

H/961

Q No  
 I am right in saying that the question of the railway was not seriously considered  
 Certainly not with regard to that part of the scene of the operation. There was some question of a railway to Nasiriyah

962

Lord Hugh Cecil On the Euphrates  
 On the Euphrates from Basra but no question of a railway along the Tigris

963

The Earl of Doughty-Scott It was assumed from the first that the river was sufficient provided there were sufficient boats on it

A Yes

964

Q That is not putting it too strongly  
 A No - provided that there were sufficient boats

965

Lord Hugh Cecil Would that have been the case if there had been sufficient boats  
 A I think there is no doubt about it

966

The Earl of Doughty-Scott These two divisions were earmarked in the wrong way. They did not affect the question of taking Baghdad because they were not meant to arrive until after Baghdad, but they affected the failure to relieve Kut  
 A Exactly

967

Q Am I right in saying that those divisions did not arrive, if I may say so, in the concentrated form in which they ought to have arrived

A They certainly did not arrive in that concentrated form

968

Q Is it unfair to say that they arrived in dribbles

A They did arrive in dribbles

969

Q And the hospitals <sup>ships</sup> <sup>supplies</sup> arrived weeks if not months afterwards

A Not months but weeks after the beginning. I think on December the 6<sup>th</sup> the first troops began to arrive and they <sup>had</sup> all arrived in Mesopotamia by the 7<sup>th</sup> January. I am speaking of those two Divisions

970 Q Therefore they all arrived within about a month  
A Yes

971 Q Therefore we are right in assuming that they were all in Mesopotamia and available by, as you say, the 7<sup>th</sup> January  
A Yes ~~at~~ <sup>about</sup> that week

972 Q There have been rumours that it was a good deal later

A I think that was about the date that the hospital ships arrived

973 Q You draw our attention, and I think if I may say so very rightly, to what you say in your précis No 3 at the bottom of page 9 and the top of page 10

A Yes

974 Q If I may so I am sure that that correctly expresses the public position. I have no doubt ~~it is~~ that it does so.

A The public position?

975 Q The public or political position. I am accepting your view

A That is my view

976 Q I have no doubt that it ~~expresses~~ <sup>expresses</sup> the political position. ~~It~~ Was the existence of that position & the motive or is it <sup>the justification</sup> ~~the justification~~? Do you understand what I mean

A The motive of what?

977 Q The motive of the advance to Baghdad or is it the justification afterwards. It

It is put here as the justification afterwards, but was the motive that guided me in my various memoranda of appreciation; in fact from the very beginning of these operations, from the very inception, the view I took was that the operations in Mesopotamia were desirable to protect India. I thought ~~that~~ <sup>as</sup> India could only be got at through Persia and Afghanistan ~~and~~ if we did not do something in the Mesopotamian direction there would be trouble ~~from~~ <sup>on</sup> the Indian frontier

42

978

Q I ~~was~~ ~~that~~ It would be fair to ask the Secretary of State whether that was the motive at ~~the time~~ in the mind of the Cabinet

979

A I may say that that was put before the Cabinet

980

Q When you say the Cabinet you mean before the War Committee <sup>the</sup> Chairman ~~I~~ ~~that~~ ~~of~~ The Inter-Departmental Committee?

A No, the War Committee consists of five Cabinet Ministers and such ~~as~~ ~~they~~ advisers as they bring in

981

General Sir Neville Lytton It is a part of <sup>the</sup> Committee of Defence

Q Practically

982

Q Chairman The Cabinet acted on the report of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Inter-Departmental Committee

A No, ~~to~~ excuse me <sup>my lord</sup> I think they acted, did they not, on the advice of the War Committee ~~which was taken on the advice of the Inter-Departmental Committee~~

~~At any rate the Inter-Departmental Committee did not come to some conclusion and the general~~

983 <sup>the</sup> Chairman

<sup>Staff</sup> I assume <sup>that</sup> the considerations Lord Donoughmore suggests were put before the Committee

Yes, they were by me if by <sup>no one</sup> ~~by anything~~ else

984 Q There was almost a preponderance of political representations on that Committee.

A There were two of ~~the~~ gentlemen from the Foreign Office and the Political Secretary ~~is~~ of the India Office and Sir Thomas Holderness. That is four. All the rest were soldiers or sailors

985 Q About half and half

A Yes

986 Lord Hugh Cecil Did you yourself concur in the Inter-Departmental Committee's report

A Yes I did generally speaking, Everything is a matter of compromise. We all had our ~~little~~ views about various points

