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. During both visits I was also fortunate to be accompanied by a number of military and FCO colleagues who added an important dimension to this assessment and who played their part in bringing this work to a conclusion. They were as follows:

- Brigadier Colin Boag
- Wing Commander Afzal Ashraf (seconded to FCO)
- Lt Colonel Ben Farrell
- Commander Simon Huntington RN
- Lt Colonel Ian Harrison
- Lt Colonel Kearn Main

5. CONTEXTUAL ISSUES

5.1 It is vital that the SSR (policing) effort is placed into its correct context. Across Whitehall, and indeed within the country at large, there is already a good appreciation of the ethnic, tribal and religious dimension in Iraq. I do not intend to expand on these further. One of the more pernicious after-effects of the previous regime is the use of 'divide and rule' policies and the high levels of distrust present in many organisations. During the course of my second visit I came across an example of where a senior IPS officer indicated his intention to dispense with an entire layer of middle managers. While the stated purpose of this was to 'flatten' the organisational hierarchy, I was left with the clear impression that the real 'driver' for this change was the fear they would combine to plot against him!

5.2 To this should also be added within the tribal dimension, the issue of 'honour' and the obligations that go with it. This is particularly important given the dire state of the economy and the high levels of unemployment.

5.3 The other contextual issue that can be easily overlooked is the framework within which the policing and justice functions are delivered. The former is still loosely based on the British colonial model whilst the latter more resembles the European (Napoleonic) system of an investigative judiciary. For those who are more familiar with the 'common law' system this can and has led to conceptual problems in fully understanding the respective roles of the police and judiciary in Iraq. This has direct implications for training and other SSR (policing) initiatives. This point is, perhaps, illustrated by the fact that the cross-Whitehall SSR (policing) group, which we created upon me being given this task, has standing items on the agenda requiring progress reports from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence, but not the Ministry of Justice.

5.4 Neither should the existence of the Border Police (DBE) and the Facilities Protection Police (FPS) be overlooked as both represent the existence of significant numbers of additional staff with 'policing' responsibilities and yet who do not fall directly within the Iraqi Police Service's (IPS) chain of command. These bodies did not come within my purview during my two visits to Iraq, but their presence – particularly as an alternative power base – must be fully appreciated. This is already the case within MND(SE), where there is a recognition that ultimate success will depend upon the ability of each of the security agencies to play their part in delivering a joined-up approach to security.

6. THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION AND INTEGRATION OF THE SSR (POLICING) EFFORT

6.1 There are two dimensions to this heading. The first relates directly to the overall policy direction being pursued by the coalition, notably within MNSTC-I, CPATT and MND(SE), whilst the second relates directly to the key strategic decisions in relation to the future control of policing and the need to confront 'head-on' issues of quality, numbers and integrity that must be faced by the incoming Iraqi government and in particular, the next Minister of the Interior.

Strategic issues facing the coalition

6.2 I am concerned that at a national level there is no overarching blueprint for SSR (policing): I have found references to at least four different strategies but have not been able to determine whether there is one single strategy that underpins the effort. Moreover, none of the documents I have seen sufficiently address the judicial dimension. Ensuring that 'justice is done' is central to establishing the rule of law and is particularly important in Iraq given the role played by the investigative judiciary.

6.3 I am encouraged this issue has been recognised at CPATT and that a broad strategic plan is now apparently under development. The Iraqis should be intimately involved in this process and I fully endorse the ethos behind CPATT's 'MOI Partnership Plan' which emphasises the importance of joint working; indeed the welcome participation of the Ministry of the Interior in the recent debate over the future of the special police battalions is a pointer towards what can be achieved.

6.4 Until now I have, however, noted perhaps a little reluctance within the coalition to acknowledge any shortcomings of the past three years and, where appropriate, to break new ground. In progressing this it is vital that the new strategic plan focuses on conceptual issues such as the role and place of policing in a newly democratic Iraq as much as it does the logistical detail of ensuring the assets it will require are in place. If not there will be a real risk that, in contrast to received business wisdom, 'function will follow form' and the opportunity to achieve a coherent vision for policing reform will be lost. The recent adoption of the Police Essential Tasklist (PETL) is a welcome move in so far as it defines in far greater detail what the IPS should be capable of. What it does not address is the actual effect, in terms of policing outcomes, this investment should deliver.

6.5 Until recently the vacuum has been filled by a focus upon numbers, specifically the recruitment and training of 135,000 police officers³. The lack of focus upon quality has had dire results and has led to the recruitment of undesirable elements ranging from those who have clear allegiances to the various militias, through those who had criminal records under the old regime, to those who are illiterate and thus unable to perform the most basic tasks. I

³ When the various special police units are added to the calculation the official establishment is just over 200,000.

am encouraged that these qualitative issues, particularly in relation to the need for effective vetting procedures, are being recognised. Moreover, though I did not see much robust evidence of its operation I further note that a national Qualifying Committee still apparently operates in Baghdad. **Much remains to be done and even now, there in my view remains an unhealthy focus on quantitative measures of performance.**

Recommendation 1

It is my recommendation that the Iraqis should be encouraged to build on existing activity and develop a robust, centrally managed vetting system for IPS recruits as soon as possible and to take immediate action to 'root out' corrupt and sub-standard elements within the IPS. In progressing this the UK will need to provide support and expert guidance.

6.6 Of even greater concern is that the Ministry of Interior has allowed, or more probably encouraged, the recruitment of additional police units over and above the Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE). I was told by two police chiefs that the primary purpose of this is to apparently alleviate the chronic unemployment that exists in many provinces. Often termed 'pop up' battalions, these units sit almost entirely outside the existing programmes to train and equip the IPS and have raised its overall strength quite considerably. For example, within Muthanna the MTOE is 1960, whilst the actual number of police is closer to 5,600! Little is known of the individuals who have come together in these new units, but it would be wise to assume that at least some are little more than personal militias and must therefore pose a substantial threat to the rule of law. Whilst it would seem that the majority of these units sit outside mainstream policing, their mere existence risks diluting the impact of the SSR police training programme. **Moreover, should evidence later emerge that they are committing human rights abuses, the media may well infer that they were recruited and trained by the coalition.**

6.7 At a wider level the burden of paying for these additional police will almost certainly have implications for the Ministry of Interior's budget. At present the monies appear to be coming from the maintenance budgets, with the inevitable impact upon the IPS's infrastructure, but looking to the future there is a real risk that the entire budget will have been spent by August 2006. If this is so, no-one is yet certain how the police will be funded after this date.

