

## **STATEMENT FROM SIR GUS O'DONNELL AND SIR PETER RICKETTS**

This memorandum provides the factual detail and analysis requested by the Inquiry on the central national security and intelligence machinery, my role as Cabinet Secretary, and the way in which the management of deployed civil effect abroad has evolved.

Some comments by way of overview may be helpful. As Cabinet Secretary and National Security Adviser, our remit is to ensure that Ministers have a broad range of high quality analysis and advice to inform their collective decisions on key national security issues; that the right issues are prioritised for the National Security Council's consideration; and that Ministers have sufficient time and space to consider fully major issues affecting national security, foreign policy and defence.

In this context, the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) is significant. The NSC meets both frequently and regularly and considers a very wide range of national security issues. The National Security Adviser is the Secretary to the National Security Council, supports the Prime Minister in the full range of national security issues across Government, and is head of the National Security Secretariat within Government. The National Security Adviser chairs a weekly meeting of NSC Departments at Permanent Secretary level which then prepares papers for the NSC and ensures that Departments are effectively coordinated.

The leadership of the UK Intelligence community is strongly represented in the Council with the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the heads of the intelligence agencies all attending. The Council often draws on JIC reports to inform its consideration of major issues. Since the establishment of the NSC and associated structures we, together with the JIC Chairman, have endeavoured jointly to ensure that the new arrangements make the best and most appropriate use of intelligence and other information and analysis, and we will continue to explore ways to improve how we support the NSC's work.

Answers to the Inquiry's specific questions on the current central national security structures are provided in the rest of this memorandum.

**Gus O'Donnell**  
**Peter Ricketts**

*Note on the text: this should be considered as a joint submission from the Cabinet Secretary and National Security Adviser unless otherwise stated, where the Inquiry has asked for specific comment on the personal approach of the Cabinet Secretary (Question 5).*

## **The National Security Council**

### **1. The composition and terms of reference for the Council and any sub-committees**

The membership and terms of reference of the National Security Council and its sub-committees are attached at **Annex A**. Ministers who are not members of the Council are invited to attend if a discussion directly affects their departmental interests. Senior officials, including the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the Chairman of the JIC and the heads of the intelligence agencies, are also regularly invited to provide expert advice.

There is also a meeting of senior civil servants, called NSC (Officials), which meets to coordinate NSC work. This is chaired by the National Security Adviser. Membership is made up of the Permanent Secretaries to members of the NSC, the CDS, the Chairman of the JIC and the heads of the intelligence agencies. Additional invitations are issued as required.

### **2. A brief description of how it operates and the underpinning rationale**

The National Security Council facilitates effective Cabinet Government across the foreign and domestic security policy agendas. It is the central forum for collective discussion of the Government's objectives for national security and their effective delivery in the current financial climate.

The Council meets weekly, usually following Cabinet. It is supported by the National Security Adviser who is responsible for the coordination of advice and the implementation of decisions reached by the Council.

### **3. The role that it would play in any future consideration of military intervention**

The National Security Council considers a broad range of domestic and international issues relating to UK national security. Consideration of foreign policy questions in the build-up to military intervention would be included in this. However Government policy on military intervention would be settled in Cabinet.

### **4. The role it plays in overseeing major British activity in other countries, e.g. Afghanistan**

The National Security Council plays a dynamic part in overseeing UK activity in other countries. It takes fortnightly operational and political updates on the situation in Afghanistan and takes decisions on the UK's strategy. The Council regularly discusses the UK's national security interests in relation to countries such as Pakistan and Iran.

### The Role of the Cabinet Secretary

**5. A brief description of your personal approach to involvement in Ministerial discussions on foreign and defence policy; and the proportion of your time devoted to those issues**

*Note by Gus O'Donnell*

My personal approach is to ensure that major decisions of national security, foreign policy and defence are made by Ministers on the basis of proper, considered advice from a wide range of sources: policy; intelligence; military; legal; economic; development and other. It is also my role to provide Ministers with the proper collective space to take those decisions.