987 Q You did not seriously or gravely dissent

A No; we all signed <sup>the</sup> that report

988 Earl of Donoughmore Am I unfair or am I putting it too far when I put it in this way as a matter of history: Look at Document No 5 - the yellow paper page 37 and contrast two telegrams, 178 of the 4<sup>th</sup> October and 180 of the 5<sup>th</sup>. 178 is ~~a demand~~ <sup>adamant</sup>. "We stick to our old decision; we are not going back upon it"

A I remember drafting that telegram myself in the Secretary of State's room

989 Q The Cabinet ~~consequently~~ <sup>evidently</sup> meet and next day there is No 180 which practically says "Oh, we ~~it~~ <sup>it</sup> should like awfully to go to Bagdad if we could."

L

Is it unfair to say that that very big change was brought about by your putting the view ~~to which~~ <sup>which</sup> you quoted <sup>to us</sup> before the Cabinet for the first time as a new idea of the Persian point

43

Q You mean to say <sup>my lord, that</sup> the Persian point ~~was not~~ <sup>put</sup> ~~was~~ before the Cabinet before the 4<sup>th</sup> October?

990 Q Yes

A On the 4<sup>th</sup> October my memorandum was in front of them

991 Q I want to know the explanation <sup>of</sup> that very big change in the mind of the Government which happened in those 24 hours

A May I read it <sup>over</sup> ~~out~~ carefully

992 Q Yes do please

A You will see "The Cabinet to whom position was reported yesterday" (that is on the 4<sup>th</sup>) from that "consider that political reasons were thought to make occupation of Baghdad desirable as isolating Germany in Persia". The opinion of the 4<sup>th</sup> was evidently based on my minute or memorandum

993 Q On the Persian point, which presumably had <sup>been</sup> not ~~to~~ put before them before

A Yes

994 Q It does not matter much

A Undoubtedly on the 5<sup>th</sup> that was their view

995 Q It is probably not unfair to assume that it was ~~not~~ the Persian point that made them change their mind or which persuaded them to consider ~~the~~ <sup>an</sup> alternative to their old position which they had maintained

A Yes I think that is so because on the 4<sup>th</sup> the Secretary of State had told them before this

this was submitted to the Cabinet "My ~~feared~~  
orders have food"

Earl of Donoughmore Thank you

996

Lord Robert Cecil There are two little <sup>which</sup> things <sup>the</sup> submitted.  
You spoke of ~~the~~ appreciation of the Turkish troops  
and a cavalry brigade. Would it be possible  
to furnish the Commission <sup>with</sup> a copy of those

Q It is quite possible. I have them here I believe

997

Q They would be interesting

A They were to show the number or what we believed was the number of troops that General Townshend had or the enemy had and where they actually ~~were~~ <sup>were</sup> on such and such a date.

998

Q I do not think they actually bear on this <sup>inquiry</sup>.  
Would you consider whether any of those would be instructive

A I do not think that they would

999

Q I do not care with regard to the earlier part of the <sup>Campaign</sup> ~~Commission~~, but with regard to this Baghdad incident it is important that we should know what ~~they~~ <sup>was</sup> thought at that moment about the Turkish strength

A I looked at the papers and they were kept together in case the Commission wished to see them, but I did not think it worth while to bring them to the notice of the Secretary, because they do not bear at all on <sup>the inquiry</sup> ~~it~~ I think

1000

Q The most important point is the strength of the Turkish Army and it would be convenient to have some idea of what the strength of the Turkish Army was believed to be at various dates from the 1<sup>st</sup> October

144 ~~the~~ to the 1<sup>st</sup> April, say  
 Chairman We can get that from the General Staff  
 & you will get it ~~very~~ <sup>from us</sup> ~~hardly~~ up to a certain  
 point. There are also the General Staff's appreciations  
 as well as my own

1001 Lord Hugh Cecil Perhaps you might submit them  
 to the Chairman and <sup>let him</sup> ~~you may~~ see what  
 bearing they have  
 A Certainly. These appreciations that we have

I find are all after the battle of Chesiphon  
 when the War Committee were considering the  
 retirement and what was to be done to  
 relieve Kut after Kut had been besieged

1002 Q They were not before the advance  
 A No

1003 Q There is no appreciation roughly of the 23<sup>rd</sup>  
 of October  
 A No

1004 Q There are three very important minutes, one  
 your own in the Red book on page 31,  
 and one from the General Staff on page 32

