

*Confidential*

# Mesopotamia Commission

Tuesday 26<sup>th</sup> September 1916

Eighth Day

## Members Present

The Right Hon. Lord George Francis Hamilton, G.C.S.I.  
in the Chair

The R<sup>t</sup> Hon. the Earl of Donoughmore, K.P.

General the R<sup>t</sup> Hon. Sir Neville Gerald Lyttelton G.C.B., G.C.V.O  
Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, G.C.B.

Lord Hugh Cecil M.P.

Sir Archibald Williamson, Bart, M.P.

Mr John Lodge M.P.

Commander Josiah C Wedgwood M.P.

Mr R. G. Duff, Secretary

Captain George Lloyd M.P. sworn

3513 Chairman Captain Lloyd, you were employed between April and September December under Sir Percy Cox in Mesopotamia in a semi military and political capacity. [See back]

A That is so

3515 2 You went out as you had been taught the language and had given a good deal of study to political questions which may arise or which may develop in that locality

48-44

I Yes

3516 2 We have taken evidence with regard to the inception of the Campaign. We are now mainly concerned as regards the medical and transport conditions.

Where

3514

2. We will take your written statement as your evidence in chief  
certainly.

[Enclosed paper document marked A.]

A

50  
20.9.16. 4

Confidential.

48 Wilton Crescent,

S.W. 30th Sept. 1916.

Sir,

In reply to your summons to give evidence before the Mesopotamian Commission and to your query as to what subjects I am competent to give evidence upon in connection with the Mesopotamian Campaign, I beg to reply that I was employed between April and July last on special service under Sir Percy Cox in a semi-military and semi-political capacity. The fall of Kut having altered the particular work for which my services had been requested, I was occupied chiefly on political and on economic enquiries, partly relating to the present and partly to the future conditions of the occupied territories. In the course of these enquiries I was chiefly in Busra, but I made one journey up the Karun River to Adwaz, one journey to Bushire, and one to Amara. I shall therefore be in a position to give you my views as regards:-

1. Harbour, lighterage and tonnage facilities at the port of Busra. Building and Piers, wharfage facilities for ocean transport as far as Kurna A.C. I should not be able to quote accurate statistics on these points, but could give you my views as to what could or could not be done, based upon my own pre-war experience of the port, and the views of British traders and merchants well acquainted with the locality.

2. Conditions of river transport between Busra and Amara, and accommodation for men and material on this journey during the height of the hot weather.

3<sup>A</sup>  
4<sup>A</sup>  
  
3514  
2.  
  
a  
  
3. Views on the general question of communication necessities. The comparative value of steamer and railway transport, and the desirability of immediate amelioration of these questions.

4. My views regarding main causes of sickness and its treatment in the Hospitals.

5. Conditions of transport of Indian Troops between Busra and India.

6. Condition of Turkish prisoner camps.

In addition to these subjects I shall be able to give evidence if so desired on the civil administration of the occupied territories, our relations with Arab tribes, revenue, judicial, and other matters.

Yours truly,

(sgd) George Lloyd.

The Secretary,

Mesopotamian Commission,

28 Abingdon Street,

Westminster.

Where ~~were~~<sup>were</sup> you ~~to~~<sup>by</sup> chiefly when you were in Mesopotamia

I was chiefly at Basra. I was moved to ~~~~~ to Amara and I was also sent up to the Daktiari country on one occasion with Sir Percy Cox; that is on the Kuran River

3517 2 You had an opportunity of seeing what the harbours the ~~port of~~<sup>year of</sup> Basra accommodation and unloading facilities were at

I Yes, but I could not speak ~~satisfactorily~~<sup>satisfactorily</sup> about it.

I knew the ~~port~~<sup>port</sup> some years ago and had to make an economic report on it then and I naturally could appreciate such ~~differences~~<sup>differences</sup> as there were when I arrived there the second time

3518 2 How long ago were you ~~there first~~<sup>was it when before</sup>; was that a nine nine years ago

3519 2 When you were at Basra we had been in occupation for about 16 months or something rather more than that I should think

3520 1 Rather more than that I should think

2 Was there a marked improvement in the harbour accommodation and the wharfage

I No I do not think there was. There was much greater activity consequent on the War. That is the first thing one noticed as regards landing stages and such things as you might expect to be provided during a campaign of any duration, they were very remarkably absent I thought. That was my first impression

3521 2 While ~~you remained there did~~<sup>there was</sup> anything ~~done to improve~~<sup>done to improve</sup> the harbour in that respect or was ~~which would~~<sup>that direction</sup> any ~~had no attempt~~<sup>had no attempt</sup> made in it? Q There seemed to be very little done as regards landing stages and provision of facilities for the

ships.

the discharge of ~~ships~~ While I was there ship began to unload. I do not know how long they had been unloading, up above Basra, at Magill, a most important Depot for Basra for the discharge of goods. For a long time previously to that I understand ~~ships~~ ships were not taken alongside at all and I think that from a very elementary study of the conditions of the port would have made it obvious for a long time before that it was very possible to bring ships alongside for at any rate many months in the year and discharge them direct on to the banks instead of <sup>into</sup> native craft, mahailas, which involves a good deal more labour and loss of time

- 3522 2 They ~~all~~ unload in the middle of the stream?  
A When I was there ~~no~~ one ship could go alongside and possibly two as Magill at a time, but for a long time previously I understand ships had merely discharged into native craft, mahailas in mid stream or as close as they could be brought to the shore ~~so that~~ the goods were twice handled. ~~and brought on land~~ A good deal of the supply is still discharged in that ~~manner~~ manner
- 3523 2 You were working under Sir Percy Cox  
A Yes

- 3524 2 Who had nothing whatever to do with that  
A ~~No;~~ I am telling you my personal observations  
3525 2 <sup>He was in a purely political capacity</sup> Did you ever discuss with any engineer <sup>in the way of</sup> difficulties that there would be to increasing the wharfage  
A I discussed with a great many people, junior engineers, officers, and others, ~~as to~~ what could be done. I think everybody agreed that

a great deal more could be done and should be done  
and in fact must be done

3526 2 During the time that you were there had the  
disembarkation or ~~the~~<sup>unloading</sup> of ships been much  
accelerated

A I should think a good deal. One of the main  
difficulties ~~were~~<sup>was</sup> being solved - The organization of  
the port ~~had~~<sup>had</sup> been put under ~~the~~ Civil Authority  
3527 Commander Wedgwood <sup>under whom</sup> I think his name was Brown,  
one of the Gray McKenzies <sup>one of the</sup> men, British  
India men from Rangoon

3528 The Earl of Darnoughmore. But out by the Admiralty?  
A Yes it ~~was~~<sup>I think</sup> Father has ~~the~~ found the conditions  
not very good, and he being a very experienced  
man took over the handling of the stevedores, -  
arranging for their entry to the port, ~~and~~<sup>the</sup>  
~~and their~~<sup>and their</sup> discharge in a more competent manner