In my time as Cabinet Secretary I have not sought actively to be a principal source of direct policy advice in matters of foreign and defence policy. However, I have always been available to the Prime Minister with advice on these matters should he request it. I welcome the establishment of a National Security Adviser. It has been a significant development which now provides the Prime Minister with a direct and personal source of foreign policy and defence advice, reducing further the personal role I would seek to play in direct policy advice on these issues. I see my current role as supporting the National Security Adviser in ensuring the smooth functioning of the Council and his Secretariat.

During the time in question I estimate I spent around 5-10% of my time directly on foreign and defence policy, and around 15-20% on Cabinet and Cabinet committee business, of which a significant part would have been on national security.

### The Role of the Cabinet Secretariat

**6. A brief description of the current size and structure of the National Security Secretariat and the proportion of its time/resource devoted to foreign & defence policy**

The National Security Secretariat was created out of two previous Directorates General in the Cabinet Office: Intelligence, Security and Resilience; and the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat. They were joined together under the National Security Advisor in May 2010,

and have since delivered a weekly National Security Council, and a National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, in addition to their full span of previous responsibilities. There are currently two Deputy National Security Advisers. One is responsible for the defence and foreign affairs portfolio, the other devoted to intelligence, security and resilience issues. There are five discrete teams: Foreign and Defence Policy; Strategy and Counter-terrorism; Security and Intelligence; Cyber Security & Information Assurance; and Civil Contingencies. The Secretariat currently employs around 195 staff, around 25 of whom work in the Foreign and Defence Policy team. This team works closely with other elements of the Secretariat which also cover related issues such as country-specific counter-terrorism reviews.

As part of the Spending Review budget reductions, the functions, structures and overall size of the National Security Secretariat have recently been reviewed to ensure that resources continue to be deployed to meet the Government's highest priorities. The resource implications of this are that the foreign and defence team will, as a result of reductions in other areas, comprise between 20 – 25% of the Secretariat's eventual size at the end of the Spending Review period.

**7. The role you expect the Cabinet Secretariat to play in:**

- **the development of policy;**
- **the delivery of policy**

The National Security Secretariat oversees the development and implementation of policy. The responsibility for the delivery of policy lies with Departments.

**8. The general principles which determine which roles and responsibilities should reside in the Cabinet Secretariat and which should reside in individual departments, particularly where responsibilities are spread between a number of Departments**

The National Security Secretariat prepares for National Security Council discussions in conjunction with Departments. The Secretariat prepares the agenda of the NSC for the Prime Minister's agreement, after discussion with Departments. It ensures that Departments develop policy advice on issues of concern to the Prime Minister and the members of the NSC. It also provides advice to the Prime Minister, via the National Security Adviser, on complex or contentious policy issues. Where responsibilities are spread between a number of Departments, the Secretariat will perform a coordination and de-confliction role as required.

## **9. Arrangements for adjusting the structure of the Secretariat in response to events**

Adjustments to the structure of the Secretariat are carried out as events or policy priorities require. For example, there is a dedicated Afghanistan-Pakistan team, given the current deployment of UK combat forces. Staff can be provided from Departments to reinforce the Secretariat in response to particular crises or policy issues.

The National Security Secretariat has been developed as a flexible structure. Its staff are accustomed to responding quickly to fast moving events, particularly as many of those who operate within it are also involved in managing the government crisis response mechanism, COBR.

### The Role of the JIC and the Assessments Staff

#### **10. The current role and responsibilities of the JIC, and the principles which underpin them, in relation to consideration of:**

- a) future military intervention;**
- b) enduring military and other involvement in other countries, of Afghanistan**

The key role of the JIC remains the provision of all-source intelligence assessment agreed across Government.