A Yes

1005 Q And a third from the General Staff at page  
 35 I think. Would it not be right for  
 the Commission to see the whole text of  
 those minutes

A Yes, certainly; there is no reason why you  
 should not. In this précis I put ~~what~~  
<sup>all that</sup> thought was most material to the question ~~the matter~~  
 before the Cabinet

1006 Q When we come to use these documents for the  
 purposes of our Report I think it would  
 seem surprising if we were obliged to  
 confess that we had not seen the whole  
 text

text

1007 Q I could furnish you of course with the text  
A I do not in the least doubt that these are substantial extracts

A I put ~~out~~ <sup>all</sup> the bits that I thought were relevant

1008 ~~The Secretary~~ ~~Lord Hugh Cecil~~ One minute is lost

A That is the one of August

1009 Sir Archibald Milhamson Would it suffice if Lord Hugh Cecil had the originals to go through and if he found <sup>that</sup> there was nothing more material than is here then they could be handed back

<sup>The</sup> Chairman I think that would do

1010 Lord Hugh Cecil ~~You explained that you think the matter of the Persian point has been justified by experience since~~ <sup>that</sup>

A Yes

1011 Q There was another political consideration not so important <sup>was</sup> urged in these telegrams and that ~~of~~ <sup>on</sup> the moral effect ~~of~~ the Arabs roundabout in Mesopotamia

A Undoubtedly

1012 Q Have the failures and disasters produced any bad effect on them or is it exaggerated

A Much less effect than we anticipated. We thought that after the <sup>rejoice</sup> ~~Ctesiphon~~ <sup>from</sup> Ctesiphon the whole country would be up

Chairman

1013 Q But that has not been so

1014 A ~~No~~ ~~Sir Archibald~~ ~~General~~ ~~or Neville~~ ~~Milhamson~~ I suppose the Political Officer could tell us <sup>better about this perhaps</sup> ~~why perhaps~~ better than

~~Mesopotamia~~  
He is in Mesopotamia.

A I do not suppose that you could get hold of him

Chair



Wheeler Snel

1015 <sup>the</sup> Chairman

Now we come to the last paragraph and that is "Administrative Breakdown". You have been examined a good deal as regards the sufficiency of river transport. I may assume that a transport which would be <sup>absolutely</sup> ~~amply~~ sufficient for a rapid rush forward, as long as it was successful, <sup>would</sup> become wholly insufficient the moment that advance is checked and a large proportion of effectives become wounded

a Yes

1016 Q It is a well admitted axiom is it not, in military tactics that retreat is a very much greater test of a transport than an advance

a Yes. I can explain that to a certain extent I think. In the first place, in the retreat owing to the low river we lost several boats; they got stuck on sandbanks and could not be got away. Another reason for the deficiency of transport after the retreat was that we had to use ordinary transport ships that were intended perhaps for supplies or for some other purpose as hospital boats to bring down the wounded. The first ship available was seized and the wounded were put on board and they were sent down. So that the deficiency arose from two causes - that a certain number of boats were taken up for carrying away the wounded and other boats were lost to us

8

1017 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge: ~~that is because they had~~ <sup>wounded</sup> ~~that~~ not made provision for the conveyance of them

a They never anticipated <sup>that</sup> they would have had that number. I do not think they had ever lost more than 1800 men on any other occasion

1018 Sir Archibald Williamson: They brought ~~the~~ prisoners back

a Yes

a Yes

1019 Q By river or by land

a They marched them I think as far as Kut, but I would not like to be certain

1020 Q They brought wounded Turks down

a Yes

1021 Q There was certain provision made for the wounded  
I presume.

a Yes, but it was quite inadequate

1022 <sup>the</sup> Chairman: Now, making all allowance for the defence you put forward of the Indian Government what impresses me on looking through these papers is that there does not seem to be any exceptional energy or initiative in India shewn to make good their deficiencies. The thing seems to me to have gone on ~~taking~~ <sup>dragging</sup> its normal course. Now what would you say, having regard to the facts

a I am inclined to agree

1023 Q ~~Now~~ How comes it to pass, because there seems to me to be something wrong in the system - it looks as if things had got bottled up and were not known. Do you think that that is the case

a I think that the people in Mesopotamia could not have kept India fully informed of the situation ~~and I very much doubt whether~~ - well, I am not in a position to answer really for what went on in Simla