3529 Gen. Sir Neville by Hutton <sup>Buganay</sup> were  
Chinaman: Did you come across as well as Sir George

A Yes. The Doctor worked that I am alluding to  
did not come directly under Sir George Buchanan. I  
think his main duties were to look after the  
rivers to see what could be done with regard  
to the rise and fall

3530 Chinaman When you were at Basra was the  
whole control of affairs in the hands of the  
military?. Were they all military officers employed  
there

A Not quite all, Mr Brown was an exception  
but the whole thing was under ~~the~~ military authority  
Sir Archibald Williamson where is Mr Brown  
I could not say. He was there the  
whole time I was there as far as known.  
I do not think he had been there very

- 5
- long when I arrived in April
- 3532 Chairman Were any of the officials of the Public Works Department there connected with railway for instance
- 1 There must have been many but they had probably been incorporated into the Army and had taken Commissions. I did not see any actually as such. The Public Works Department men actually as such Not in charge of departments? from
- 3533 2 & No; ~~but~~ a great many ~~were~~ may have come in ~~under~~ from the Indian Army Reserve and taken Commission
- 3534 Chairman They generally came in the capacity of purely military officers
- 1 Every one with one or two notable exceptions, came in under Army administration and as officers
- 3535 2 and they only had the functions of their military rank
- 1 They only had the functions of their military rank at point I want to make is the great congestion. There was at all times ~~for~~ <sup>in respect to</sup> unloading. Great waste of tonnage was going on all the time I was there. A very large number of steamers were lying in the stream whose discharge was quite impossible showing ~~#~~ a lack of organisation at the Indian end or the Basra end, or both. Five or six ships arrived at very short periods close to one another with no possibility of discharge for weeks. The ships would arrive and would be kept waiting in the river useless for any other purpose when, with better organisation, their arrival could have been delayed and they could have made other trips. I was glad to understand in one case I cannot speak for the accuracy of it.

5.

that there were 40,000 tons of goods lying in the harbour in ships & bottoms, whilst at the moment's was told that the monthly discharged capacity of the harbour was something round about 30,000 tons. I cannot vouch for the correctness of the figures but at any rate it was something of the kind. That would show the delay which existed

3536 2 It would take a month to unload the ~~ships~~  
that were there

A Probably

3537 Commander Wedgwood Five weeks  
A Yes

3538 Chairman ~~the stores ought to be landed, when they~~  
properly protected?

A I cannot say that with regard to the ~~magill~~. I was very little up there but at Basra I should say they were fairly

3539 2 Were there any difficulties about getting proper labour  
for unloading

A The labour difficulty has been very great all through ~~I have to say~~ <sup>and</sup> there is never sufficient labour, <sup>at</sup> labour prices for <sup>which</sup> tasks are rising.

3540 2 It is suggested by one witness that the remuneration given was inadequate. Did you hear that suggested

A No, I should have said the remuneration given to that labour was very high indeed, certainly immensely greater than any there ever had been previously, and as regards the price it was quite sufficient to attract ~~men~~ tasks from all round if it had been properly organised

3541 Lord Hugh Cecil Is there a large population to draw on for the purposes of labour

→ A very much larger population than you would think  
 Previously when other works were undertaken, for  
 William Wilcox's works, the same question was  
 put to me and I said I believed <sup>further north</sup> that you could draw  
 on fairly big reserves of labour. That was afterwards  
 found to be the case, and whilst there ~~were~~ <sup>were not</sup>  
 any very large villages, you attracted a  
 much greater population than you had any reason  
 statistically or geographically to expect.

3542

Chairman What is the population of Bassra <sup>in</sup> normal  
 times  
 → I have forgotten. There have never been any <sup>proper</sup> statistics.  
~~The~~ Turkish <sup>Census returns are</sup> ~~were~~ hopelessly inadequate.

3543

2 It is a big place

→ It is a big place

3544

2 ~~What~~ Are the buildings good buildings?  
 → They <sup>are the</sup> same kind of buildings that you have in that  
 part of the world. They are pretty solid <sup>and</sup> ~~and~~ buildings. It depends on your standard

3545

2 You are prepared <sup>to give us</sup> know your views as to what  
 you consider <sup>or say</sup> should not be done. Do you mean  
 this kind of evidence or do you wish to make a general statement?

→ I would like to say that I think a great deal  
 more could be done as regards the provision of  
 landing stages at Mardigil. I think that as  
 regards Kurna<sup>n</sup>, <sup>the junction</sup> ~~this is a point between the Euphrates~~  
 and the Tigris, - the possibility of Kurna<sup>n</sup> as a depot  
~~base~~ to which ocean going steamers able to  
 cross the bar could go direct without any  
 discharge into river steamers, should be immediately  
~~fully~~ examined. I think there is a great deal of  
 evidence to show and I think it is certain that  
 for most of the year at any rate vessels of a  
 considerable size coming direct from India or  
 elsewhere could take goods straight up to Kurna<sup>n</sup>.

without discharging them at Basra and without putting them into river steamers. Very probably landing stages could be built at Kurnah to enable the discharge of goods from ocean going vessels direct to ~~Kuttabat~~. The advantage of that it is unnecessary to point out I think.

3546

Lord Stavagh Cecil We have heard that ocean going vessels can go up to Kurnah & Yes <sup>say do</sup> occasionally but very rarely. As far as my observation goes ~~very~~ <sup>practically</sup> ~~the~~ no use is made of Kurnah as a depot base.

3547

Colonel Sir Cyriac Bridge Is Kurnah a large place & No there is nothing practically there - a few mud houses

3548

Chairman Are the banks steep?

& No they are not steep; You would have to build out I imagine. I have not sufficient engineering capacity to say, but it is a point to which you should and could bring ocean going steamers of a certain size.

3549

Colonel Wedgwood You would ~~save~~ 50 miles of rail and a big bridge across the Euphrates

& You would save discharging at Basra and relieve congestion, and ~~as required~~ <sup>food destined entirely</sup> up the Tigris you could discharge ~~them~~ <sup>them</sup> loaded into the railway proposed to be built there without breaking bulk or man handling them twice or three times.

3550

Chairman You were working with Sir Percy Cox

& Yes

2 It may not be <sup>quite</sup> a fair question to put but what does what you have stated represent the policy of the Department of which he was the head

a I would not like to say that at all. Sir Percy Cox had nothing whatever to do with those questions.

He is really the Civil Governor occupied in setting up the Civil judicial and Revenue administrations as between the frontiers and the occupied territories I know his views quite well but it would be most impudent to quote them because he never gave them to me officially.

3552

2

- Your next point is "Conditions of river transport between ~~Burma~~<sup>Assam</sup> and Amara and accommodation for men and material on this journey during the height of the hot weather"
- If I may I would like to make one other point on the first question and that is that of having light railways along the shores of the river ~~between~~<sup>May</sup> gill and Ushia - between ~~Ushia~~<sup>Majuli</sup> and the large military camp at Makina
- That would be on the ~~left~~<sup>right</sup> bank which On the right bank of the river - the bank on which Basra stands

3553

2

- Basra is on the right bank is it  
Basra is on the right bank. It is on the western bank - ~~the right bank~~

Geograph

I Lu

Whele Snell

Y

3555

2 In your judgment are there exceptional difficulties in making ~~a~~<sup>a</sup> railway

a. No.