Key principles remain the importance of all-source intelligence analysis, the independence of intelligence assessment from desired policy outcomes and challenge and peer review (for example by sharing and comparing assessments with allies) throughout the process. The JIC's Chair continues to be independent of both the intelligence agencies and policy customers.

The JIC would therefore play a key role in providing, at the strategic level, intelligence assessments in support of policy decisions with respect to any future military intervention.

The JIC plays an essential role at present in the work of the National Security Council by providing policy-relevant intelligence assessments that support its discussions. That includes papers on Afghanistan. The JIC does not make policy recommendations, but its judgements regularly underpin NSC debate.

**11. Progress on implementing the recommendations in the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction chaired by Lord Butler of Brockwell.**

The table attached at **Annex B** details how the Government's commitments in its response to the Butler Review Recommendations have been implemented. Key features include changes to the central intelligence machinery at the Cabinet Office and a strengthening of the intelligence analysis profession and the procedures that ensure high analytical standards are maintained. Butler's recommendations remain a key influence to the conduct of intelligence and were given significant weight in the production of the intelligence sections of the Strategic Defence and Security Review.

Stabilisation Unit

**12. The recommendations of the Cabinet Office led Review of Stabilisation and Deployed Civil Effect;**

**13. Progress in implementing that Review.**

The recommendations of the Stabilisation Task Force Review of Stabilisation and Civil Effect (shortened to the Cabinet Office Task Force – COTF) and progress in implementing this Review are set out in **Annex C**.

## **Annex A**

### **Membership and terms of reference of the National Security Council and its sub-committees**

#### **National Security Council**

##### **Membership:**

Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Minister for the Civil Service (Chair) (The Rt Hon David Cameron MP)

Deputy Prime Minister, Lord President of the Council (Deputy Chair) (The Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP)

First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (The Rt Hon William Hague MP)

Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Rt Hon George Osborne MP)

Secretary of State for the Home Department; and Minister for Women and Equalities (The Rt Hon Theresa May MP)

Secretary of State for Defence (The Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP)

Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (The Rt Hon Chris Huhne MP)

Secretary of State for International Development (The Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP)

Chief Secretary to the Treasury (The Rt Hon Danny Alexander MP)

Minister of State – Cabinet Office (The Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP)

Minister for Security (The Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones)

##### **Terms of Reference:**

To consider matters relating to National Security, Foreign Policy, Defence, International Relations and Development, Resilience, Energy and Resource Security.

## **NSC (Threats, Hazards, Resilience and Contingencies)**

### Membership:

Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Minister for the Civil Service (Chair) (The Rt Hon David Cameron MP)  
Deputy Prime Minister, Lord President of the Council (Deputy Chair) (The Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP)  
First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (The Rt Hon William Hague MP)  
Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Rt Hon George Osborne MP)  
Lord Chancellor, Secretary of State for Justice (The Rt Hon Kenneth Clarke QC MP)  
Secretary of State for the Home Department; and Minister for Women and Equalities (The Rt Hon Theresa May MP)  
Secretary of State for Defence (The Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP)  
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (The Rt Hon Dr Vincent Cable MP)  
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (The Rt Hon Chris Huhne MP)  
Secretary of State for Health (The Rt Hon Andrew Lansley CBE MP)  
Secretary of State for Education (The Rt Hon Michael Gove MP)  
Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government (The Rt Hon Eric Pickles MP)  
Secretary of State for Transport (The Rt Hon Philip Hammond MP )  
Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (The Rt Hon Caroline Spelman MP)  
Secretary of State for International Development, (The Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP)  
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (The Rt Hon Owen Paterson MP)  
Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, Media and Sport (The Rt Hon Jeremy Hunt MP)  
Minister for Security (The Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones)

(Restricted attendance for intelligence matters to: Prime Minister (Chair), Deputy Prime Minister (Deputy Chair), Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Secretary of State for the Home Department, Secretary of State for Defence.)