6.8 The apparent failure to anticipate the problems caused by the presence of rogue elements in the IPS and the creation of the 'pop up' battalions reinforces the concerns I outlined in my interim report that insufficient attention is being paid to intelligence as a key strategic issue. It remains the case that whilst the majority of SSR (policing) functions fall within CPATT's remit, intelligence is the preserve of MINF-I 'C2' department. Albeit from limited information, it would seem the current focus reflects the military approach that in his recent book, 'The Utility of Force', General Sir Rupert Smith categorises

as collection of information on "items and intentions"⁴. This stands in contrast to the police approach to criminal and community intelligence which places a premium on collecting and analysing data on power structures and networks, signal events and environmental impact factors. Within this context the apparent moves to increase the military's presence in CPATT and other SSR (policing) bodies may not be the most productive approach. Perhaps what is needed is a different perspective and a new strategic approach to identifying the intelligence requirement in relation to insurgent and militia activity and then ensuring sufficient assets are in place to meet this requirement and analyse the resultant product. Though a tactical level initiative, the 'TIPS' project in Baghdad and the ethos underpinning it points a useful way forward. I was pleased to note that building upon this success, proposals are now in hand to replicate it in Basra. This is a valuable initiative and I would be disappointed if the recent momentum that has been achieved to create 'TIPS' in Basra was not very soon a reality.

Recommendation 2

It is my recommendation that the UK should encourage MNF-I to transfer responsibility for criminal and counter insurgency intelligence to CPATT and further, that its subsequent development activity reflect the community intelligence ethos.

6.9 Notwithstanding some concern that there could be greater corporacy at a strategic level, the situation in MND(SE) is far more encouraging. Here, I found real evidence that the early disconnect between the military and CivPol efforts is already becoming a thing of the past. Both bodies are now firmly signed up to the 'Southern Iraq: IPS - Transition Plan' and the five strategic themes that underpin it⁵. It is further encouraging to note that the Italians also acknowledge the importance of the strategic themes and that even within CPATT, the utility of the Transitional Plan is now apparently recognised. Although it would benefit from being refreshed the overall plan is sound and points the way forward.

6.10 At the operational level there is growing evidence of effective inter-agency working between CPATT and the SSR (policing) function in MND(SE). I am particularly encouraged to note that within MND(SE) a CPATT representative now sits within the UK Provost Marshal's office to co-ordinate activity and that plans are in motion to integrate CPATT International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO) within the Police Transition Teams (PTTs). The situation within Baghdad is also improving with two Chief Superintendents and one Superintendent now embedded there. Their presence has boosted the UK's ability to assist in this critical area and looking to the future I see merit in

⁴ Gen. Sir Rupert Smith - The Utility of Force (2005) p. 125

⁵ These are: 1) Luring; 2) Police Support Infrastructure; 3) Intelligence Capability; 4) Operational Capability; 5) Police Support

the additional deployment of an ACPO⁶ level (1star equivalent) officer to CPATT. This is an issue I shall return to in chapter 7.

6.11 In my interim report I contrasted the apparent success that has been achieved with the Iraqi Army with the difficulties being experienced in building the IPS. Policing is conducted amongst the people. It is a very complex and dynamic endeavour and to be successful it is vital that police have primacy in domestic security issues. The lack of police input at the strategic planning level may explain, at least in part, this dissonance. I fully endorse the moves to place senior UK police officers within coalition military command infrastructure, but it is also apparent to me that similar arrangements should be put in place within PJHQ Northwood. This will help to ensure that the police service's needs and perspective are accommodated at the mission planning and execution stages. General Sir Rupert Smith's perspective on this issue is valuable and in particular his view is that *"In considering the plan, it must be clear that the answers to the questions lie with a wide range of agencies, of which the military are but one, and maybe only a minor one at that"*. Building further upon this point he added *"However, in our modern conflicts, dealing with the civil population is directly associated with the objective and is a primary not a secondary activity"*⁷.

Recommendation 3

It is therefore my recommendation that for this and future deployments a senior police officer of Chief Superintendent rank should be embedded within PJHQ.

Strategic Issues for the Iraqi government

6.12 From the Iraqi perspective two strategic issues dominate the horizon, namely the question of the extent to which the centre has, and should have, the ability to exert control over the IPS⁸, and their need to tackle the twin issues of over-staffing and the removal of undesirable elements from the service. The thread linking the two is that of the need for effective governance structures that can impose uniform standards and operating practices. These are lacking at present and as a consequence, at a provincial level the success of the local IPS is very much dependant upon the quality and character of both the Chief of Police and the Governor and the effectiveness of their working relationship. In the future it is vital, in my view, that the Ministry of the Interior has the ability, without undermining operational independence, to maintain corporacy and good governance.

6.13 One of the first tests of the new Minister of the Interior and his officials will be their willingness to tackle the rogue elements in the various Basra

⁶ The membership of the Association of Chief Police Officers comprises Chief Constables, Deputy Chief Constables and Assistant Chief Constables and their equivalent in the Metropolitan and City police services. It can be argued the ranks equate to Lt General, Major General and Brigadier respectively.

⁷ Gen. Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force* (2005) p. 385

⁸ *ibid* p.387

⁹ The existing Iraqi Constitution envisages a national force but controlled at a provincial/local level.

police intelligence agencies (the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA), the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) and Criminal Investigation Unit (CIU)) that are being pursued through Operation CORRODE¹⁰. The previous decision by the Ministry to disband the DIA was little more than a compromise that dispersed the central characters elsewhere within the IPS. It is estimated that the hard core comprise no more than 20 individuals and their removal will have a disproportionate impact as it will allow the silent and generally well intentioned majority, who have previously been acquiescent out of fear, to assert themselves.

Recommendation 4

It is my recommendation that the US and UK use whatever influence is available to them to ensure that the next Minister of the Interior has a sound appreciation of the scale of the challenges and, moreover is willing to take decisive action to address them.

6.14 In parallel, the Minister will also need to take prompt action to disband the 'pop up' battalions and ensure that future recruiting and vetting processes are sufficiently robust. Assuming many of the majority of these were indeed created merely to provide employment then, as long as alternative schemes can be set in place, the transition will be capable of being managed smoothly. It is my view that all of the cities I visited would benefit enormously from an effective public works programme.

6.15 Within this context of the challenges now facing the Ministry of Interior the ongoing efforts by CPATT, DFID (including the secondment of a senior member of the Home Office) and CivPol to build capacity and capability within the Ministry are to be welcomed and should be expanded upon. Certainly, any failure within the Ministry to address these issues will imperil the entire SSR (policing) programme.

Recommendation 5

It is my recommendation that the coalition treats the creation of governance capacity within, and close liaison between, the Ministries of Interior, Defence and Justice as a priority and invests in such accordingly.