1024 Q Now, where is the military Department when the Government go to Simla

a The Army Department is up at Simla

1025 Q The whole of it

a The whole of it

1026 Q It goes up bodily

a It always remains there. It is only a camp office

that

46

1027 Q That goes down to Delhi now  
Do you think it is ~~not~~ a good arrangement to have a huge Department like that right up at the top of the hills

A Yes, I do because they can do far better work at Simla than <sup>they can</sup> in the Plains in the hot weather, and it is a mistake to always move the office up and down. We found it a great drawback in the old days to go down to Calcutta I have no experience of moving to Delhi. The move to Calcutta was worse because it was a greater distance.

1028 Q You, as Military Secretary, are not cognizant of the transport or of the medical provision for any expedition sent out from India

A No; we are not fully informed

1029 Q You in your previous evidence, I think, said you assumed that whatever the Establishment is they work up to it

A Yes

1030 Q How did not you get indirect information if not officially that things were <sup>wrong</sup> ~~going~~ with this Expedition

A Never

1031 Q Never at all

A Never at all

1032 Q There were many private letters and ~~private~~ rumours

A Not at all till after the event. We heard very little ~~until~~ after <sup>Ctesiphon</sup> Tostefan. There was always a chorus of praise and laudation in the Press and elsewhere

1033 Q ~~That~~ <sup>But</sup> things were not satisfactory

A I believe that things were not satisfactory. I <sup>began</sup> ~~appear~~ to hear about them from letters written after Kut el Amara

10

1034 We may say that  
I ~~to clear away~~ the glamour of those victories obliterated  
the ~~to clear away~~ shortcomings

a Yes  
1035 Lord Hugh Cecil: And as the troops increased, the  
deficiencies become more apparent

a Yes  
1036 Chairman: But there was no increase of troops until  
the Expedition went up to the relief of Kut  
a no there was no increase. There were the two  
divisions only in Mesopotamia and a Cavalry  
brigade

1037 Lord Hugh Cecil: ~~to~~ December or January ~~really~~  
a They began to come in in December. I think  
that one brigade arrived on the 6th December

1038 Chairman: It is no good crying too much over  
spilt milk and we shall have other evidence,  
but you are a man with very great experience.  
~~you~~ Could <sup>you</sup> dot the i's and cross the t's as  
regards this breakdown of administration. Could

~~a You mean, could I say~~  
I ~~put~~ <sup>you put</sup> your finger on what you think the <sup>weak</sup> ~~two~~  
parts and the parts to which we ought to direct  
our attention

a Yes, but I think that so far as India is concerned the  
initial ~~cause~~ cause goes far beyond this Commission.  
I mean it strikes at the whole system of  
military administration in India

1039 I do not want to go into that because it ~~but~~  
would entail a good deal of examination, ~~but~~  
do you think that the system is too greatly  
centralized

a Absolutely, that is my opinion. I ~~have~~ submitted  
a Minute on that subject about a month ago  
to Mr Chamberlain

1040 I without going into the pros and cons for the

change ~~you~~ made six or seven years ago, that has tended to increase centralisation

Q To my mind that has caused centralisation and congestion of business

47

1041 Q And apparently ~~of~~ <sup>the</sup> Commander in Chief ~~there~~ has now very little time <sup>to devote</sup> ~~to~~ to his duties as Commander in Chief

A He is now Minister of War rather than Commander in Chief

1042 Q Nobody else can carry out the functions of Commander in Chief

A There is no Commander in Chief in India. They have even got rid of the Army Commanders

1043 Q One man is trying to do more than two men's work

A One man is doing what was ~~about~~ <sup>about</sup> the work of five. At the time I recollect there was a Commander in Chief, four Army Commanders or six, and there was the Military member. Questions were dealt with by those six persons and their respective departments <sup>and</sup> Staff and they are all concentrated now at Army Head quarters under the Commander in Chief

1044 Q That must tend to ~~a~~ very great ~~deal~~ <sup>delay</sup>

A It tends to my mind not only to delay but to immense congestion of business that is not properly dealt with

12

1045 Admiral Sir Appian Bridge <sup>to</sup> insufficient attention

A Yes; things are not gone into in the same complete manner as they were <sup>before us</sup>

1046 Chavman: The Secretary of State has laid <sup>before us</sup> a paper relating to ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Medical Service, Supplement B

