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MODUK; PJHQUK

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MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ POSTS

Subject:

INFO:

SUBJECT: :

FM BAGHDAD

TO IMMEDIATE FCO

TELNO 58

OF 211635Z JANUARY 05

INFO IMMEDIATE , ANKARA, CABINET OFFICE, DFID, JIC LONDON

INFO IMMEDIATE MIDDLE EAST POSTS

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK/MODUK NAVY/MODUK AIR/MODUK ARMY/MODUK PE

INFO IMMEDIATE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IRAQ POSTS, NATO POSTS, PJHQ

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON,

CABINET OFFICE FOR NO 10

SUBJECT: NOSEC: IRAQ: ISF ASSESSMENT TEAM VISIT

CAIRO TEL NO 14

SUMMARY

1. VISITING ISF ASSESSMENT TEAM EXPECTED TO REPORT TO RUMSFELD THAT ISF DEVELOPMENT IS BROADLY ON TRACK - BUT THERE IS NO SILVER BULLET AND IT WILL TAKE TIME. ALLAWI SAYS HE HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE MNF-IS POLICE ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM CONCEPT - THE FUTURE OF WHICH IS UNCLEAR. WE NEED TO ENCOURAGE MNF-I TO ENGAGE CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH IRAQI CONCERNS IN THIS AREA.

2. POSSIBLE RECOMMENDATION THAT UK SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD ON ALL IRAQI POLICE WORK.

DETAIL

3. GENERAL LUCK (A RETIRED US FOUR-STAR GENERAL AND FORMER C IN C SOUTH KOREA) LEFT IRAQ ON 20 JANUARY HAVING COMPLETED A WEEK LONG ASSESSMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES. LUCK WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A 20 STRONG TEAM, WHICH INCLUDED SMITH (UK-DEPUTY CHIEF CONSTABLE HAMPSHIRE) AND (MODUK). HE WAS HERE AT RUMSFELDS REQUEST, HAVING BEEN ASKED TO VALIDATE PETRAEUS TRAIN AND EQUIP PROGRAMME AND EXAMINE WHETHER ANYTHING COULD BE DONE TO SPEED UP THE DELIVERY OF CAPABLE IRAQI FORCES. THE LINKAGE TO THE US EXIT STRATEGY WAS CLEAR. LUCK AND HIS TEAM CALLED ON ALLAWI, DAOUD, NAQUEEB, SHAALAN, CASEY, PETRAEUS, NEGROPONTE AND MYSELF. SMITH AND ALSO VISITED MND SE AND HAD SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EMBASSY POL-MIL TEAM.

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*Our Information*

4. LUCK INSISTED ON NO PUBLICITY AFTER A PRE-VISIT LEAK. HE IS NOT PRODUCING A WRITTEN REPORT (ALTHOUGH SMITH AND WILL EACH DO SO) BUT WILL BRIEF RUMSFELD ON 24 JANUARY, AND THE PRESIDENT ON 7 FEBRUARY. GENERAL ORDIENO (LUCKS DEPUTY) PLANS SUBSEQUENTLY TO BRIEF THE UK CHIEFS OF STAFF. WE UNDERSTAND THAT LUCK WILL BROADLY ENDORSE THE EMERGING MNF-I PLAN FOR ISF DEVELOPMENT AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

US GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT.

5. LUCK THINKS THAT ONLY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HAS ENGAGED SERIOUSLY AND IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH. OTHER DEPARTMENTS WILL HAVE TO MOBILISE AND PLAY A FAR BIGGER ROLE IF THE INSURGENCY IS TO BE DEFEATED. THOUGHT THAT THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR THEME OF HIS BRIEFING.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TEAMS (MATS)

6. LUCK WILL RUBBER-STAMP THE MNF-IS INTENTION TO SWITCH ITS MAIN EFFORT FROM OPERATIONS TO TRAINING AND MENTORING USING THE MAT CONCEPT. HE TOLD US THAT THIS SEEMED TO HAVE WORKED WELL IN AREAS (SUCH AS MND SE) WHERE IT IS STEADILY BEING IMPLEMENTED.