6.16 A likely catalyst for ensuring that the Ministry of Interior takes ownership of policing is the creation and adoption of the long awaited National Policing Plan. This will provide the Iraqis with the opportunity to articulate their vision of how policing should look and to set their own priorities. I believe that, for understandable reasons elements within CPATT are proposing that they should assume primary responsibility for drafting an Iraqi National Policing Plan and indeed that there has been consultation with the current Minister of Interior in this regard. While I see the need to press on with

¹⁰ For further description of Operation CORRODE please see paragraph 6.11

progress, I would suggest that this product should be seen as a draft to be commended to the Iraqis and that the final product should be an Iraqi produced and owned initiative – of course this should not preclude the provision of expert support and guidance where appropriate and I note a senior UK police officer is presently seconded within the Ministry for this purpose. Recent experience, such as in the move to create an officer cadet training school in Baghdad, suggests that once they assume control the Iraqis can be quick to dispense with anything they do not have real ownership of. I acknowledge this may delay the creation of a National Policing Plan, but believe this is a risk worth taking.

Recommendation 6
It is my recommendation that the US be encouraged to allow the Iraqi government lead responsibility for the National Policing Plan. This should be led by the new Minister of Interior in consultation with the 18 provincial Chiefs of Police. In progressing this the coalition must of course provide expert advice and guidance and perhaps the suggested draft.

Defining and measuring success

6.17 The above issues bring into sharp focus one of the key strategic challenges facing the UK and the wider coalition, namely 'How do we define success?' I am firmly of the view that we have been guilty of being too aspirational. This is evident at a number of levels and in particular, has given rise to the impression that we will be creating a first world police force in an otherwise troubled region. It is clear that we (by which I mean the Government and the media) need to understand that we will not be building 'Surrey Police' in Iraq. **Instead, our goal should be to create a body that is fit for purpose, that respects human rights and democracy and which bears favourable comparison with its peers in the region.** The MND(SE) mission statement focuses on creating an 'acceptable IPS' and there is much to commend this 'strap line'. Though over 175 years old there is still a resonance in the original mission statement given by Sir Robert Peel to the Constabulary of Ireland upon its creation in 1822 (seven years before he created what was to become the Metropolitan Police Service in London). The overall objectives were to:

- Protect life
- Protect property
- Preserve the peace
- Prevent crime
- Detect crime

6.18 The same dynamic is evident in some of the SSR (policing) initiatives that are being pursued at an operational level. Certainly, I have noted a tendency to pursue technically advanced solutions and theoretical models at the expense of practical outcomes. For example, one of the International Policing Advisors I met in Basra stated the IPS did not need computers as

these would be novelties that would probably be sold, broken or ignored, what they actually needed were desks, pens and paper (While of course we must help them to assume appropriate technological solutions I personally saw some evidence of the point being made in a number of Station visits I made)! The problem can be addressed I feel, by ensuring that greater flexibility to design and implement bespoke local solutions is delegated to the brigade level SSR (policing) function.

Recommendation 7

It is my recommendation that greater flexibility to design and implement bespoke solutions be delegated to the brigade level SSR (policing) function.

6.19 There is a significant amount of monitoring activity, however, too much of this is focused upon gathering quantitative data. For example the assessments of the training provided to the IPS are based on throughput, or outputs, rather than on the subsequent utility and effectiveness of that training.

6.20 The danger of focusing on the numbers trained is that there is no guarantee they are still serving within the IPS. Successive Provost Marshal's have visited virtually all of the police stations throughout the provinces of Mulhanna, Maysaan and Basra and none has found a single graduate from JIPTC, this despite the fact that significant numbers of IPS have been trained there. I hope that a possible explanation for this is not that upon return to Iraq they became disillusioned and simply left the service.

6.21 The same trend is apparent in CPATT's Police Station Monthly Report (PSMR) scorecard system for monitoring the development of the IPS and which focuses on whether or not equipment and staff are in place, rather than on their actual effectiveness. Moreover, it would appear this is a bureaucratic process and one International Policing Advisor estimated it consumed 30% of his time. In some areas the burden is shared with military colleagues and the looming deployment of CPATT International Police Liaison Officers will probably see them assume responsibility for these assessments. I further note the shortcomings of this system, which nevertheless provides a valuable audit function, are recognised. At brigade level the ability exists to make qualitative judgments on effectiveness that can lead to the overall assessment of a particular IPS station or command being downgraded.

6.22 The recent adoption of the Police Essential Tasklist (PETL) offers the opportunity to make more qualitative assessments of the IPS progress, but care will have to be taken that it does not come to rely on counting numbers and processes rather than actual outcomes.

7. THE EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SSR (POLICING) EFFORT, INCLUDING THE CARABINIERI, IN MND(SE)

7.1 Within this heading I make a clear distinction between efficiency, which is chiefly concerned with ensuring that existing human and financial resources are joined-up and are being put to good use, and effectiveness, which assesses the actual impact of this effort within the four southern provinces.

The efficiency of the SSR (policing) effort – Inter-agency co-operation

7.2 My interim report welcomed the moves in late 2005 to achieve greater co-ordination of the military, CivPol and ArmourGroup effort and in particular the creation of the Police Military Coordination Groups (PMCG)¹¹. At the time, I commented that the momentum needed to be maintained and I am pleased to report this has indeed been the case. As I hoped and indeed expected, the embedding of CivPol officers within the divisional and brigade level SSR (policing) operations sections has achieved a much needed synergy that has been reinforced by the strategic and operational PMCGs. The clarification that responsibility for the overall direction of ArmourGroup's contribution rests with CivPol commanders has also been beneficial. In many ways these welcome developments reflect the Police and Military 'jointery' which worked so well in Northern Ireland and it is my recommendation they should be regularised as standard operating practice. (As I will address later, this is an approach we should be doing all in our power to encourage between the Iraqi Police and Military) Certainly, any future move to alter the balance that has been achieved could be counter-productive.

Recommendation B

It is my recommendation that the existing joint working arrangements, delivered through the Coordination Group, is regularised as standard operating practice for the delivery of SSR within MND(SE).
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7.3 It is also clear that the Transitional Plan truly drives activity and a good illustration of this is that SSR (policing) activity now accounts for at least 47% of the military's activity and that figure is rising (This is a significant improvement even upon the position as in December). As further evidence of this focus I was encouraged to note that amongst military colleagues in MND(SE) there is a welcome emphasis upon building counter-insurgency (COIN) capability.

7.4 Notwithstanding these positive developments tensions still exist over where primacy for the SSR (policing) effort rests and what, in practical/management terms, this means. Despite the announcement that the Ministry of Defence would assume overall responsibility for SSR (policing) I have yet to see written confirmation of this and certainly, the view in theatre is that there is still a lack of clarity at departmental level in Whitehall as to where managerial responsibility for a range of issues rests. Put simply the

¹¹ This co-ordination of activity has been codified Operation FUS by the UK military.

shift in thinking that should have followed the assumption by MOD of primacy for SSR in Iraq has not yet permeated all activity. Perhaps as a consequence of this, I have noted that confusion seemingly exists in a number of what should be non-controversial areas. For example, in the immediate aftermath of my second visit I noted that different views existed on the status of the movement restrictions placed on the CivPol officers and also in relation to the priority afforded to ArmorGroup staff when using air transport, albeit this last issue has now seemingly been resolved.