### Terms of Reference:

To consider issues relating to terrorism and other security threats, hazards, resilience and intelligence policy and the performance and resources of the security and intelligence agencies; and report as necessary to the National Security Council.

## **NSC (Nuclear)**

### Membership:

Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury and Minister for the Civil Service (Chair) (The Rt Hon David Cameron MP)  
Deputy Prime Minister, Lord President of the Council (Deputy Chair) (The Rt Hon Nick Clegg MP)  
First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (The Rt Hon William Hague MP)  
Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Rt Hon George Osborne MP)  
Secretary of State for the Home Department, and Minister for Women and Equalities (The Rt Hon Theresa May MP)  
Secretary of State for Defence (The Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP)  
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (The Rt Hon Chris Huhne MP)

### Terms of Reference:

To consider issues relating to nuclear deterrence and security.

## **National Security Council (Emerging Powers)**

### Membership:

First Secretary of State, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Chair)  
(The Rt Hon William Hague MP)  
Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (Deputy Chair)  
(The Rt Hon Dr Vincent Cable MP)  
Chancellor of the Exchequer (The Rt Hon George Osborne MP)  
Secretary of State for the Home Department; and Minister for Women and Equalities (The Rt Hon Theresa May MP)  
Secretary of State for Defence (The Rt Hon Dr Liam Fox MP)  
Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (The Rt Hon Chris Huhne MP)  
Secretary of State for International Development (The Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell MP)  
Chief Secretary to the Treasury (The Rt Hon Danny Alexander MP)  
Minister for Government Policy – Cabinet Office (The Rt Hon Oliver Letwin MP)  
Minister of State – Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr Jeremy Browne MP)  
Minister of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism (The Rt Hon Baroness Neville-Jones)

### Terms of Reference:

To consider matters relating to the UK's relationship with emerging international powers.



## Annex B

	Butler Conclusions and Government Response (2005)	Update: 2011
1.	<p><b>Chapter 7 – Conclusions on broader issues</b></p> <p><b>International co-operation</b></p> <p><i>“We note that much of what was reliably known about Iraq’s unconventional weapons programme in the mid- and late-1990s was obtained through the reports of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These international agencies now appear to have been more effective than was realised at the time in dismantling and inhibiting Iraq’s prohibited weapons programme. The value of such international organisations needs to be recognised and built on for the future, supported by the contribution of intelligence from national agencies.” (Paragraph 57)</i></p> <p>17. The Government recognises the valuable role played by the international agencies such as the IAEA. It works closely with them. A present example of the IAEA playing a key role is in relation to the Iranian nuclear programme.</p>	<p>Para 17 The Government values the work of international agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA is the lynchpin of the international community’s efforts to ensure nuclear energy can play a major role in combating the challenges of climate change, poverty and energy security without proliferation. Its safeguards provide the essential foundation of the international non proliferation regime under the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We therefore have the clearest strategic interest in the effective application of the Agency’s safeguards and we look to support it wherever possible.. The Government attaches particular importance to the IAEA’s very valuable work on the Iranian nuclear programme and other priority dossiers.</p>