3556

2 Not even in times of flood

a. No, not there

3557

2 It would run up how far.

a It would run up four miles to ~~Makina~~<sup>Makina</sup> and would run where ~~as~~<sup>as</sup> it was thought down the bank to Uska - chiefly between the military camp at ~~Makina~~<sup>Makina</sup> and the various points between Magill and Uska.

3558

Commander Wedgwood: You mean a light railway of 2 feet 6 gauge

a. The ~~smallest~~<sup>smallest</sup> mechanical thing you can provide ~~is~~<sup>is</sup> a ~~tram~~<sup>tram</sup> ~~trolley~~<sup>trolley</sup> to relieve mule transport, assist in the movement of troops and avoid the four mile ~~treacherous~~<sup>treacherous</sup> marches between ~~Makina~~<sup>Makina</sup> and Magill ~~in the centre~~<sup>in winter or wet</sup> great heat or in the ~~and generally~~<sup>which the troops have to do; as speaking generally</sup> ~~very~~<sup>will</sup> pull down whatever you consider elementary is required under elementary civilised conditions in any camp area.

3559

Lord Hugh Cecil: How far is ~~Makina~~<sup>Makina</sup> from Magill

A. A ~~town~~<sup>town</sup> and a half to five miles I should say. It is a considerable hardship to men marching about with heavy kit ~~to~~<sup>to</sup> embark up river. It is slow and involves a great deal of mule transport. A great deal of the difficulty would be removed by light railways properly run.

3560

Chairman: Had any commencement of such a railway been made.

a. I saw nothing

3561

2 ~~but~~<sup>they were not</sup> commencing to build a railway when you left?

a. Not as regards the port of Baera; as regards other railways they were being made. At present the main

3562

2 Transport ~~across~~<sup>between</sup> ~~the~~<sup>the</sup> River Baera and Smara is by sailing boats?

3563

2 were they sufficient for ~~the~~ the bulk of the transport  
 a (certainly not I should think. I put that point in because  
 I have seen a great deal of criticism as regards the  
 conditions for troops going up river, and knowing  
 the country very well I thought it worth while to state  
<sup>my view.</sup>  
what I said. I want to preface these remarks which refer  
 to General Mac Munn's administration by ~~that~~ by  
 saying that I think it is only due to say <sup>to him</sup> perfectly amazingly  
 that he has done ~~essentially~~ good work. He has not been  
 there very long but I think he has had a heritage of  
~~with~~ immense difficulties with which he is grappling very  
 successfully

3564 2 What is he  
 a I.G.C.

3565 Commander Wedgwood: He succeeded Davidson  
at yes.  
Lord Hugh Cecil: When was he appointed

a I cannot say exactly but I should think some  
 time in the Spring of this year. In any criticism  
 I make of the conditions there I do not think they  
<sup>defects</sup> are due to him. He has done I think everything  
 that anybody could and most brilliantly <sup>grapple</sup> to ~~cope~~  
 with the ~~circumstances~~ situation so far. What  
 I say refers back to previous times

3566 2 are his powers confined to moving goods or has he  
 means of improving communications

a His responsibilities, as I understand <sup>and</sup> (I am not a  
 qualified ~~military officer~~ to speak with regard to that), refer  
 to all the lines of communication - ~~the movement~~  
<sup>The movement of</sup> of transport, troops, goods - all along as far as I  
 know. He works in conjunction with Supply and  
~~Transport and others~~ When <sup>the</sup> Supply  
 and Transport wish to get goods to a certain point  
 the carriage of the goods comes <sup>under</sup> the I.G.C's

*S.* Department and the carriage of men. They have to go to the S.G.C. to get them there

*Chairman:* I am sorry that we interrupted you perhaps I may give my own experience briefly. I travelled by a river steamer as an ordinary officer, not on the staff, from Magall to Amara. There were on board 200 Turkish prisoners, a small party of civilians, Turkish women and children. Children of men and women anyway. There were some British details in one party barge and the other barge was full of mules. I found myself officially commanding the troops going up river at the last moment without any warning, which I think might have been given by the Military Landing Officer concerned. I noticed to put it very briefly, very bad organization as regard the papers, which I think accounts for a great deal of the muddles going on up river. I examined

*the papers* the only things which were handed to me and from a business point of view, I cannot imagine any transport succeeding under the conditions prevailing. I looked at the way bill on which should be inserted not only all the troops, the names of the officers and the amount of cargo, but their destinations. I saw no possible indication as to where they were going

*the* and I found that largely destinations were omitted. It was therefore impossible for me, although I was responsible for it, to know where mules, men or Turkish prisoners should be deposited.

*Chairman:* You stopped at intermediate stations, I suppose several.

a ~~they said~~ It was my duty to see that the goods and the men were discharged at the right places,

but it

It was not possible for me to do it. There was nobody on board the steamer to whom I could appeal, and I pointed that out as one small matter of organization which I know, as a matter of fact, accounts for a good deal of the muddles which certainly occurred. I was ~~never~~ asked almost immediately ~~I woke~~  
 in the morning <sup>the</sup> ~~by~~ <sup>or</sup> great heat with a young officer to assist him with 200 Turkish prisoners who were crowding round him and who obviously wanted something. <sup>He did not know what to do with them.</sup> He could not speak Turkish nor had he any reason to suppose that I could. There was only one other Turkish speaking officer speaking under correction, in Mesopotamia at all during the time. It was merely a chance that <sup>This young officer</sup> I spoke Turkish. <sup>He had been sent on board with</sup> approximately 200 Turkish prisoners without any interpreter, and it was impossible for him to cope with them at all. They required food. No arrangements that I could discover, ~~at any rate~~  
<sup>no</sup> inadequate arrangements had been made for the rationing of this party of 200 prisoners. After great labours, which I will not dwell upon <sup>now</sup> ~~now~~ we found food for them. The Supply and Transport had failed to send the officer where the food was. It was put in a most improper place I think, and there were no arrangements or facilities of any kind for cooking were made. Nothing had been done. The men were ~~placed~~ <sup>of</sup> ~~placed~~ on board anyhow and the food was ~~placed~~ <sup>flung</sup> on board separately, and there was a great deal of labour, <sup>involved and there was</sup> incurred a certain amount of ill feeling for a few moments among the Turks ~~incurred~~. I think the Supply and Transport ~~are~~ <sup>need</sup> ~~not~~

~~some good~~

~~suitable of great improvement as regards organization;~~

in fact a great deal of improvement

where ~~there~~ misgivers  
" were there ~~was~~ being sent to

~~going up for exchange~~

a There were going up for exchange

2 was there any particular pressure or were the conditions more or less normal

a The pressure on the river steamers was always great I should say

3571

2 were there any military operations going on

a No; after Kust, during the whole time I was there, there was practically nothing going on at all