A Yes; I collected those

1047 Q The comment that ~~you~~ <sup>I should</sup> make on those Papers as an old <sup>is that</sup> the Secretary of State is that there <sup>are</sup>

are a number of excellent private letters and a very large number of private telegrams but there is no official dispatch at all from the Secretary of State to the Government of India

a No

1048

Q Now surely these rumours which gained substance as they were circulated and the private letters would have formed the foundation for a dispatch to the Government of India (calling attention to them and asking for the institution of an inquiry into them

a A dispatch, as you know, takes some weeks to prepare and to reach India, whereas a telegram only takes a day

1049

Q That is true. A dispatch from the Secretary of State in Council speaking with authority, is a document which the Government cannot ignore, and which it must take action upon

a The same would apply to an official telegram from the Secretary of State

||

1050

Q I am not sure that it has the same weight.

~~Q~~ These are nearly all private

a <sup>When</sup> ~~Q~~ This Commission was ordered I was told to collect everything I could that we had in the Department on the subject. With regard to the <sup>collection</sup> telegrams and letters relating to medical arrangements in Mesopotamia, I put together everything I could

1051

Q You have given us a lot of very confidential information, but if you had not put in private telegrams, with regard to the latter part of the Papers there would have been nothing to put in, would there

a No, there would have been nothing

13

25

1052 Q Chairman: I cannot help feeling that this system of private telegrams has rather contributed to the inertia of the Indian government. What do you say?

A Well it depends very much on the use made of the private telegrams by the recipients, Lord Hardinge. If he had simply pigeon-holed them ~~and put them into his drawer~~ ~~hold them up without it. If it is dropped~~ then of course nothing would <sup>have been</sup> done, but I assume that he <sup>would take</sup> ~~took~~ some action, having the telegrams before him

1053 Q This is the only document that we have got about these requisitions

A ~~Because~~ At that period the Expeditions A, B and C. were not in connection with Mesopotamia. There were any number of official telegrams in my Department connected with those Expeditions.

1054 Sir Archibald Williamson Q ~~You may~~ Have you ~~the use of them at this~~ ~~end at any rate as public telegrams but they~~ ~~seen all the~~ ~~went of~~ private telegrams <sup>seen all</sup> of any concern.

A I think I have ~~one of those that concern me~~ <sup>seen</sup> I have occasionally come across a telegram which I had not <sup>seen</sup> ~~seen~~ at the time, but if so that was accidental

1055 Chairman You have certain medical officers at the India Office but their functions are purely those of examination.

A Yes

1056 Q They do not do any administrative work

A No. You are alluding to Sir Havelock Charles.

1057 Q Yes, to the Medical Board

A The Medical Board prod your chest and find out how you are

1058 Q Supposing a dispatch ~~came~~ <sup>came</sup> home suggesting

an alteration in the complements of the medical units you would have no one to advise you would you

a In that way we have an adviser. Anything of that kind coming home, not necessarily in connection with the War but apart from the War I should send to Sir Havelock Charles on what is called a Reference Paper, and ask him his opinion <sup>if</sup> if it was a medical point

1059

General Sir Neville Lytton: Is he the medical adviser

a No, he is not the Medical Adviser; ~~he is the Secretary~~; he is the President of the <sup>the</sup> Medical Board

1060

1. Chairman: It is pointed out that ~~of~~ the whole of the supplies of the Expedition went from Bombay and all the wounded came there <sup>but</sup> and yet there was practically nobody associated with the Head Quarter Staff there

a Yes

1061

2. As an old administrator ~~at the present time~~ do you not think that that is very bad

a It is one of the things that I had occasion to comment upon. I think it is very bad. Under the old system a Commander in Chief would have had his own Staff on the spot. <sup>have gone to</sup> His own P. M. O. ~~but~~ <sup>to</sup> would have gone to Bombay and seen the medical arrangements there and he himself would probably have gone over the Hospitals, and seen the troops off and welcomed the wounded. That was the experience of the old Bombay

15

27



Bombay and Sir Richard Temple the Governor was extremely active in forwarding it

49

607

1062

Command

General Sir Neville Lyttelton: That was so. There was an Expedition to Cyprus carried out from <sup>in 1906</sup> a ~~with~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~repair~~ <sup>thing</sup> when the Expedition went to China most of the business in connection with that was done by the Bengal Command. Bombay also sent a lot of stuff. Then again, when India sent a lot of troops to South Africa, European troops, horses and so on, that was all done really from Bombay