<p>2.</p>	<p><b>Co-ordination of counter-proliferation activity</b></p> <p><i>“We consider that it would be helpful through day-to-day processes and the use of new information systems to create a ‘virtual’ network bringing together the various sources of expertise in Government on proliferation and on activity to tackle it, who would be known to each other and could consult each other easily.” (Paragraph 58)</i></p> <p>18. Experts and analysts in the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) field meet frequently. Apart from participating in formal meetings, they also hold frequent informal forums. A new IT system, SCOPE, is being developed, for the purposes of better disseminating intelligence material on all subjects securely (including relevant maps, photographs and multi-media material) and better allowing analysts to work on intelligence. SCOPE will connect ten Government Departments and Agencies and is being rolled out over the period to mid/late 2007. SCOPE will deliver intelligence faster and to a wider community than hitherto. Customers, and particularly analysts, will be able to “pull” intelligence from a central archive as well as to receive intelligence “pushed” at them. SCOPE will also provide group working facilities.</p>	<p>Para 18. The Assessments Staff WMD team continue to collaborate closely with Defence Intelligence (DI) and the intelligence agencies on the production of papers for the JIC.</p> <p>There are many Counter-Proliferation (CP) and WMD-related activities ongoing in the intelligence community, including regular working group meetings, exchanges and workshops. The Counter-Proliferation Intelligence Working Group is the forum for senior managers from across the analytical and intelligence communities to discuss and co-ordinate analysis on proliferation-related issues; chaired by the Assessments Staff, it meets monthly or as required.</p> <p>IT developments currently being introduced will enhance information-sharing across the community. They are being introduced to the Counter Proliferation Community first.</p>
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<p>3.</p>	<p>19. The Government recognises that the DIS plays a vital role within the national intelligence community, and agrees that the DIS should serve wider national priorities as well as Defence. In future, the central intelligence Requirements and Priorities process will apply to the DIS, although as an integral part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which ultimately remains responsible for its direction, the DIS also has to meet MoD needs where individual priorities may on occasion differ from those laid on the Agencies.</p> <p>20. The importance of ensuring that proper channels for dissent are available to civilian staff of the DIS is recognised. The MoD has already introduced, since Lord Butler reported, new arrangements for raising issues of conscience and professional concern, including dissent, in order to address, <i>inter alia</i>, the concerns expressed by Lord Butler. These arrangements are fully analogous to those available to the Agencies in respect of the Intelligence and Security Staff Counsellor, with a nominated officer fulfilling that role for DIS staff.</p> <p>21. The advantages of appointing an intelligence specialist as Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence (DCDI) are recognised by the MoD. As the post requires a skills base wider than intelligence, increased staff development effort, including a leadership programme, for members of the DIS is being introduced which should in future enable more personnel with extensive intelligence experience to be considered for the post.</p>	<p>Para 19. Defence Intelligence plays a vital role within the UK intelligence community and the central intelligence and Requirements and Priorities now apply to DI as well as the Agencies. This recognises fully the role DI plays in supporting other Government Departments, including the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff.</p> <p>Para 20. Following the recommendations of Lord Butler, the MOD introduced arrangements for staff to raise issues of conscience and professional concern, including dissent. These are fully analogous to those available to the Agencies in respect of the Intelligence and Security Staff Counsellor.</p> <p>These arrangements provide for DI staff to have access to nominated officials. The Director General Human Resources and Corporate Services or, in his absence, the Director Civilian Personnel act within the terms of the Intelligence and Security Staff Counsellor. Guidance to staff is published in the 'MOD Policy Rules and Guidance Handling Matters of Conscience, Reporting Concerns at Work and Whistleblowing in the MOD – the Public Interest Disclosure Act (PIDA) 1998'.</p> <p>Para 21. DCDI is a demanding two-star management post requiring a wide range of skills (not just intelligence) and it is important that MOD develops people with all the competences for the role. Promotion into the Senior Civil Service within the DI, as with the rest of the MOD, is consistent with the Professional Skills for Government agenda and criteria. Although the current DCDI is a MoD</p>
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		<p>Generalist by background he has undertaken intelligence analysis training while in post. DI actively encourages its senior analysts and middle managers to gain experience within MoD and the wider Civil Service to develop their skills and provide strong future candidates for the DCDI post</p>
4.	<p><b>The Joint Intelligence Committee</b></p> <p><i>“We see a strong case for the post of Chairman of the JIC being held by someone with experience of dealing with Ministers in a very senior role, and who is demonstrably beyond influence, and thus probably in his last post.” (Paragraph 63)</i></p> <p>22. The Prime Minister made clear to the House on 20 July 2004 that the Cabinet Office would set about making a permanent appointment to the Chairmanship of the JIC, to take effect during 2005, and that this would be done in accordance with Lord Butler’s criteria.</p>	<p>Para 22. In November 2007, Alex Allan was appointed to the Chairmanship of the JIC at Permanent Secretary grade.</p>