3572

2 There was no emergency to account for hasty and imperfect arrangements

~~except that~~  
a No, Fever was so bad in Basra whilst I was there that the staff were being very much depleted and I know that offices were constantly without clerks, or a very very small supply, and certainly under <sup>the</sup> very bad weather conditions. It was difficult to carry on. <sup>The condition of things</sup> It was unfavourable on Staff work as it does on regimental work. It is very bad for all. I think that improvement could be made

3573

Commander Wedgwood: Were these able bodied prisoners <sup>who were</sup> being exchanged for our wounded

a I cannot say for <sup>whom</sup> I do not know that they were being exchanged. I make the point that I think that the staff work as regards Supply and Transport and Communications ~~should be made~~ improved and a great many of the difficulties are due to the lack of supervision <sup>small</sup> of detail which could be remedied. On the river steamer, for instance there was a kind of carelessness which <sup>would like to refer to</sup> I think is bad. The heat was terrific. It is very hard to visualise the conditions when people do

not know the country. The steamers had only a single awning <sup>and</sup> there were cases of heat-stroke. The captain was asked about it and he said that he had applied for a double awning <sup>ago</sup> weeks and weeks <sup>but</sup> <sup>ago</sup> nothing had been done. That is one case I know. A thing like that ought not to happen. It is easy to ~~make~~ provide <sup>what does</sup> a double awning on the boat. ~~The~~ a the Mejidiah I think it is called

3574 Chairman: Who was in charge of the Transport and Supply department

a I cannot tell you

3575 2 I rested with them to supply the awning

a I think so but I am not quite sure. As far as myself <sup>Certainly</sup> ~~as~~ ~~under~~ the conditions ~~were~~ for the boat going up river in the hot weather <sup>were</sup> ~~and~~ down <sup>were</sup> very bad

3576 3 Commander Wedgwood: Unnecessarily bad

a I think unnecessarily bad

3577 4 General Sir Neville Lyttelton: When was this

a I went up to Amara sometime back, in June.  
I think

3578 5 Lord Hugh Cecil: Was there ice available

a a little ice was available. There is always a great shortage of ice there of course

3579 6 Chairman: On the steamers?

a On the steamers. A medical officer on board was himself ill. He died did all he could <sup>with the</sup> ~~cases~~ heat stroke <sup>as well</sup>. When the water is any temperature you like, you cannot get quick remedies

3580 7 Lord Hugh Cecil: Was there adequate ice for the treatment of people who had heat stroke.

a There was a little ice on board. I did not see it used. I do not think there is anything to be said about that. Ice was there.

3581

Chairman Does a medical officer go on board  
a medical officer goes on board the "Mejidieh". I  
do not know if there is one on every boat  
Sir Archibald Williamson: Had Cook's boats arrived  
from the Nile?

3582

a I think so. I am pretty sure I saw a good many  
of them in Cairo before I left.

3583

I were they successful

a No. they were not very good steamers I should  
think

3584

Chairman: The third point in your statement is:  
"Views on the general question of communication  
necessities. The comparative value of steamer &  
and railway transport, and the desirability  
of immediate amelioration of these questions"

a I have only to say what I think is pretty obvious  
to any body - that it is my view that a railway  
should be built and probably <sup>one</sup> two, and ~~it~~  
ought to have been built very much earlier,  
or it should have been made very clear whether  
the difficulties in building a railway behind  
the troops up ~~&~~ the Tigris were too great to  
be overcome

3585

Lord Hugh Cecil: Kurna to Amara and Basra, <sup>to Basryah</sup>  
a Yes. There should have been a railway built in  
my judgment to follow the troops along —  
as they went up the river. Lord <sup>remained</sup>  
Kitchener refused to depend upon <sup>simply</sup> river  
transport in the Soudan campaign. I found it  
difficult to get reliable evidence as to how great  
the difficulties in building the Tigris railway  
would be. It seems obvious that no very definite  
decision or expert advice had been taken early  
as to whether <sup>the</sup> railway could or could not

be built. We know <sup>that</sup> there are great difficulties in the marsh country, but those of us who know the country believe that a light railway is perfectly feasible. A railway is obviously necessary for <sup>the</sup> army in the field, and I beg that question may be cleared up.

3586

Commander Wedgwood: There is no difficulty in taking a railway to Skut up the Shat-el-Hai.

— The marshes do not affect that part.

a The floods would affect that part

3587

Sir Archibald Williamson: Can you go back from the river so far as to get land free from marshes?

a Yes, but the marshes <sup>go</sup> a considerable way in. A road has been built <sup>with</sup> <sup>on</sup> a bund or raised embankment for the whole way I think, or a considerable part of the way at any rate, between Kurna and Amara and it has stood the weather conditions very well. I cannot see why a line should not be made on the top of it.

3588 2 Sir Archibald Williamson: Is the country <sup>not</sup> very different from the Valley of the Nile in that respect  
a Yes

3589 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge: Would much bridging be required in crossing creeks

a Yes, a good deal of bridging would be required, and it has already been done in many areas— wooden trestle bridges

3590 2 Some of the creeks have bridges

a A great many. The road from Kurna to Amara is <sup>bridged</sup> <sup>by</sup> pretty constantly on trestle bridging

8 3591 Lord Hugh Cecil: Does that roadwork fairly well.  
a As far as I know, fairly well.

3592 2 Does it take motor traffic

✓ 1) I do not think so. It takes mule wagons, country carts and so on

✓ 2) Chairman: Were there many motor boats on the river when you were there

A A certain number of light launches. There was a great shortage of tugs

3594 2) Were the launches provided by the Government or by private associations

A I saw a few red-cross craft <sup>ones</sup> which I think had been given by private organizations. The main supply was entirely by the <sup>Government</sup> Army I think. I feel sure that all the Army <sup>Commanders</sup> of the various departments who had launches must have been supplied by the Government

3595 Lord Hugh Cecil: Did you hear anything of the conversion of heavy craft, motor boats or other transport to Government purposes.

A No, I heard nothing about it one way or the other. The railway question seems to me to be the ~~natural and~~ most vital point now. If the communication question is cured, I believe it is fairly easily capable of being cured, almost all the difficulties that you have in the campaign will be immensely ~~improved~~ lessened if they do not entirely disappear. The defects in regard to sick transport, military power and effectiveness against the enemy, are all due in my judgment or mainly due, to ~~means of Command~~ defective organization

3596 Commander Wedgwood: That is not merely your own judgment but the view of the <sup>of the</sup> most important people out there

A It is the view of every sane person whom I met in a private capacity. I do not want to quote it officially

3597

Sir Archibald Williamson: What is being done

a I cannot answer very clearly. ~~The Tigris river and~~  
~~with regard to railway~~  
~~the Euphrates river~~  
~~when I left~~  
 railway ~~matters were~~  
~~proceeding at a very~~  
~~casual pace.~~  
~~When I arrived~~ saw no signs of  
 rapid advance or of immense energy

3598

2 Is that towards Nasiriayah

a Yes

3599

2 Shaiba being 18 miles away  
a Yes3600 Commander Wedgwood: Had they reached Shaiba then

a No

3601 Lord Hugh Cecil: When did you ~~arrive~~ leave  
a. The end of December, July.3602 Sir Archibald Williamson: Was that being built with the  
German material on the spot

a I do not think so, but I could not speak positively

603 Chairman: That would not relieve the main line of transporta. No. As long as our ~~boundaries~~, <sup>strategy and tactics</sup> are the same and our  
the main important railway must be the  
Tigris Railway3604 Admiral Sir Cyprian Broome: Would that railway which  
you speak of relieve the difficulties of the Hammar Lake  
a. The Euphrates Railway?