1063

Chairman: The change in the system has resulted in much more concentration, much more red tape about getting applications through and at the same time the old local Superintendents at the big ports seems to have disappeared. Yes. I will not say that there is more red tape. There is much greater concentration of business and consequent congestion

1064

Where are the Head Quarters of the Medical Administration  
A Simla

1065

Is that at all independent of the Military or is it entirely under the Military authorities  
A There are two separate high medical authorities in India. There is the Director General who does the military business and there is the Director General who is over and above the Indian Medical Service and who conducts all the Civil business. He is also, I think largely responsible for the medical stores

16

1066

General Sir Neville Lyttelton when was the <sup>abolition</sup> ~~policy~~ of the Presidential Armies carried out  
A The abolition of the Presidential Armies

was

28

E

1067 Q was in 1893 or 1894 ~~I think~~ -1893 I think  
Q That is a long time before the other drastic changes  
were made

A Yes. The great change was made in 1906.

1068 Q The abolition of the Presidential Armies which  
was the beginning of it <sup>you may</sup> ~~be~~ say, <sup>was a</sup> ~~the~~ good  
deal earlier.

A The abolition of the Presidential Armies was  
not the beginning. I think there was an  
improvement after the abolition of the  
Presidential Armies because we had the  
four Commands. The abolition of the Commands  
took place either in the middle of 1908 or the  
end of 1907. The abolition of the Military  
Department was in April 1906.

7

intended

me

Chapter 3 Serial

1069 Mr Stodge That was when Lord Kitchener was Commander-in-Chief  
+ yes

1070 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge Before you part company with the Commission I want to ask you a couple of questions which will enable the Commission to come to some opinion as to whether this was so-called a collapse - to use a phrase in your document - of the expedition was quite unrelieved of by any brightness at all in the way of results. We should not conclude, should we that the great gallantry and military skill displayed and the hardship and endurance of the troops have been entirely thrown away

A No I do not think they have been thrown away

1071 I you told us that the political results had remained <sup>position</sup> practically stationary down to the present moment + We have secured the Indian frontier for two years

1072 I And protected the chiefs

A Yes, protected the <sup>moral</sup> prestige of the chiefs

1073 I And kept the hold water tight or all right.

+ Yes absolutely

1074 I And the Arabs have been much less troublesome than might have been feared

+ yes

1075 I Over and above that as to more direct military results if you look at page 214 No 212 and No 216 you will see "War Office to General Nixon, dated 17th November 1915" - This has been quoted so I will not quote it again. "We have reliable information that Von der Goltz left for Bagdad on 10th November  
Stahl

- 50 /  
 1076 Q Khalil Bey, the uncle of Enver Pasha, is marching from Erzeroum with 30,000 men.  
 A We have already discussed that -  
 Q I was asking with regard to the advance on Kut and I am now asking <sup>with regard to</sup> the advance before Kut was ~~was~~ <sup>drawn</sup> opened and besieged. Did we ~~draw~~ <sup>draw</sup> a great many troops from the ~~Romanian~~ <sup>Armenian</sup> frontier and therefore greatly facilitate the Russian advance from the Caucasus in the early part of this year.  
 A I think undoubtedly we did; we drew some, I will not say a great many.  
 1077 Q The break down does not appear to have been a collapse with absolutely <sup>redemptive feature</sup> no ~~chance~~ at all.  
 A No; I think that on the whole we should have been infinitely worse off if we had never gone to Mesopotamia.  
 1078 Lord Hugh Cecil If we had stopped at Amara we should <sup>we</sup> have been infinitely worse off.  
 A Well, in the light of events I am not quite certain that we should have been as well off because if we had stopped at Amara I think there would have been trouble on the Persian side before August <sup>1916</sup> ~~the~~th. We have trouble now in Persia.  
 1079 Q It depends upon how serious the trouble might have turned out to be. It might have arisen earlier if we had remained at Amara.  
 1080 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge: Our advance did <sup>alarm</sup> ~~overcome~~ the Turks <sup>with regard to</sup> ~~about~~ Baghdad.  
 A Undoubtedly. And undoubtedly ~~took~~ <sup>drew</sup> off a  
 1081 Q Considerable number of troops.  
 A Yes

~~I With regard to the City of Kad we kept them~~  
~~at bay~~

1082

I would like that to be on the Minutes  
A I think that Bagdad acted as a magnet to the  
Turks and to ourselves.