<p>5.</p>	<p>23. <b>The Assessments Staff.</b> On the advice of the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator, the Government has decided to expand the Assessments Staff in several areas. A new team will be established to provide a standing internal review and challenge function for JIC assessments. That team will also co-ordinate regular assessments of countries at risk of instability, and – in the warning function of the JIC – regular papers highlighting significant threats or other issues likely to face the Government in the coming year in the fields of security, defence and foreign affairs. The team in the Assessments Staff dealing with WMD will be strengthened with an officer with scientific experience. All of the Assessments Staff teams will in future also have research analyst support, not least to ensure better capacity to use open sources and research past records. This strengthening of the Assessments Staff will result in it increasing in size by about one-third. Staffing levels and structures within the Assessments Staff will be reviewed again in two years' time.</p> <p>24. The Chief of the Assessments Staff has been given an additional role of advisory oversight of assessments across Government in the security, defence and foreign affairs fields.</p> <p>25. The Assessments Staff now have, as the Butler review recommended, access to the Staff Counsellor.</p> <p>26. <b>Specialism of Analysis.</b> The Government has decided to establish a post of Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis, to advise in the security, defence and foreign affairs fields on gaps and duplication in analyst capabilities, on recruitment of analysts, on their career structures and on interchange within and beyond Government; to advise on analytical methodology across the intelligence community; and to develop more substantial training than hitherto on a cross-Government basis for all analysts working in these fields. The post of Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis will be established in the Intelligence and Security Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, whose Head is the JIC Chairman.</p> <p>27. <b>Scientific Advice.</b> The Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government, currently Professor Sir David King, has responsibility for providing scientific advice to Government including the Cabinet Office. The Government sees no reason to establish separate structures in the Cabinet Office. Sir David King is discussing with the Cabinet Office ways in which the advice provided to the Cabinet Office, and especially the JIC and the Assessments Staff, can be enhanced.</p>	<p>Para 23. The Assessments Staff has continued to evolve in the light of changing priorities and challenges and has grown since 2005, in particular to include greater number of Research analysts who support the senior desk officers. The formal challenge function has been incorporated into the Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA) team. The early warning team continues to produce regular assessments of countries at risk of instability, as well as covering a range of emerging cross-cutting transnational issues.</p> <p>Para 24. The Chief of the Assessments Staff supports the JIC Chairman's PHIA role by taking responsibility for cross government analytical capability and standards.</p> <p>Para 25. The Assessments Staff continue to have access to the Staff Counsellor. Each incumbent has visited the office of the Assessments Staff to explain and publicise his role.</p> <p>Para 26. The Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA) was established in September 2005. .</p> <p>The PHIA staff co-ordinate cross-community analytical training; provide a challenge function for JIC products; monitor the health of the analytical community; evaluate the effectiveness of analytical product; develop and encourage inter-agency communication at the working level; encourage and develop career paths and interchange between agencies; and develop knowledge contacts outside the intelligence community including</p>