3605

2 Yes

a. I could not speak positively about that - I do not know

3606 Chairman: Is the communication between Kurna and  
Nasiriayah easier than on the Tigrisa. I did not go up. I cannot speak from experience. There  
is nothing like the same congestion. There was only a  
brigade at Nasiriayah when I was there, and I do  
not think there is much difficulty3607 Lord Hugh Cecil: The Euphrates Railway would not touch  
Kurna at all; it would go direct

a. It would not touch Basra. It skirts the marshes

Chair

3608 Chairman: That is not the railway which is most wanted  
 A. No; the railway most urgently needed and upon which  
<sup>the remedy for</sup>  
<sup>so many defects in my judgment depends is the Tigris Railway</sup>  
<sup>that is the railway from Kuona to Kalaat Salih Amara</sup>  
 and Es Sinn

3609 Lord Hugh Cecil: Es Sinn is the present front  
 A. Yes

3610 Chairman: Is the other railway begun? The Kuona Railway  
 A was ~~beginning~~ when I was there. I remember that I went  
 up with an Officer who was ~~beginning~~ it

3611 Commander Bedgood: What kind of do you mean by "beginning"  
 were any rails laid

A. There was no sign from the ~~bank~~ river bank of any  
 railway anywhere, but I cannot say what there may  
 have been at a further distance. I had no knowledge  
<sup>of</sup> anything being done

3612 Sir Cyprian Bridge: Were they doing any bridging in the  
 Hammam Lake

A. I do not know. I am afraid I do not know anything  
 about the conditions of the Hammam Lake

3613 Chairman In your view, and I suppose in the view of everybody  
 this deficiency of transport has a very detrimental effect  
 on the troops

A. Yes

3614 2. Has it affected their moral spirits

A. I was not up at the front with the troops but I think there  
 is no doubt that the moral of the troops suffered from the  
 severe conditions

3615 2. Is there a feeling of isolation or desolation and that they  
 are not being given proper care of.

A. I think there is a considerable feeling that they are not  
 being properly fed and that the conditions are unnecessarily  
 bad. Those of us who were at the Dardanelles and who  
 have <sup>realised</sup> the difficulties there, know that the condition

in Mesopotamia are very much worse. The climate is very much worse. There were great difficulties in transport and supply at the Dardanelles, but they were overcome there in a very different way, ~~than~~ the way in which they have been tackled in Mesopotamia.

General Sir Nevile Lyttelton There was a very short line

~~there were~~ A very great difficulties in landing in bad weather under fire and so on. There is a long line of sea communication

Chairman Have you any information with regard to the hospitals.

were you at the hospital at all

A. No I was not. With regard to ~~all~~ <sup>point 4</sup> forms of the dysentery, I think that a great deal of the sickness is caused by troops who come out there not behaving properly, taking into account the conditions. I do not know if they are lectured on the way out or the officers are lectured as to how troops should be handled in tropical countries and particularly in Mesopotamia. I saw sights in Basra in the main camps that would account for any amount of sickness - Troops were bathing constantly

when the sun was up, which would kill me or most people. <sup>They were</sup> People going about in ~~vegs~~ <sup>vegs</sup> in the daytime; and <sup>pieces</sup> ~~conditions~~ of that kind are bound to make men dangerously ill or affect their health at once. I thought the medical officers in charge of a unit should not allow their men to do these things or the conditions should have been explained very clearly to all ranks before they landed. <sup>With regard to</sup> Officers who are new to tropical climates it is very necessary to explain that exposure to the sun under certain conditions must <sup>cause severe</sup> affect a illness, and anybody who behaved, as some of the troops were allowed to behave, bathing <sup>exposed</sup> in the sun and walking about insufficiently clothed, would certainly get ill.

3618

Commander Wedgwood: Were they all wearing helmets at the time

A. Yes, but there was a good deal of lack of organisation.

Certainly troops ought not to be allowed to battle <sup>in the open</sup> for instance.

3619

General Sir Nevile Lyttelton: <sup>was here</sup> Want of discipline

A. I question whether the orders were given. want of discipline is disobedience to the orders

3620

Commander Wedgwood: These were drafts, <sup>not</sup> ~~the~~ regular regiments

A. ~~There were~~ <sup>I saw</sup> troops I saw at Mataria Camp. There would be drafts and troops brought back from the front.

3621

Chairman: with regard to transport of troops between Basra and India do you have something to say?


A. It refers to Indian troops. I want to put this as forcibly as I can - that considering the extraordinary fine way in which Indian troops have fought ~~it is important that they should be properly treated~~ <sup>for the sake of India and other reasons</sup> it is important that they should be properly treated. I can give my own experience only. I came down on a transport as good a ship as you could want. The "Lieutenant", British India, an excellent ship. I was not in charge; I was a passenger and it was not my business to interfere <sup>with</sup> or comment on the conditions in any way. We got on board in the evening and I think 1100 Indian sick were brought on board at the trooper hours after sunset. I paid very little attention to their being put on. That was all done tolerably well no doubt. Next day at about midday when going down river I went purely from curiosity <sup>down</sup> between decks to see what the conditions were, and I can say quite unhesitatingly <sup>now</sup> the conditions were deplorable and most improper. I speak very strongly about that because I think it is most important. I do not say that it is so in every instance the Ghurkas, the Sikhs <sup>Punjabis</sup>, the Mahomedans <sup>and so on</sup> were all mixed up which is very undesirable. A Sikh cannot help a Mahomedan if he wishes and he will not in any case. As you know natives will not help each other much in any

3629

any case, but where religion intervenes they will not touch each other. These men were so called Convalescents. One's impression <sup>with regard to</sup> Mesopotamia is that a convalescent is a man for whom there is no room in the hospital owing to pressure. I do not think that that is a very incorrect statement as to what is officially called a convalescent. Certainly a very large number of these men were <sup>terrible</sup> ill, and <sup>were</sup> convalescents in no sense of the term. They were hospital ship or cot cases if ever there were such cases. Scarsy was very <sup>very</sup> bad. <sup>There was very</sup> bad ague and fever and acute dysentery and the men were put down ~~on~~ between decks fairly crowded and nothing was being done for them at all when I went down. Speaking the language but not being <sup>very</sup> conversant with Indian conditions I went to another officer on board who was as irresponsible as myself, merely a passenger, and asked him to see the conditions. I was afraid I might have aggravated them, but although he had spent his whole life in India ~~but~~ he was more horrified if anything than I was. The staff of that ship was one British Medical Officer who no doubt did all he could, one native doctor <sup>who</sup> was pretty useless and could do nothing unless compelled to, and two native orderlies, as I was told, and I think it is true. There was practically no organisation of any kind and such a staff could not hope to deal with 1100 sick men. There were over 1000, and I was told 1100.