7.5 Clarification is needed. Again the Northern Ireland experience may offer a way forward. There, as the situation allowed a move to the establishment of police primacy it became very helpful for all concerned to agree and abide by certain operational definitions. For example, it was the police role to establish 'the rule of law'. It was the Military role to provide police with whatever assistance was necessary in this regard. In this context it was indeed agreed that 'control' was defined as control of what was done, and 'command' was defined in terms of how tasks were achieved and therefore related to the integrity of chain of command within each organisation. While I accept that the current situation in Iraq generally is very different to that existing in Northern Ireland when moves to police primacy were initiated, the situation in MND(SE) is not so starkly different. In any case, I am certain that clarity of understanding is all important. In this regard it may in fact be better not to use terms such as 'control' and 'command' and instead express the position in terms such as follows. **Within a framework where the GOC has overall responsibility for the direction of SSR police reform, the implementation of such should rest with CivPol, with military colleagues supporting and facilitating the actual service delivery where appropriate.**

7.6 The efficiency of these arrangements would I believe, be significantly further improved if the head of the UK CivPol contingent (the Chief Police Advisor – Iraq, or CPA-I) were embedded with the GOC within MND(SE) where he or she would equate to a brigade commander. The current CPA-I is based in Baghdad and performs, inter alia, the role of advisor to the Ambassador. His role is complemented by the existence of an additional policing advisor at Basra who is located within the UK Consulate and not at MND(SE) headquarters. The looming replacement of the CPA-I has created the opportunity to address this issue and, given the priority now attached to policing reform in MND(SE), it is my recommendation that the CPA-I's successor should be re-deployed and should function within the MND(SE) command structure where he or she will be able to manage the SSR (policing) effort¹².

¹² The process in regard to a successor to the existing CPA-I is already underway and the job specification and attendant terms of conditions will need to be altered to reflect this recommendation if it is accepted.

Recommendation 9

It is my recommendation that the CPA-I's successor should be re-deployed and should function within the MND(SE) command structure where he or she will be able to direct the SSR (policing) effort.

7.7 The existing post of police advisor to the Consul General is now probably superfluous and risks becoming a distraction to the main effort. I am of the view this post can be transferred to Baghdad to command the various elements of the UK contingent serving there. This individual will also have proximity to the Ambassador and be able to provide advice on policing issues when required. I believe such restructuring would bring greater coherence to the UK policing contribution within Iraq and in particular to the four southern provinces.

7.8 My overall impression of the quality of the CivPol and ArmorGroup contribution is that it is high, though clearly some individuals are stronger than others. Amongst the CivPol contingent I was originally surprised at the predominance of retired officers, although I fully appreciate that this is as a result of a reluctance of many serving officers to volunteer or in some cases a reluctance of their Chief Constables or Police Authorities to approve their deployment, as current law requires. Most of these colleagues are employed at a 'rank' higher than that held whilst they were still serving. It does not follow that their contribution is any less significant than that of serving officers. Indeed I must express my deepest admiration of the contribution such colleagues are making. To ensure however, that we have the greatest 'currency' of policing theory and practice available in theatre I will personally do all I can to encourage greater participation in this and similar overseas missions, by serving colleagues.

7.9 I am concerned about the coordination of activity in relation to the judicial dimension and in particular, the role of Investigative judges. In theatre there is some recognition of this. Judges are accommodated within existing training programmes and, in some areas, benefit from liaison meetings with IPA and even IPS colleagues. My sense, however, is that too little import has been given to the significance of the investigative judiciary to Iraq's judicial system. In contrast to states whose legal system is based on common law they are much more involved in the intricacies of criminal investigations. In providing training in the investigation of serious crime to police CPATT/MND(SE) it may just be that this is not fully taken into account. This is not to say that police should not receive this training - of course they should. In my view however it is also clear that the judiciary and their aides also require such input. If, as I was informed by a leading Magistrate, the Ministry of Justice acts to create a Judicial Police that will have a prime responsibility for investigating serious crime, then it may be necessary to re-evaluate the wider SSR (policing) programme to ensure a seamless approach between police and judiciary. Here again, 'capacity building' in

all relevant Ministries and great encouragement for them to work in harmony, I see as a vital function for the Coalition.

Recommendation 10
It is my recommendation that that the judicial dimension should be fully integrated within the SSR effort.

7.10 Interestingly CPATT is not the sole source of training for judges as I have also established that the European Union 'JUSTLEX' mission has an extensive training programme for Iraqi judges and senior police officers, as well as Prison Governors. These four week courses are delivered within mainland Europe and the organisers anticipate a throughput in excess of 500 students by June 2006. The business case that underpins this training makes no mention of the CPATT or MNSTC-I contribution to the wider SSR (policing) picture and **it is imperative that the training of judges is fully co-ordinated and integrated within the overall SSR (policing) programme.** Moreover, in researching the 'JUSTLEX' mission it further became apparent that other European nations are also providing bespoke training to the various Iraqi legal and security services. Greater clarity and cohesion are urgently needed. A former colleague of mine, Mr. Stephen White is doing what I consider to be outstanding work as head of the JUSTLEX mission and is fully engaged in this area.

Recommendation 11
It is my recommendation that an audit of all training be undertaken to ensure that a clear picture exists and that, as far as is possible, all such training is consistent with, and aligned to, the overall goal of SSR (policing).

The efficiency of the SSR (policing) effort – resource usage

7.11 My overall impression is that the human resources (CivPol and IPAs) dedicated to SSR (policing) were commensurate to the situation as it was in 2005. Within the context of the vastly improved relationship between the military and the civilian police effort and the likely demands of the 'Year of the Police' I do not believe this is still the case. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are now significantly more missions than there are IPAs, indeed the ArmorGroup coordinator recently estimated that out of necessity he was declining some of the military's requests for IPA support. This suggests an unhelpful shortfall and whilst I do not have the detailed knowledge of the various initiatives to provide an accurate assessment of how many additional IPAs and/or CivPol officers would be needed to achieve a step change, the CPA-I's estimate that an additional 25 are needed may not be too far off the mark. It would be my view that this additional investment would give a needed and timely impetus to the 'Year of the Police' and would provide a 'surge to transition' capacity.

7.12 This additional investment would be complemented by the anticipated boost to the CPATT contingent in MND(SE) and the opportunity created by

the likely drawdown from Muthanna in late spring that will allow for the re-deployment substantial resources to Basra. This will be timely and will allow for the re-building of the Basra intelligence agencies as Operation CORRODE progresses.

