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**FAXED** **PRIME MINISTER**

By fax to Prime Minister at Chequers <sup>14/09</sup> p.m.

4 copies to  
Jonathan  
Aragh  
Stephen  
Matthew  
me

1878

Tachi views on  
content and handling  
of the Resolution  
(with a few marginal  
comments from me)

Iraq: Pursuing the UN Route

Sand 14/9

1. In advance of our discussion on 17 September, which Sir Jeremy Greenstock will also be attending, I thought it would be useful to set out a proposed strategy for achieving our objectives through the UN.
2. In summary, we should:
  - deliver a more intrusive inspection régime which, if Saddam complies, achieves our WMD objectives;
  - demand Iraqi actions not words, within tight deadlines;
  - get all we need into a first Resolution, without either committing ourselves or ruling out a second;
  - persuade President Bush to commit to the heavy lifting necessary to secure Russian acquiescence, while we take the lead with the French;
  - be prepared to run the Resolution ourselves if the US agree, since we are better placed to deliver in the Security Council.
3. It has been clear from my discussions in New York that President Bush's speech has transformed the politics of the issue, at least in the short term. It gives us a huge opportunity. But it will be a highly complex process requiring difficult political judgments. We will need your intervention at crucial moments

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## Substance

6. Our own emerging thinking and that of the US is converging. We both believe that we should aim for a Resolution covering the following main elements:

a determination that Iraq has been and is now in material breach of a whole series of obligations to the Security Council - designed to provide the necessary legal cover;

a demand for unfettered access for inspectors, with clear deadlines as a first test of Iraqi compliance, and with a more intrusive mandate than previous Resolutions;

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some provision on what happens if Iraq fails to comply with the specific requirements, falling short of authorising "all necessary measures", which Jeremy Greenstock judges is simply a non-starter with the other three.

*Chavez  
won't accept  
all necessary  
measures  
at this stage*

*D*

7. I enclose an illustrative draft of what such a Resolution might look like (we have not shared this with the US, but it reflects some initial discussion with them). Within that broad framework, a number of issues will require political judgements:

whether to challenge Iraq to produce very quickly a full declaration of its WMD holdings. Some on the US side are attracted to this because they see it as setting a very early test of Iraqi willingness to comply which Iraq could fail. I think it is a bad idea. It would give Saddam Hussein a perfect opportunity to produce a long text full of obfuscation, which would generate endless argument in the Council. We want action not words from Iraq. There are better ways of setting early deadlines (in particular a demand that Saddam begin within a few days arrangements to get inspectors back into Iraq).

*But does  
a Saddam  
Declaration  
have to precede  
getting on with  
inspections?  
Can't we run  
both in parallel?*

*A*

how much tougher an inspection regime should we require beyond existing UNSCRs? The Americans are thinking of a provision which would allow Blix to decide what further access he needed to achieve his mandate. The enclosed draft suggests ways in which this could be done it would mean jettisoning previously-agreed special arrangements (like exemption of palaces etc). This would be difficult to negotiate in the Council. Nor do we want the Iraqis to reject the Resolution because it can be said to move the goalposts. But I favour trying this approach;

*But surely  
we can't accept  
special arrangements.  
Our dossier is  
designed to show  
how vulnerable  
abstaining palaces from  
inspection has proved.*

*A*

14/09/02

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how clear should we be in the provision on consequences of non-compliance? This will be the hardest-fought point in the Council. As mentioned, "all necessary measures" looks unnegotiable. Equally, the Americans will adamantly oppose a requirement for a further Security Council Resolution (which would leave the Russians a veto over any military action). The current US preference is to stipulate that any failure to comply with the provisions of the Resolution would constitute a further material breach and that Iraq would be responsible for the serious consequences of that. We should clearly start tough, with some formula on those lines. The final result will almost certainly be less explicit.

*The words  
right  
A.*


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(JACK STRAW)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
14 September 2002

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