1083

They feared an attack on Baghdad  
General Sir Neville Lytton. I see in book 8  
page 4 a telegram No 6 from <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ ~~Secretary of State~~ ~~that~~ ~~the~~ ~~Officer~~  
Viceroy to Lord Stardinge Here says "All our  
permanent hospital personnel has long been  
exhausted". This is as far back as November  
1914. That is to a certain extent an excuse  
+ Undoubtedly

1084

I The demands of England had considerably  
crippled their medical resources  
+ Yes. We have put in a statement  
showing the great extent to which England  
had drawn on India

1085

I It appears from telegram No 15 on page  
5 that Lord Stardinge's attention had been called  
to the fact that the British troops in  
Mesopotamia had suffered severely from the climate  
That was in July long before the advance,  
so he was aware of it several months before.  
+ Yes, he was aware of it when he  
went to Basra

1086

I Did not the India Office before that know  
pretty well that we were not doing well  
in the matter of supply and transport  
A No I do not think that we had any  
idea

1087

I This is a very early communique on the subject  
A In the private letter he says that the  
troops suffered from the climate

1088

I That they ~~are~~ <sup>were</sup> living in swamps. He does  
not

not refer to any breakdown in the medical arrangements. He knew that there was a good deal of sickness

- 51  
 1089 Q What was the percentage in the hot weather  
 A In my days there it was ~~was~~ 10 per cent in the hot weather  
 A I expect it was more than that
- 1090 Q A great deal more  
 A I would not like to say what it was because really I do not know; I can't not tell you
- 1091 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge 10.6 is in the papers somewhere  
 A I had forgotten that. Where is that
- 1092 General Sir Neville Lyttelton Page 7 of the same book  
 That is No 22, Supplement B  
 A Since this was printed I have found another telegram bearing on that which I can give to the Secretary. In that it says ~~the~~ "Strength of Force D. Your telegram of the 16<sup>th</sup> instant No 50880. The 8.5 per cent of sick among British troops is calculated on their own strength and not on the strength of the whole Force." It was 8.5 per cent of British troops that was sick
- 1093 Q That is not very high for the time of year  
 A No it is low
- 1094 Q I have seen 100 men in hospital ~~from~~ <sup>from</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> hot weather  
 A ~~in~~ <sup>in</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> hot weather  
 A Yes. To a certain extent they are picked men who go on ~~service~~ <sup>service</sup>
- 1095 Lord Hugh Cecil I am right in saying am I not, that the first mention of the rumours

108

of serious defects in the ~~practical~~ <sup>medical</sup> arrangements  
is to be found in No 21 and No 23  
in Mr Chamberlain's private letters to Lord  
Hardinge. In the same paper No 8  
Supplement B No 21 there are two  
very strong letters from Mr Chamberlain  
to Lord Hardinge

A Yes

1096 Q One dated the 14<sup>th</sup> October and the other  
dated the 29<sup>th</sup> October

A Yes

1097 Q So far as your recollection goes  
the 14<sup>th</sup> October is substantially  
the date you would give for beginning  
to hear rumours of defects. The India  
Office began to hear <sup>then</sup> that things were  
going wrong as far as you can recollect

A Yes

Chaplin

A Yes

wheeler / Snell

1098 a Yes I think it must have been about then  
2 not much before that at any rate  
a No

1099 2 The reports we got then were from —  
2 Members of Parliament  
a not ~~exactly~~ <sup>necessarily</sup> Members of Parliament but from the friends of the men.

1100 2 We never heard officially about the medical breakdown until a very late date. It was only from private letters that we heard

Lord Hugh Cecil: The authorities in India continued to deny it for a very long time  
a Yes, that is so

1101 2 As late as Sir Beauchamp Duff's letter of the 30th December to the Viceroy on page 11 of the same paper. That is an enclosure sent by Lord Hardinge to the Secretary of State. Substantially he denies at any rate a very large part of the accusation ~~in that letter~~

118 a He says that there is no shortage but comforts are all at the base at Basra or Amara and do not get to the front

1102 Chairman: Thank you. I am sure we are much indebted to you, General Barrow, you have put the case very clear & clearly before us

The witness withdrew

Adjourned to ~~Wednesday~~ <sup>Tuesday</sup> the 30th August. 5th September

Horace William Hill

113 Shorthand Writer.

S. J. Pica ital