7.13 As previously mentioned a limited number of staff are also now deployed in CPATT in Baghdad, where they have been integrated into its command structure. This represents a significant investment, but it is one which has enabled the UK to bring its expertise to bear. As a consequence it is clear that CPATT now places a greater weight on the UK view and this has had a positive impact upon policy development. In part these developments also reflect the role of General Peterson, who clearly has a good understanding of the issues and whose high reputation is very clearly justified. I support the deployment of an ACPO officer (one star equivalent) to CPATT, but see this as a longer term aspiration; the priority lies in re-deploying the head of contingent to MND(SE) as outlined in paragraph 7.6. Subject to being able to find a suitable candidate of ACPO rank willing to serve within CPATT, it is my view he or she would be the logical successor to the UK Brigadier who by agreement with the US presently serves as the Commanding General's deputy. Certainly, I am firmly of the view that the body charged with progressing police reform in Iraq is able to benefit from the police perspective at the highest echelons of its decision making functions.

7.14 I am also concerned that the resources in theatre are not yet being deployed to best effect. Two issues stood out during my visit, namely the ongoing restrictions on the movement of CivPol, and ArmorGroup; and the conditions of employment enjoyed by the CivPol officers.

7.15 I was very disappointed to discover that notwithstanding evidence of clear progress, movement restriction remains a contentious issue. Hitherto it had been my impression that during my previous visit an agreement in principle had been reached. As matters stand, and despite having access to exactly the same intelligence and risk assessments as the military, the FCO is still applying its own criteria. Whilst the military's policy can be considered as 'risk aware', that pursued by the FCO is best described as 'risk averse'. The most recent example of this was the decision to 'lock-down' the UK contingent at JIPTC in Jordan following a threat to our embassy there. My understanding is that briefing from London specifically stated there was no threat to JIPTC. This approach damages the SSR (policing) effort and undermines the credibility of the CivPol and ArmorGroup staff and is a good case study of what can occur when there is confusion over where primacy lies. The almost unanimous view in theatre amongst these officers is that they would be quite content to operate on the basis of the military's risk assessments and it is my recommendation that the decision to place areas 'out of bounds' should rest with the GOC.

Recommendation 12

It is my recommendation that the decision to place areas as 'Out of Bounds' should rest with the GOC, not the FCO.

7.16 Linked to this issue is the priority accorded to CivPol and especially ArmorGroup officers when seeking to travel with military air assets, both within MND(SE) and when travelling into and out of theatre. Hitherto, ArmorGroup officers apparently only rated a low priority status and thus frequently find themselves 'bumped off' flights and it was not uncommon for them to be marooned for days at a time. I understand this has now been addressed and I shall be looking for confirmation the situation has improved. This issue is but a symptom of a wider problem, namely the lack of sufficient assets in theatre to meet air transport requirements; during my visit I also came across examples of military staff engaged in SSR work that were similarly restricted in their ability to move about in theatre. I am aware this issue has already been raised in other fora, but it is important that I emphasise its significance. Those engaged directly in SSR activity have key roles to play and unnecessary or prolonged absences are not without consequences at a time when SSR is such a high priority.

7.17 It may also be necessary to address the terms and conditions that apply to CivPol officers, particularly in relation to their entitlement to two weeks leave in every eight. Once the complexities of travel are accounted for this can equate to between 25%-30% of an officer's entire secondment and can significantly impact continuity. In contrast, the arrangements for both the military and FCO are less impactful. Whilst I fully recognise the importance of attractive terms and conditions to recruitment it is nevertheless my opinion that this issue needs to be re-visited with a view to establishing a more equitable balance - for example allowing an officer to take one period of leave 'in tour' and the rest at the end of their tour would limit the dislocation. The ideal solution, which would be supported by the CPA-1, would be to mirror the military's arrangements. Moreover, in order to preserve continuity it is also vital that the key players in the SSR (policing) effort stagger manage the leave they do take to minimise the disruption caused by multiple absences.

7.18 Taken together the above paragraphs have caused me to look again at the findings of the Strategic Taskforce on International Policing, of which I was a member. The present commitment in Iraq pre-dates the publication of the Taskforce's recommendations and I am now of the view that we did not adequately address one of the central issues, namely the creation of a UK police 'expeditionary capability'. Neither has it enabled the existing resources to be deployed to their maximum utility. There may therefore be value in re-convening the Taskforce with the goal of creating a genuine police expeditionary capability operating within a framework that provides maximum support to overseas SSR (policing) deployments. One potential solution to this dilemma would be to specifically fund the recruitment of additional appropriately skilled officers within each contributory Home Office police force who can, and will, be capable of being deployed overseas on FCO sanctioned missions without being subject to the existing constraints. I do not underestimate the constitutional implications of such a move, but policing cannot be allowed to continue to punch beneath its weight in future overseas deployments that are otherwise seen as a priority for 'UK plc'.

Recommendation 13

<p>It is my recommendation that the Strategic Taskforce be re-convened with the goal of creating a genuine police expeditionary capability operating within a framework that provides maximum support to overseas SSR (policing) deployments.</p>
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7.19 The other key resource deployment issue is in relation to the use of the financial support that is available to repair and enhance the IPS's infrastructure. My visit to Muthanna's police training school and to the Warren site in Basra demonstrated just how effective these funds can be when spent wisely, however, it is apparent that best use is not being made of this valuable resource: the budget is under-spent and too many police stations are still in a parlous condition.

7.20 This can be attributed to two main factors, the first being the understandable concern to ensure there is a proper audit trail for expenditure and that monies are not diverted for other purposes and the second being the apparent confusion that exists in some quarters over how to apply for and access these monies. In a variety of focus groups staff made the point that the provision of basic amenities, such as office furniture and equipment can provide a timely answer to the question "What has the UK done for us"? Neither of the obstacles are insurmountable; this is an important issue and needs to be prioritised accordingly.

The effectiveness of the SSR (policing) effort

7.21 In considering the overall situation in MND(SE) it is important to understand that the four provinces are all different and that there is no 'one size fits all' solution.

7.22 Within MND(SE) one of the greatest challenges remains the need to tackle rogue elements within the Basra intelligence agencies. In my interim report I commended Major General Dutton's three point plan¹³ to address this problem. The first strand has since evolved into Operation CORRODE, which not only aims to remove the rogue elements, but also plans to rebuild the Basra intelligence agencies as centres of excellence once this has been achieved. Such is the importance of this operation that the GOC has taken ownership of it, which in turn will help to ensure that its significance is not lost at Corps/MNF-I level. I fully endorse and commend the stance the GOC has taken and consider this operation to be vital to the overall success of the SSR (policing) effort in the MND(SE). While it was to be hoped that such action should have had complete Iraqi 'buy-in' I am aware of the very recent reaction of the Governor of Basra to a number of recent significant arrests. It is my firm view that we must remain robust and resolute in the face of any such local resistance.

¹³ These were: 1) Removal of bad elements; 2) Severance package and biometric capture; 3) Training/culture change.