Chairman: Were they practically all discharged hospital patients? They must have all come from hospital. They were called convalescents but it is not a fair term to apply to them. No doubt you have had evidence before you already as to what constitutes a convalescent in practice in Mesopotamia. Anyhow they were men who were <sup>sick</sup> ~~freedom~~ all and who had had most severe conditions. Their rations were improper. I <sup>saw</sup> myself to eat dry gram

gram  
~~a sort of dry food~~ being served out to men who had scurvy,  
 whose lips and ~~hands~~<sup>nostrils</sup> were so swollen that they could  
 not attempt to eat it. There was <sup>a certain quantity of</sup> milk on board — a  
~~certain quantity~~ I believe, but the sick men for whom I  
 was anxious were far too ill to care. Nobody was  
 taking the milk round to them, and eventually I and  
 another officer got permission from the officer on board  
 to buy milk ourselves and take it round to these cases  
 which we did each day. It is sufficient to say that the  
 conditions were gross on that ship and ~~the~~  
 must have had a most deplorable effect  
 on the minds of the Indian troops, and I know <sup>that</sup> in fact  
~~it~~ <sup>they</sup> did.



Hornbl

3624 Admiral Sir Ayuan Bridge What was the date of this

- 1 Towards the end of July
- 2 This year
- 3 Yes.

3625 Sir Archibald Williamson After the Second Commission had finished their ~~en~~ inquiries

- A These conditions in my judgment are not the least bad for individual officers. The Medical officer in charge of the ship for instance could not deal with a situation like that. The full lies in men who should be taken on hospital ships being put on transports and so on

3627 Commander Wedgwood why ~~should~~ not the medical officer get volunteers given among yourselves to help under circumstances like that. There are <sup>always</sup> numbers of military men going down

- + I think that the medical officers themselves were worn out. Their <sup>man</sup> had been doing heroic work in the hospitals; he was absolutely worn out, and had not enough energy to tackle a big situation like that. He did the best he could. There was no organisation. I do not think that anybody died as a matter of fact; I do not know for certain.

3628 Sir Archibald Williamson How many days were you at sea

- + ~~It is~~  $4\frac{1}{2}$  days <sup>Karachi</sup> to Karachi. Some were destined to ~~Kuttrah~~ and some to Bombay ~~Bombay~~

3629 Creaman Where did they come from

- + From the Indian base hospital, Dungarpur ~~or~~ No 3 general hospital in Poona - I do not know

3630 Rao Hugh Cecil Can you give any further details because it is important in examining other witnesses for us to have these facts before us

I would tell you in detail what I saw if it does not waste time and why I thought the conditions grievous.

Chairman who would discharge those people as convalescent & ~~I have no knowledge of~~ <sup>to be on the</sup> how they came ~~on~~ ship. I was merely a witness of what ~~were~~ what they went through on the ship. They probably came from the base hospital at Basra and very properly were sent off to India as soon as possible. When I went down below the first man I saw was a native lying sick helpless on the deck suffering from acute dysentery: he had been in the stages of acute dysentery with all that it means just using the deck round him instead of the water-closet. The stench and filth were unbearable. Nobody had moved him or looked after him <sup>and</sup> he was lying face downwards and looking very bad. He was not dying I think. I went ~~with~~ <sup>on further and saw a</sup> number of ~~the~~ cases of acute lying huddled <sup>very</sup> ~~being~~ with no blankets and nothing had been done for them. The men crowded round me as I went up and said that ~~they~~ <sup>the statement</sup> ~~had~~ <sup>some</sup> had nothing to eat since the evening before, some of them said since the morning before. I cannot say whether that was correct. I know that natives are very apt to say that they have not eaten when they have, so I did not pay ~~too~~ too much attention to that but it was so general that I had to pay <sup>a</sup> good deal of attention to it. I found on the next deck one havildar with a gang of people round him. He was distributing rations of some kind amidst

a great hubbub. I stopped the hubbub and asked him what he was doing. He said that he was giving out rations. One man could not distribute rations to all that crowd; it was utterly impossible. Cooking pots at this time had not been given to the troops but eventually cooking pots were found and arrangements were gradually made. It was found impossible to reorganise the ship and put all the Sikhs ~~together~~<sup>all the</sup>, of Mohammedans ~~and~~<sup>but</sup> Hindus together as they should have been in my judgment. The best ~~so~~ was done afterwards that we could do under the circumstances. There were no stretchers on board for moving men about and I may say this so that you may visualize the state to which the men had been reduced in many cases; ~~that when I went round with milk and filled cans with Nestle's milk and water~~ I got a man to carry them round with me, we took the worst cases. The men who were far too ill to complain and gave them milk. I remember ~~that in one~~ ~~case~~ in many cases the Brahmin drank out of the same glass as a Punjabi Mohammedan next door to him, which in ~~face~~ <sup>itself</sup> would have created a mutiny in ordinary times. All of them eagerly took anything you could give them & I do not think that I can visualise it more definitely than that to show how great their need was or how bad their conditions were.

- 2 Was the ship intended for hospital work or was it an ordinary transport?
- It was an ordinary transport. It was obviously in this case intended for the carriage of ~~the~~

## Convalescents

- 3633 Lord Hugh Cecil There was no hospital equipment  
A There was no hospital equipment. I went over  
the ship twice a day — and never  
~~saw~~  
~~had~~ any
- 3634 Sir Archibald Williamson ~~was~~ <sup>the</sup> deck where they were ~~so~~  
~~had~~ used for passengers in ordinary <sup>peace or war</sup> times, & ~~the~~  
~~a cargo deck~~
- A I should think most certainly so. The deck was fit  
for natives who were really convalescent
- 3635 2 Was it light and airy  
A There were port holes. It is not very airy  
at  $110^{\circ}$ . That was bad
- 3636 Commander Wedgwood Do you think that that sort  
of thing goes on every time a cargo of convales-  
cents goes ~~on~~ <sup>away</sup>? Did you hear whether it was  
general or was this a particularly bad case?  
A I never ~~in regard to that~~ enquired <sup>into the conditions</sup>. I had left  
Bassea you see. It was not my business.  
I merely saw this and I thought it very bad  
and ~~that~~ was only fair to tell the Commission
- 3637 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge This happened about eight  
or nine weeks ago
- A Towards the end of July
- 3638 Chairman Where did you land  
A I landed for an hour or two at Karachi <sup>and</sup>  
went on to Bombay
- 3639 2 The bulk landed ~~where~~ <sup>where</sup> at Bombay ?  
A Karachi I think. Once we touched Karachi  
the conditions seemed to be first rate! —  
I ~~had~~ <sup>had</sup> ~~Bombay~~ —  
+ I could not say. I went into the hospital to  
— as? —  
and everybody spoke well of the hospital ~~and~~  
of an

~~of the arrangements~~. Everything was done promptly and well. They were given clean things at all events once and everything seemed excellent for Archibald Williamson. Were there not sufficient hospital ships?