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		<p>academia, business and finance.</p> <p>PHIA has established a group of senior officials from agencies and departments known as the Heads of Profession Group (HoPG), which meets regularly to share best practice and propose policy. JARIC, GCHQ, SIS, Security Service, JTAC, Cabinet Office Assessments Staff, FCO, DI, HMRC, SOCA, NCSB and UKBA are represented. Sub-groups have been formed to deal with cross-community analyst training, analytical challenge and the evaluation of intelligence assessments. The HoPG plays a key role in supporting the JIC's responsibility for oversight of the intelligence community's analytical capability.</p> <p>To enhance the status and authority of the role, the title PHIA is now held by the JIC Chairman.</p> <p>Para 27. The WMD team in the Cabinet Office Assessments Staff contains an officer with scientific expertise and the support of a research analyst. The JIC reserve the option to invite the Chief Scientific Officer to meetings as appropriate.</p>
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<p>6.</p>	<p><b>The language of JIC assessments</b></p> <p><i>“The JIC has been right not to reach a judgement when the evidence is insubstantial. We believe that the JIC should, where there are significant limitations in the intelligence, state these clearly alongside its Key Judgements. While not arguing for a particular approach to the language of JIC assessments and the way in which alternative or minority hypotheses or uncertainty, are expressed, we recommend that the intelligence community review their conventions again to see if there would be advantage in refreshing them.” (Paragraph 66)</i></p> <p>28. JIC assessments now include an “Assessment Base” box which sets out the extent and depth of secret intelligence and other information drawn upon in an assessment.</p> <p>29. The Chief of the Assessments Staff has reviewed and re-issued guidance to his staff on language to be used in assessments.</p> <p>30. Alternative and minority hypotheses or uncertainties exposed at either Current Intelligence Group (CIG) or JIC levels are now being recorded in JIC minutes. In cases when the JIC cannot reach consensus, dissenting views will be reflected by the JIC Chairman in a note on the face of the final JIC assessment.</p>	<p>Paras 28-30. The Assessments Staff and PHIA continue to work on strengthening the rigour of JIC assessments. The Challenge Team engage with the Assessments Staff through the process of producing JIC papers, arranging and facilitating analytical workshops, raising issues on early drafts and feeding into the final stages, and through reviewing past papers to see if judgements were correct and to identify lessons learnt. New arrivals to the Assessments Staff are encouraged to attend courses on analytical techniques including assumption checks and alternative hypotheses.</p> <p>A Confidence Statement is included in each JIC product which sets out the extent and depth of secret intelligence and other information drawn upon in the assessment. This appears beneath the Key Judgements</p>
<p>7.</p>	<p>611. <b>We do not suggest that there is or should be an ideal or unchangeable system of collective Government, still less that procedures are in aggregate any less effective now than in earlier times. However, we are concerned that the informality and circumscribed character of the Government’s procedures which we saw in the context of policy-making towards Iraq risks reducing the scope for informed collective political judgement. Such risks are particularly significant in a field like the subject of our Review, where hard facts are inherently difficult to come by and the quality of judgement is accordingly all the more important.</b></p>	<p>The National Security Council (NSC) was created by the coalition government in May 2010. The Council is held weekly and is chaired by the Prime Minister. It is attended by Cabinet members with departmental interest in national security, and the National Security Adviser and Cabinet Secretary. Senior Officials, including the Chief of Defence Staff, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Agency Heads, are also frequently invited to attend. The Council considers and coordinates matters relating to National Security, Foreign Policy, Defence, International Relations and Development, Resilience, Energy and Resource Security.</p> <p>The National Security Adviser is secretary to the NSC and is responsible for coordinating and delivering the</p>