7.23 In addition to undesirable elements of the IPS already recruited and trained by the coalition, I am aware that the 'pop up' battalions are also an issue in MND(SE). Their removal from the pay-roll could risk overwhelming the second strand of the three point plan. **It is vital that whilst there will be significant cost implications in paying off such inappropriate extra police numbers I feel it must not be allowed to impede the 'weeding out' of undesirables already in the IPS.**

7.24 The other issue that if not addressed risks undermining the SSR (policing) effort is the problem of combating organised crime, particularly smuggling which seems to have become entrenched following the imposition of sanctions on the previous regime. None of the Chiefs of Police that I spoke to considered this a high priority. I also understand why smuggling has not been a top priority for the Coalition. If not vigorously tackled however, the experience from other countries is that the proceeds from such activities can be used to subvert the organs of the state. Given the high levels of corruption that already exist within Iraq this poses a significant risk. The OBE has made encouraging progress but is not yet fully 'fit for purpose' and certainly, the concentrated effort on building capability and capacity in this vital area needs to be maintained into the foreseeable future.

7.25 Before providing a short assessment of each of the provinces in turn it is worth highlighting the areas in which significant progress has been made and which are common throughout the region covered by MND(SE). Foremost amongst these are the Tactical Support Units (TSU) and the Provincial Joint Operation Centres (PJOC).

7.26 The TSUs have earned a good reputation and Intelligence suggests they are far less likely to have either been suborned or otherwise been the target of effective infiltration by the militias and political parties. This is a relative comparison however and none of us can afford to be complacent in this regard. From descriptions of their operations from IPA mentors it is clear the units are effective at small scale but intensive COIN operations and that their expertise and confidence is growing. A strong esprit de corps is also evident and the superior cleanliness of their building suggests a pride in belonging to the unit. Neither are religious tensions particularly apparent and I was given one example where a group of Shia unit members collected sufficient money for a Sunni colleague to have an urgently needed operation in a private hospital after sustaining gunshot wounds in the line of duty.

7.27 The PJOCs are now well established and all exhibit signs of growing capability. The recent general election and before that the national vote on the constitution provided their first real tests and I am pleased to report that, stiffened by coalition support, they 'passed'. The efficient management of public calls and the subsequent police response, not to mention the management of policing operations is one of the building blocks for the provision of an efficient and effective policing service and these developments are most encouraging. My one concern in relation to the PJOCs is the previously mentioned tendency within CPATT to rely upon overly technical solutions. In both of the PJOCs the technical specifications of the newly

planned control rooms were impressive and would be the envy of some forces in the UK. We must make sure that we properly build the ability of the Iraqis to maximise the benefits of such a system, and to sustain its functionality over the long-term, when they are starting from such a low base.

7.28 It is also apparent that the PJOCs have been one of the catalysts for encouraging the emergence of the same 'jointery' between the IPS and the Iraqi Army that we now see between the UK military and the CivPol/ArmorGroup contribution. It is clear that mutual suspicion still exists between the IPS and the Iraqi Army, but this nevertheless represents a significant step forward. Here again the successful handling of the recent general election was a useful validation of the state of cooperation between the security agencies. One of the operations on which I was briefed, envisaged MNF forces providing the outer cordon, the Iraqi Army the inner cordon and the TSU conducting the entry and arrest element of the operation. Such jointery was also critical to security success in the more 'difficult' areas of Northern Ireland, but was of course not necessary in all areas.

Recommendation 14

It is my recommendation that the UK exert its influence to further embed and encourage the concept of joint operating between the IPS and the Iraqi army in areas where the security situation makes this appropriate.

7.29 The general opinion of the average Iraqi recruit is positive, albeit from a low base. The majority would seem to be well intentioned and should yet flourish if the rogue and incompetent elements are excised from the organisation and robust vetting procedures set in place. This latter point is recognised by most of the local Chiefs of Police and, supported by the Coalition, there are encouraging moves to address this issue. Moreover, from a distance it is also easy to overlook the commitment of many Iraqis. My meeting with some IPS officers, particularly those who worked on the Hassan and Carroll cases was a humbling experience. The dangers they and their families face and their willingness to face such danger, demands our full support to them.

7.30 Of the provinces within which the UK has primacy for SSR (policing), Muthanna has in my estimation, made the most progress and exhibits the highest level of Iraqi self-sufficiency. Compared to Maysaan and Basra, the environment is relatively benign (the population is more homogenous and predominantly rural based) and the Chief of Police and Governor are both forward thinking. The former cut an impressive figure, his headquarters was well presented and his office displayed the only performance charts I saw during my two visits. The IPAs further state he regularly holds his staff to account and that he and his subordinate commanders are capable of running operations with little or no support. The Chief himself is keen to secure ongoing coalition support, but I suspect this has more to do with access to resources than anything else. The province is already at Tactical Over-Watch and whilst the transition criteria have not yet been met in full I

judge it is ready for transition to **Operational Over-Watch**. (The reader will be fully familiar with the definitions of Tactical and Operational Over-watch – the latter allowing significant drawing down of In Province resources after an infrastructure has been created allowing us to 'surge' forward again as deemed appropriate.)

7.31 Maysaan may also be close to transition, though for different reasons to Muthanna. The province is already at **Tactical Over-Watch** and is likewise projected to meet the transition criteria on schedule. Where it differs from Muthanna is that in the two main cities the coalition are far less welcome, indeed it may be the case that they are now more part of the problem than the solution and that as much has been already been achieved as was possible in the circumstances. This is not to criticise the SSR (policing) effort there, the majority of the Iraqi police officers themselves still appear to be well disposed towards the coalition and despite an extremely dysfunctional relationship between the Chief of Police and the Governor, the province has largely seen the same advances in joint working, its PJOC and in TSU capability that is evident elsewhere. **In the circumstances Maysaan too should also be capable of moving to Operational Over-Watch at the earliest opportunity.** In coming to this assessment I acknowledge the anxieties that exist in relation to border security. The reality is that the DBE are increasingly capable and, given that our presence on the border is already minimal, I do not believe that the consequent draw-down would be detrimental.

7.32 Basra remains by far the most problematic province with the central issue being the need to tackle the severe difficulties within the various intelligence agencies already dealt with above. The presence of rogue elements within these agencies has precluded the training and mentoring activity that has characterised the SSR (policing) effort elsewhere and such development activity will only be capable of being progressed once the former have been removed. Elsewhere, the tensions between the Chief of Police and the Governor continue to hamstring operational and organisational efficiency and effectiveness. As a consequence I judge it very unlikely that Basra province will meet the transition criteria by May 2006 as was originally envisaged. The transition in the other Provinces should however allow for significant additional concentration on Basra.

The Carabinieri contribution

7.33 The most significant outstanding item from my interim report was my desire to visit Dhi-Qar and to take an operational view on the Carabinieri contribution there and whether this was an approach we should seek to replicate.

7.34 I spent a full day in Dhi-Qar with the Italian Ariete Brigade, of which a Carabinieri MSU battalion is a constituent part. I found my Italian hosts to be very warm, engaging and, one would have to say they presented as operationally impressive. I was provided with a series of thorough briefings that reinforced the message of delivering impressive results in training provision, where most of their targets have already been met, and in mentoring and joint working with the IPS.