A More were sent I know. I imagine they were only put on this transport because there was not room in the hospital ships.

3641 2 If 12 000 new cases of sickness in July ~~20~~ were evacuated to India <sup>you took only</sup> took a 10th or a 12th. You do not know about the rest.

A I know that the number of sick was immense. It was ~~during that time~~. I cannot say what the numbers were. I have a considerable knowledge of Eastern conditions and ~~I think that it~~ it will have a very grievous effect recruiting in the future in India if troops are treated in that way. It may be an isolated instance. I have no reason to suppose otherwise.

3642 Chairman You have a note in your Statement "Condition of Zemindar Prisons Camps".  
A I put that down because I have seen in the papers that they were bad.

I merely wish to state that I think they were excellently run.

3643 Earl of Donoughmore: - At Basra

A Yes: They were run as well as the conditions permitted. I talked to prisoners and they were all very content.

3644 Chairman: Who ran the camps under

A I cannot remember the name of the office. It was a junior office. They would come under the A. P. & M.'s Department. I do not know who the senior office was.

A.P.M's

3645 Commander Wedgwood. The Provost Marshal

*15  
16*

A The Provost Marshal. I was probably the only person who could talk comfortably with the Turks. I know Turks and I know when they are contented. They were thoroughly satisfied and contented with the way in which <sup>the</sup> prisoners were treated.

3646

Circularman. As regards the last paragraph you are able to give evidence as <sup>to</sup> regards the Civil administration of the occupied territories and our relations with the Arab tribes. I should rather like to put a general question to you. What has been the effect on the tribes of our failure to reach Baghdad. I daresay you discussed this question with Sir Percy Cox.

A It is rather a difficult question to answer. The Arab tribes are in a very difficult position. They are between the Turks and ourselves and their attitude is determined entirely, or practically entirely, by military success or failure.

3647 2 Is the failure to reach Baghdad looked on as a great military failure, or does the fact that we held our position close to Kut counteract ~~all~~ that impression?

A It is difficult to give a direct answer. The Arabs behind the Turkish lines will be entirely pro-Turk and those on our side, the Montifik, ~~and~~ and ~~the~~ other big tribes, have certainly I think ~~been~~ probably <sup>been</sup> restrained from more openly <sup>or</sup> connecting with us by the knowledge of our failure, but I do not think that they are very seriously concerned affected.

3648

2 You do not think that the failure to get to Baghdad and the failure to relieve Kut has had an <sup>adverse</sup> ~~disastrous~~ effect on our prestige?

3649 A It certainly has had an adverse effect, but it is an effect that will be rapidly counteracted by any military success. Of course it has had an adverse effect ~~but it~~ is not irretrievable.

Lord Hugh Cecil Now in the meantime dangerous?

A That is another matter. ~~I think that~~ Our long unprotected line of communication is always susceptible of great interruption. It is always threatened by rebels. We have been singularly fortunate. This applies to ~~anywhere~~ up River.

Sir Percy Cox has done remarkably fine work there ~~by~~ <sup>and</sup> his influence with the rebels ~~and~~ the administration he has set up, has done a wonderful deal to keep them quiet and contented and prevent them from harassing our communications.

3650

Chairman You know what the primary object of the expedition going up to Bassra was. In its initial stages would you say that it was justified?

A It was absolutely essential to go there, possibly not on the ~~now~~ grounds which some people advocated, ~~but for~~ for the protection of the oil fields, although that was necessary. It was absolutely essential to go to Basra. I would not say how much further at ~~the~~ moment.

3651

Earl of Darnborough One question arising out of what the chairman just put to you as regards the attitude of the rebels. I have noticed somewhere in the telegrams that have come here the suggestion that the rebels ~~were~~ <sup>had</sup> a disposition so to speak would have helped the Turk with information and so on rather than to help us. Have you come across that at all?

17  
3652 A The Arab predisposition would be entirely anti-Dark, but on second thoughts he would always assist those people who he thought were going to win. The Arab predisposition clearly is entirely anti-Dark.

Lord Hugh Cecil. With regard to the channel between Kuma and Bassa you told us that ocean going steamers could go up to what sort of draft can now go

A I cannot answer definitely but I think at most times of the year, certainly when the river is highish, a 3,000 ton two decker steamer could get to Kuma

3653 2 You say it is very little done now

A I think very little done

3654 2 What is the reason for that

A I cannot tell you. There are no discharging facilities there. I do not think that the question has been studied. I was not afraid to seal up the river and I would not like to speak too positively

3655 2 There is no great difficulty and danger in the navigation?

+ No; Ships can get up there

3656 Mr John Stodge: Would you care to give us the name of the officer who expressed himself strongly with respect to the conditions <sup>aboard</sup> that ship

A I should ~~think~~ it very, very much prefer not to. He is a regimental officer

3657 Cleverman Was he an officer <sup>or</sup> to the experience  
+ Yes

3658 Commander Wedgwood I want to know first of all whether you think there are enough nurses

in the country. Did you hear ~~the~~<sup>of</sup> requests for  
more nurses

A No

3659

2 There were none on board this boat you spoke of.  
A No; there were two nurses invalided <sup>aboard</sup> ~~on~~ <sup>aboard</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>boat</sup> ~~you speak of~~.

3660

2 ~~Each~~ going as passengers

2 You <sup>said</sup> that there is great labour difficulty at Bassra and that makes unloading difficult as well as repairs. ~ ~ ~ difficult

A There is a shortage of labour all round, as is said to be. ~ ~ there is great

3661

2 ~~How far do they get Indian labour from India.~~ what extent

A I cannot say but I have heard that Indian labour is very reluctant to come. We had the same difficulties you probably remember in the Dardanelles with regard to free labour, but I was impressed <sup>to</sup> persuaded to come and we have greater powers in India of persuasion than we had in Greece. I do not think it an insuperable difficulty

3662

2 It is possible for Indian labourers to live there as at Mombasa for instance.

A Yes if they are given huts

3663

2 You have not heard of steps being taken to impress Indian labour

A There is Indian labour

3664

2 But it is free, not impressed

A I could not speak positively but I do not think there is any impressed labour. I do not know about that definitely.