POLICE ASSISTANCE TEAMS (PATS)

7. ALLAWI TOLD LUCK THAT HE DOES NOT LIKE THE PAT CONCEPT (WHICH AS CURRENTLY ENVISAGED INVOLVES PUTTING SMALL NUMBERS OF MNF-I SOLDIERS AND POLICE ADVISORS IN IPS STATIONS). HE MADE THE SAME POINT TO ME ON 20 JANUARY. THIS CHIMES WITH THE INTERIOR MINISTERS VIEWS AS DOES ALLAWIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CASE FOR A LIMITED TRIAL, POSSIBLY USING THE SPECIAL POLICE COMMANDOS, IN TROUBLED AREAS (WE THINK MAINLY IN THE SUNNI HEARTLAND). SMITH AND US MOI ADVISORS ALSO REHEARSED IRAQI CONCERNS OVER THIS IDEA WITH LUCK. PUTTING MNF-I BACK ON THE STREETS WOULD BE A BACKWARD STEP POLITICALLY, WOULD BE RESENTED BY THE IRAQI POLICE THEMSELVES= AND WOULD RAISE SERIOUS FORCE PROTECTION ISSUES FOR THE MNF-I TROOPS AND POLICE ADVISERS INVOLVED. SMITH TOLD US ON 19 JANUARY (BEFORE LUCKS MEETING WITH ALLAWI) THAT LUCK DID NOT (NOT) INTEND TO REFLECT ANY OF THESE CONCERNS TO RUMSFELD. THIS WAS PRESUMABLY BECAUSE CASEY WAS DEAD SET ON THE PATS, WHICH HE SOLD HEAVILY IN WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER, AND INTENDED TO ASK FOR THE ADDITIONAL US FORCES (PROBABLY A THREE MONTH EXTENSION FOR ONE BRIGADE ALREADY IN THEATRE) REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE PROGRAMME. WE HOPE THAT LUCK WILL NOW DO SO, HAVING HEARD ALLAWIS VIEWS.

BUREAUCRATIC (GOVERNANCE) ASSISTANCE TEAMS

8. LUCK HAS CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THE LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE SECRETARIAT CAPACITY IN KEY MINISTRIES SUCH AS MOI, MOD AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS OFFICE. HE THOUGHT THAT IRMO DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH PEOPLE DEPLOYED AND THOSE THEY DID HAVE DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT SKILLS, INCLUDING TO BUILD PROPER CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN MINISTRIES. HE WANTS ADDITIONAL ADVISERS IN THE MINISTRIES TO COACH AND MENTOR IRAQIS. (COMMENT: THE DFID-LED GCPP PROJECT DUE TO BEGIN IN FEBRUARY IN MOI WILL DO EXACTLY THIS. WHAT WILL BE KEY IS THAT IRMO FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS ON BUILDING CAPACITY, NOT SUBSTITUTING FOR IT).

INTELLIGENCE

9. THE INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES FROM THE TACTICAL TO THE STRATEGIC ARE VERY WEAK AND NEED FUNDAMENTAL OVERHAUL.

COMMENT

10. SMITH AND [REDACTED] TOLD US FROM THE OUTSET THAT LUCK DID NOT EXPECT TO FIND ANYTHING FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH. NEVERTHELESS, HE AND HIS TEAM GAVE PETRAEUS A SIX HOUR GRILLING ON DAY ONE FROM WHICH HE SEEMS TO HAVE EMERGED LARGELY UNSCATHED. IN PARTICULAR, LUCK ACCEPTS THAT THERE IS A REAL PROBLEM WITH IRAQI LEADERSHIP AND THAT THERE IS NO QUICK FIX.

11. NEGROPONTE TOLD ME THAT LUCKS MEETING AND DINNER WITH ALLAWI HAD GONE WELL

[REDACTED] CASEY AND PETRAEUS HAD HOPED THE FINDINGS OF THE LUCK VISIT WOULD ENGAGE WITH ALLAWIS NEW SECURITY STRATEGY AND WAS THE RATIONALE FOR DEFERRING A WOLFOWITZ/TEBBIT CONFERENCE IN BAGHDAD. ALLAWI WOULD HAVE SYMPATHY WITH THE PROPOSALS SET OUT BY SULAIMAN (EGIS HEAD) FOR A GREATLY ENHANCED SIX MONTH TRAINING PROGRAMME FOLLOWED BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE COALITION OF A DATE FOR HANDING OVER CONTROL TO THE IRAQIS (TUR).