7.35 Certainly, it is undeniable that the Carabinieri are a superb resource. A self-contained body, they maintain the ability to self-deploy anywhere within the province and can bring significant numbers to bear on any given problem. The Carabinieri unit alone comprises in excess of 300 men, of whom a substantial minority are dedicated to SSR (policing).

7.36 In assessing the relative value of their contribution it is first necessary to place their apparent achievement into its correct operational context. By the Italian brigade commander's own admission Dhi-Qar is a relatively benign environment. The local population is homogenous (98% Shia, of the same faction) and, almost uniquely, the Chief of Police enjoys a very good working relationship with both the local Governor and the Minister of the Interior, all of them being of the same Shia background.

7.39 During the course of the field visit I did not get the opportunity to observe the IPS policing a demonstration in Nasariyah despite a request to do so and neither was I able to visit the PJOC. With regards to the latter I was told this was because the PJOC was not staffed at the time I was passing, which was in the late afternoon. This came as a surprise as I understood that the PJOCs are staffed on a 24/7 basis. While I was extremely well treated by my hosts I feel I detected a certain determination on their part to carefully guide what I would see. (Care on their part to make sure that I and my party were properly protected may of course have led to that impression on my part. They certainly provided a very high level of protective cover.) I understand

that prior to my visit, efforts by the Provost Marshal to obtain specific data on a number of relevant SSR (policing) issues had met with the response that this was privileged information

7.40 Just as it seems that because MND(SE) has been less operationally problematic than other parts of Iraq it may not heretofore have headed the CPATT priorities, perhaps we, in MND(SE) have taken a similar approach to Dhi-Qar. This may just have led to a gap in our understanding of what exactly is being achieved in comparison to our other Provinces. I know that the GOC is taking a personal interest in the Province and this in my view is very positive.

7.41 My observations on the effectiveness of the Carabinieri should not be taken as being critical of their contribution. They remain a significant and formidable resource and any offer of additional support from the Italians should be grasped without hesitation. Indeed I would support all efforts to actively lobby their continued involvement. Though not in the first tranche, I also see it likely that after Maysaen and Muthanna Dhi-Qar will meet the transitional requirements for the move to Operational Over-Watch. This will in turn create an opportunity to re-deploy the Carabinieri. Political considerations are such that I assume it to be very unlikely that the Italian government will allow them to be deployed outside their own command structure, nor to security operations in one of the more problematic provinces such as Basra. I have previously identified the threat posed by smuggling and, given the ongoing concerns about possible infiltration across the Iranian borders, consider the Carabinieri would be ideally suited to assume responsibility for training and preparing the DBE for its role in guarding Iraq's frontiers.

7.42 It is also appropriate that I address the issue of whether or not the Carabinieri '3rd force' model is more suited to conditions in Iraq than the largely UK model of jointery between an IPS, with TSU capability, and the Iraqi Army that is being developed at present. My judgement is that it is not. I took the opportunity to raise this with a number of the senior IPS officers that I met and they were unanimously of the view that the current arrangements were both the most appropriate and the most familiar to them. Whilst their achievements are tangible it can be argued that the SSR (policing) effort in Muthanna has achieved verifiable results that are at least as impressive, but with significantly fewer resources and within a less benign environment. Even within Basra and Maysaen there are indications that a higher level of self-sufficiency has been achieved than in Dhi-Qar. Moreover, notwithstanding the Carabinieri's experience in paramilitary operations I note that the success of the TSUs is founded on the training provided by UK SSR (policing) practitioners. Overall I consider the model we are pursuing to be a better policing legacy for the new Iraq.

8. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXISTING TRAINING ARRANGEMENTS

8.1 Training is one of the central components within the overall SSR (policing) programme within Iraq. Until recently it would seem that considerable latitude existed in local delivery, however the recent decision by CPATT to deliver Basic Recruit Training at the Joint Training Academy (JTA) at Shaibah may contribute to a more standardised approach. Within this section it is my intention to focus upon this wider picture before assessing the UK's role in training provision.

The wider picture

8.2 Training is one of the areas where the lack of an overarching blueprint for SSR (policing) is most evident. I am concerned that there does not, at any stage, appear to have been a sustained effort to undertake a training needs analysis and the training regime that presently exists, while now vastly improved originated, if I have been accurately briefed, is based on the U.N. policing solution offered in the Balkans, post-conflict there. Matters have risked being made worse by the apparent lack of consistency in training provision across Iraq and even within MND(SE). I suspect, for example that the Italian view of TIP training differs from that provided for the other three provinces by UK personnel. I should, however, stress that in making this assessment I am not taking a view that one approach is superior to the other.

8.3 I was also surprised that strict control of the BRT syllabus rests with the Joint International Police Training Centre (JIPTC) in Jordan and not in theatre. JIPTC benefits from the presence of a large Iraqi contingent, headed by a Brigadier from Baghdad and there are the beginnings of a 'feedback loop', but I would still question JIPTC's ability to remotely contextualise their training packages and I am firmly of the view that that responsibility for the BRT syllabus and the wider training curriculum be transferred to CPATT in Baghdad.

Recommendation 15

It is my recommendation that the US is encouraged to transfer responsibility for the BRT syllabus from JIPTC to CPATT in Baghdad.

8.4 Having spoken to a number of members of staff it is clear that there is little exchange between the trainers and the IPAs and IPLOs in theatre. Some of the UK trainers stated they would find it much easier to relate to their students if they were able to see Iraq at first hand. This makes good sense and it is my recommendation that the necessary processes are set in place to allow those officers who are able to travel to undertake fact-finding visits in theatre. At the very least, each Course should include the latest update to staff and students of the prevailing political and security situation in theatre.

8.5 Though in many respects the presence of 15 different nationalities contributing to training at JIPTC should be viewed as a positive, one consequence is that there can be 15 different ways of doing things and this in itself can impose additional limitations. I am confident that the leadership at

JIPTC will ensure proper direction and coordination to ensure that this is not problematic.

Recommendation 16

It is my recommendation that the necessary processes are set in place to allow those officers who are able to travel to undertake fact-finding visits in theatre.

8.6 The present BRT syllabus exhibits the same tendency towards overly aspirational or complex solutions that is evident in other SSR (policing) activity. The module on democratic ideals is vital to the creation of a cultural and corporate memory of how things should be done, but the operational modules would benefit from a more pragmatic approach. Superficially, these modules are impressive in that they purport to address many of the policing and COIN skills that the IPS need, however, I seriously doubt they are capable of delivering the desired outcome in the very limited time allowed. For example, all students receive training on a variety of tactical firearms techniques and tactics such as 'building entry' and 'search to contact'. In the UK this is the preserve of specialist units who receive substantial training and who practice these skills regularly. Put simply, some of the skills we are trying to train are too sophisticated for the audience and we would be better advised to focus upon basic survival skills. I see this as a 'duty of care' issue and consider the UK military would be well placed to provide this training in theatre should resources permit. I am aware for example, of the very valuable vehicle checkpoint training provided 'in theatre' by the Czech contingent. As briefed to me this is much more valuable to recruits than the input in this area at JIPTC. The overall point to emphasize is the need for continuous operational refresher training.