31. The Prime Minister recognises the importance of Cabinet discussion and, as he said on 20 July 2004, where a small group is brought together to work on operational military planning and developing the diplomatic strategy, in future such a group will operate formally as an ad hoc Cabinet Committee.

32. The Cabinet Office's role is to ensure that the Cabinet Committee system remains effective and fully functioning. Committees exist to handle all areas of major business with the right people involved. This structure provides a framework for the collective consideration of, and decisions on, major policy issues and issues of significant public interest. It provides the procedures by which issues that are of interest to more than one Department are properly discussed and that the views of all relevant Ministers are considered and that discussions are properly recorded and distributed to those who need to act on them.

33. The Cabinet Secretariat sits in the Cabinet Office but is non-Departmental in function and purpose. It serves the Prime Minister and Ministers, who chair committees, rather than Cabinet Office Ministers themselves (except in their role as Committee Chairmen). The head of the Secretariat is the Cabinet Secretary. The Secretariat is composed of five individual secretariats; Economic and Domestic; Defence and Overseas; European; Civil Contingencies; and the Intelligence and Security Secretariat. The Cabinet Secretariat's role is to put in place the appropriate handling procedures for committee business, such as the preparation of papers and minutes to ensure the effective functioning of the committee structure.

Government's international security agenda. He frequently attends Cabinet and works closely in support of the Prime Minister and Government. The role remains distinct from the head of European and Global Issues Secretariat.

## Annex C

### **Recommendations of the Stabilisation Task Force Review of Stabilisation and Civil Effect (shortened to the Cabinet Office Task Force – COTF) and progress in implementing this Review**

*COTF recommendations: a cross-Whitehall Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre (CSSC), initially of at least 200 personnel, should be established and the number of effective personnel on Stabilisation Unit's database of Deployable Civilian Experts should increase to 800-1000.*

- 1289 civilians have been approved for the Civilian Stabilisation Group (CSG), exceeding the original target of 1000. This includes 1012 Deployable Civilian Experts (DCE) and 277 members of the Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre (CSSC) recruited from over 35 Government departments and all grades up to SCS.
- The CSG was set up to manage deployment of up to 200 individuals at any one time. In the course of December 2010, the Stabilisation Unit managed 150 deployees in theatre, comprising 33 serving police officers and 117 civilians serving on both multilateral and bilateral missions. Personnel were deployed in December 2010 to 15 countries including 73 to Afghanistan, 38 to Kosovo, 15 to Georgia and 4 to the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

*COTF recommendation: a Stabilisation Volunteer Network (SVN) should be established substantially to widen the range of potential volunteers available*

- The SVN has been a useful tool to build relations with other organisations interested in working in a stabilisation context. The SVN now includes the Local Government Association, the National Health Service, private sector companies and a number of NGOs.
- We have been able to use the SVN to create placement opportunities for CSG members where they are able to gain skills in areas relevant to working in a stabilisation context, including Hounslow Council where individuals worked on a community cohesion project.

*COTF recommendation: MOD should rapidly identify members of the Armed Forces Volunteer Reserves with relevant skills, who would be available to deploy as part of the CSG.*

- In consultation with the Stabilisation Unit (SU), FCO and DFID, MOD wrote a paper setting out options for the recruitment and deployment of reservists in civilian roles. Its recommendations were endorsed by the 3\* Defence Strategy and Plans Group. The MOD and SU continue to discuss the best ways of identifying reservists' civilian skills and increasing interoperability.

*COTF recommendation: the SU should be expanded and refocused, under Director-level leadership, to become the single HMG delivery unit for civil effect with an enhanced planning capacity and rapid response capability.*

- With responsibility for international secondments and police deployments transferred from the FCO, the SU is now the single HMG delivery unit for civil effect.
- With eleven core planning posts, augmented by a trained planning pool of civil servants for deployment at short notice, the SU can provide support to operations where there is a UK military presence, HMG planning for fragile states with little or no UK military presence; and international partners.
- The SU is capable of responding rapidly through a combination of core SU staff and members of the CSG. Providing core training to over 30% of the CSG by mid-2011 and focusing on those most likely to be deployed minimises the lead time between appointment and deployment, thereby maximising preparedness.
- Following the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the SU's remit was widened to cover conflict prevention as well as post-conflict support. The SU will take the lead in establishing Stabilisation Response Teams (SRTs), which will be fully integrated, bespoke teams able to deploy quickly in response to any request.

*COTF recommendation: A new International Police Assistance Group (IPAG) should develop more robust arrangements for delivering police capabilities for civil effect*

- IPAG was formed in September 2009 to provide operational support to the International Police Assistance Board. Additional police personnel have been recruited, providing a pool of 125 police on standby for deployment in support of stabilisation efforts. Our recruitment is in line with future projections for policing requirements for 2011-2.