12. WE RAISED WITH LUCK THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING ACCOUNTABLE ISF THAT SUPPORTED THE RULE OF LAW AND RESPECTED HUMAN RIGHTS. THESE WERE NOT NICE TO HAVE ADD-ONS BUT WERE FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR CHANCES OF DEFEATING THE INSURGENCY AND SUSTAINING DEMOCRACY IN IRAQ. LUCK AGREED ENTIRELY, ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY WHETHER HE INTENDED TO FLAG THIS UP. SMITH AND [REDACTED] TOLD US THAT THEY HAD ALSO EMPHASISED SEVERAL TIMES THE IMPORTANCE OF POLICE PRIMACY IN THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN, BUT THIS HAD NOT REGISTERED AT ALL WITH THE AMERICANS.

13. UK ADVISERS IN MNF-I AND MNSTC-I HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON THE VIABILITY OF THE PAT CONCEPT. THERE ARE CONCERNS THAT THE MAT APPROACH - WHICH RIGHTLY HAS WIDESPREAD SUPPORT - HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON THE DIFFERENT SET OF PROBLEMS FACING THE POLICE, WITHOUT ANY PROPER ANALYSIS TO BACK IT UP. QUESTIONS HAVE ALSO BEEN RAISED ABOUT FORCE PROTECTION - AND WHETHER SMALL NUMBERS OF MNF-I AND POLICE ADVISERS IN IPS STATIONS ARE VIABLE. IT IS ALSO UNCLEAR WHETHER THE CONCEPT LENDS ITSELF TO THE IRAQI WAY OF POLICING. OTHERS CONTEND THAT THE PAT CONCEPT IS FUNDAMENTALLY SOUND, BUT HAS BEEN SOLD VERY BADLY TO THE IRAQIS.

14. THE PATS CONCEPT HAS PROBABLY NOW GOT SO MUCH MOMENTUM THAT IT WILL GO AHEAD IN SOME FORMAT. BUT WE SHOULD INFLUENCE THE EVENTUAL SHAPE IT TAKES BY ENCOURAGING MNF-I TO ENGAGE SERIOUSLY WITH THE IRAQI CONCERNS. GENERAL KISZELY AGREES STRONGLY, AND BELIEVES CASEY DOES TOO. ONE SCHOOL OF THOUGHT IN MNF-I/CPATT IS THAT THIS COULD PERHAPS INVOLVE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF IPS STATIONS (FEWER, BUT LARGER AND MORE EASILY DEFENDABLE SITES) AND RELIANCE ON ISF/MNF-I QUICK REACTION FORCES RATHER THAN EMBEDDED MNF-I SOLDIERS IN IPS STATIONS. THIS MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE IRAQI CONCERNS.

15. LUCK WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY OUR POLICING WORK IN THE SOUTH, AND THOUGHT THAT OUR EXPERIENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND WAS VERY USEFUL. HE TOLD US THAT HE WAS SERIOUSLY THINKING OF RECOMMENDING THAT THE UK SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD FOR ALL POLICE WORK IN IRAQ (PRESUMABLY MEANING IN CPATT). WE ASSUME THAT THIS WOULD PROBABLY BE A STEP TOO FAR FOR US, AND POSSIBLY FOR THE AMERICANS AS WELL.

16. BUT WE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF POLICING IN IRAQ AND NEED TO CONSIDER WHAT WE COULD OFFER. THIS WOULD REQUIRE MORE UK POLICE AND MILITARY OFFICERS WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE OF OPERATING IN NORTHERN IRELAND DURING THE PEAK YEARS OF THE COUNTER-TERRORIST EFFORT TO WORK AT A STRATEGIC LEVEL WITH KEY IRAQI AND MNF-I FIGURES. IN PARTICULAR, THEY WOULD NEED TO WORK IN THE MOI, AS PART OF THE UK POLICE ADVISERS TEAM, WITH THE PROVINCIAL POLICE CHIEFS AND IN CPATT, HELPING TO BRIDGE THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN THE IRAQIS AND THE COALITION. WE ALSO NEED TO EXAMINE WHAT WE COULD OFFER IN TERMS OF NICHE CAPABILITIES SUCH AS INTELLIGENCE, FORENSICS AND SPECIAL BRANCH POLICING. GENERAL FIL (HD CPATT) IS KEEN FOR OUR HELP IN ALL THESE AREAS.

17. AND FIRECREST

CHAPLIN

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