Recommendation 17

It is my recommendation we should encourage a revision of the BRT syllabus to achieve a better focus upon basic policing and survival skills.

8.7 Training is also prone to the same emphasis upon numbers that is apparent in other strands of the SSR (policing) effort. The management of JIPTC gave the impression that a robust stance was taken in relation to inadequate candidates, but this was contradicted by the trainers who stated that "no-one fails for academic reasons" - this despite the fact that some of their students are semi or wholly illiterate! The explanation for this may lie in the fact that most examinations are oral and are conducted on a group basis. This brings with it problems of its own as there is a severe shortage of Kurdish interpreters - not that this apparently prevents Kurdish students from 'graduating'.

8.8 I would not, however, want the reader to draw the impression that JIPTC, and the SSR (policing) training function is failing. It is not. JIPTC is a most impressive facility and much good work is being done in building capability and capacity. Progress has also been made in a number of key

areas such as the training of Iraqi IPS trainers, who are now capable of delivering lessons, and in the vetting processes that should underpin recruitment.

8.9 The training delivered at the various regional training centres in MND(SE) is variable, but overall should be considered a success. There is evidence of Iraqi buy-in and of the ability of local Chiefs of Police to shape the training according to emerging needs. This is most evident in Muthanna where a high degree of Iraqi self-sufficiency is apparent.

The UK contribution

8.10 The largest single UK training commitment is to JIPTC, where the UK forms the biggest single coalition contingent¹⁴. Regrettably the UK's influence in the running of this fine facility is not commensurate with level of commitment; at present just two of the 15 managerial posts are held by UK officers albeit agreement has recently been reached for the UK to provide either the Chief of Staff or the Deputy Director. Recent changes to terms and conditions in theatre may now also allow for UK staff to fill other managerial posts and the biggest risk is that we will be unable to find suitable candidates. This must not be allowed to happen.

8.11 Amongst the UK training staff¹⁵ I noted a degree of frustration at their apparent inability to influence the syllabus, even to accommodate tactical developments in Iraq such as in relation to current insurgent practice in the use of improvised explosive devices (IED). Concerns were also expressed at the apparent mechanistic approach to training. Some officers gave examples of being asked to teach from lesson plans and from theory in areas of policing where they were not actually skilled or experienced. The officer in charge of the U.K. contingent at JIPTC was present at the focus group where these issues arose and he will be pursuing them with those in charge at the Centre. I am confident that the issues can be effectively addressed there.

8.12 I must stress that all of the UK trainers were very much committed to their role and believed they were making a difference. Many are also exercising their own judgement to ensure that lessons are as relevant as possible given some perceived constraints of the syllabus.

8.13 The situation at the Baghdad Police Academy, the JTA and the regional training centres is encouraging. Here, the UK contingent has played a key role and in particular, has established a real niche for themselves in training specialised skills, notably in relation to forensics, intelligence and major crime investigation.

8.14 Clearly, the above assessment could raise a number of questions over the quality and relevance of the training that is being provided, particularly in relation to the CPATT directed BRF and as a consequence some may question the wisdom of maintaining the present substantial contribution to this

¹⁴ The latest data shows the UK contingent as being 51 strong. The US contingent is 53 strong and the next largest being the Canadians with 13. The British 80 staff at the centre.

¹⁵ These views were expressed in the focus group of approximately 10 UK trainers.

function. I understand these concerns, but note that training is a significant element within SSR (policing) reform and believe a continued commitment to it, if properly handled, will be a springboard to greater influence in a number of key strategic areas.

8.15 There would, however, be value in re-evaluating our priorities. In particular, the decision to deliver BRT at the JTA Shaibah may necessitate an increase in the number of UK trainers deployed there if the training targets are to be met and the UK's lead role maintained. I have received a number of different estimates on the likely resource implications of this and, in the first instance, consider that a full business needs analysis should be undertaken. Given it is unlikely that additional trainers will be deployed from the UK to theatre any solution will largely depend upon our ability to re-deploy existing staff to match the new priority. Of course, any subsequent decision to transfer resources from JIPTC to JTA Shaibah will require careful management of CPATT's sensitivities in this area.

9. CONCLUSIONS

9.1 In many respects the challenge facing us in Iraq appears more daunting from London than it does in theatre. This I attribute to the inevitable difficulty that exists in grasping some of the key contextual factors. The lack of a blueprint for SSR (policing) reform has not helped this dynamic and neither has the absence of a clear appreciation of what success looks like. This helps to explain my assessment that just as the view before the events of 19th September was probably too optimistic so it is that the view post the events of that day was too pessimistic. Critical to achieving a balanced view of the situation is the need to align expectations to the reality of the situation we are facing in Iraq. Lowering expectations, especially amongst a partisan media, will not be easy but it is important to recognise that we can point to real achievements.

9.2 In my interim report I took a stance that could be described as cautiously optimistic. My most recent visit has confirmed me this in view, but has also given me a greater appreciation of the significance of the threats posed by rogue elements in the Basra intelligence agencies and also by the 'pop up' battalions. If not addressed they will imperil the entire SSR (policing) effort. Moreover, whilst they are rightly the focus of considerable coalition activity, the ultimate solution rests with the Iraqis and in particular, the Ministry of Interior. Assuming the next Minister lives up to the burden of expectation the key to success will be the creation of effective governance structures and in this we can indeed make a difference.

9.3 Notwithstanding the reservations I have expressed about the quality of training, intelligence and the other factors that inhibit the SSR (policing) effort, Iraq is on the right path and there is a good news story to be told. From an admittedly low base, Iraq's security forces are now recognisable as such and early signs of self-sufficiency are becoming apparent. Indeed in some areas we may not be far from reaching the point of diminishing returns. The UK can take pride in its contribution.

9.4 The IPS will not resemble a western police force at any point in the near future, but the basic format, modelled on the UK experience, but which needs to fully accommodate Iraq's 'Napoleonic style' legal system, is sound and should be allowed to evolve. This last point is, I feel, particularly important as it reflects growing Iraqi control of their own destiny. I am encouraged that this point has been recognised by the coalition for it is my firm view that the only elements of the SSR (policing) programme that will endure beyond the coalition's departure will be those which enjoy genuine Iraqi ownership and support.

9.5 Of course, success is far from guaranteed. Despite the greater coherence, focus and Iraqi participation in the SSR (policing) effort we are not there yet and, at a wider level much, if not all, depends on the construct, appeal and resolve of the new government. As such, if it would be deemed of value, I am very happy to return to Iraq to assess further progress when the

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new Government and particularly the new Minister of the Interior has been installed.

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