3665

2 In listening to your evidence <sup>I am coming to the conclusion</sup> ~~I think you~~ <sup>that the</sup> most important point is railways and <sup>the</sup> ~~staff~~ <sup>a</sup> port at Bassra or Kurna

✓ Yes

- 3666 2 Is it your opinion that it would be worth while to send out somebody to report on how, say, a million of money could best be spent on the port of Bassa, assuming that we are going to stick to it
- A Most certainly; I think it highly desirable that somebody competent should go out
- 3667 2 Is it your opinion that the British Government in view of the permanent occupation of Bassa could perfectly well take in hand the making of it into a decent port and ~~that is~~ should get in information on that subject first of all
- A I think it very important that that should be done. I think that it is capable of being made into an extraordinarily fine port
- 3668 2 You say that that for a year <sup>and a half</sup> after the expedition was started practically nothing was done
- A I would not like to say that practically nothing was done, but I do not think that anything had been done which could be characterised as changing Bassa into ~~being~~ a very useful port
- 3669 2 There was no sign of making it into a permanent British port
- A That is certainly so. That is just how I would like to put it. I cannot think of anything
- 3670 2 To take steps to make it into a permanent British port would be one of the best things this Committee could recommend
- A It is most desirable
- 3671 2 Is that your opinion  
A Yes, I think it a very proper and right thing to do
- 3672 2 Mr Archibald Williamson Is it not the case that ~~only~~ the vessels drawing 20 feet long

3673

- access to Basra and vessels drawing 14 feet have access to Kurna  
 + I am not sure exactly as to the size of the ships. That sounds about correct  
 2 It has been I think given in evidence before the Commissioner that there is only one good port in that part of the world and that is Koweit. Is it not perhaps a more politic thing for our Government to spend money on making a port at Koweit and ~~a~~ a railway from there, than ~~do~~ it from Basra  
 A That opens up the whole Baghdad railway question. My own view is that Basra must be the main outlet and the main port, and not Koweit

3674 2

- You spoke of vessels going to Kurna to discharge. It has been given in evidence that there is no impossibility in vessels drawing 14 feet going to Kurna, but you must be aware that very few steamers <sup>vessels</sup> draw so little as 14 feet. They are not built except for special trade

- + Speaking without expert knowledge I should have thought that in the British <sup>India</sup> Company's service there were a considerable number of steamers drawing about 14 feet. A very large number of steamers drawing 18 to 20 feet could <sup>not</sup> come up into the river now. Some of them <sup>are</sup> often semi-discharged or semi-loaded outside

3675

- 2 At ~~Karachi~~ F?

Q Yes

- 3676 Commander Wedgwood Any improvement of the port of Basra would mean dredging the bar  
 + Yes

3677 2 The whole point is dredging operations  
A Yes. It was decided in the Baghdad railway  
negotiations that there was no difficulty  
whatever in dredging the bar. It is a perfectly  
feasible operation and ~~has been~~ reported on favourably  
I believe by everybody concerned. It has always  
been assumed that that would be done directly  
any civilised power occupied Basra

3678 Ques ~~since~~ Fitchbold Wilkinson. For a temporary purpose  
money might well be spent on Basra, but I  
was thinking of ~~permanence~~ occupation and that was  
why I was asking the question  
A Exactly

3679 2 I suppose, Captain Lloyd ~~you were there in~~  
~~and other~~ conditions  
times of peace and permanent ~~arrangements~~  
the railway starts from Koweit or not it  
will still go ~~through~~ <sup>to</sup> Basra. That is the  
course proposed is it not

A The railway would certainly come to Basra.  
Speaking of it from north to south it would  
probably ~~have~~ <sup>be</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>connected</sup> to Koweit.

3680 2 You said that there were no wharves at  
Basra ~~and~~ you thought there might be one  
wharf at Magill

A Yes

3681 2 General Gorringe gave us the impression that vessels  
were now discharging as a matter of custom  
at wharves there. He did not say it in definite  
words

A If he gave you the impression that ocean going  
vessels were discharging at Basra at wharves  
(I am not speaking of Mayhill <sup>among others</sup> I have not seen  
it. I do not think that there is a single  
place on the banks where without profit  
land

lading stages a vessel could discharge. At Mafgill one vessel comes alongside to discharge and possibly two.

3682 Chairman He was speaking of Mafgill I think  
He said I think that only two could discharge  
at a time

A Basra is going to be of <sup>sufficient</sup> commercial importance  
in the future not to deter us from spending  
money on it now from a military point of view.  
In any case it is going to be of immense  
importance

3683 Sir Archibald Williamson In what capacity were you  
there nine years ago ~~was sent~~

A ~~Nine years ago~~ I went down by the government  
to write a Blue book on the ~~economic~~ conditions  
of the country. We were considering whether we  
might take a closer economic interest in it as  
well as German and Turks.

~~I~~ I was sent down there as a Trade  
Commissioner to write a Blue book ~~on the~~ <sup>that</sup> whole  
area between the Persian Gulf <sup>and</sup> the Black Sea

3684 2 There was much a large trade in Basra  
~~as that being~~ considerable trade

3685 2 Do you know anything about the tonnage of exports  
and imports

~~I~~ I could give them but I have not them <sup>here</sup> ~~here~~

3686 2 One firm I heard employed 7000 labourers  
~~I~~ Yes

3687 2 During the date season

~~I~~ During the date season

3688 2 Would that be for picking up or shipping dates  
~~I~~ Picking packing and shipping

3689 2 The Vincent Commissioner reported in April. We  
are told that at that date the transport  
are

accommodation on the river was capable of taking up ~~25,000~~<sup>2</sup> tons a day. You said that 40,000 tons were waiting where you were there

- 1 I give the figures with reserve. That was how it was represented to me by a fairly competent person. I have forgotten who it was, ~~he~~<sup>was</sup> was ~~an end of all~~ <sup>commenting on the</sup> congestion. He said to me "There are 40,000 tons of goods lying in this harbour to day and the monthly discharge capacity of the harbour is 30,000 tons". That is how the matter was represented to me. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of it.

3690

- 2 If ~~250~~<sup>200</sup> tons a day was the capacity of the river fleet it would take 120, ~~000~~<sup>000</sup> days to deal with ~~2,000,000~~<sup>0,000</sup> tons

- 1 I do not think that that is the logic of it at all. A great deal of it would be left at the place ~~back~~ and not go forward at all

3691

- 2 The bulk of the consumption is where the people are

- 1 Yes, but a great deal is required at Basra  
2 You did not see a great deal of Indian labour employed

A No

3693

- 2 ~~If~~ <sup>We</sup> you asked if any effort had been made to get Indian labour. We were told that it had been recommended and some had been brought but not an adequate supply. Would that correspond with your information

- A That would correspond with my impression  
2 Did you hear anything when you <sup>were</sup> ~~were~~ about the condition of the drinking water  
A I heard references of a complimentary and opposite character made to ~~it~~

but it has been properly dealt with. It is all chlorinated

- 3695 Q What ~~said you~~ was what you had to drink?  
 A Not all that I personally drank I think as a matter of fact, but I know that on the river steamers the tanks are chlorinated

- 3696 Lord Hugh Cecil You are sure of that  
 A I am sure of it. I know that it is so at Amara. I am sure of it and I know that at Basra most of the main drinking tanks are chlorinated

- 3697 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge Does that ~~not~~ make them <sup>the water</sup> perfectly innocuous  
 A I am not competent to say & understand so

- 3698 ~~Lord Hugh~~ Cecil Was the chlorination done with an inefficient process? You never heard the suggestion that it was inefficient and that the water was after all, impure

- A I never heard any suggestion of it

- 3699 Q You do not believe it

- A I have no reason to believe it at all; I have the greatest confidence in it

- 3700 Sir Archibald Williamson Was anything being done when you were there to provide vegetables for the troops. Were there efforts to grow them specially

- A The troops at the front I believe very rarely saw vegetables. There was a certain quantity in Basra, and a supply of onions and so on. There again it is a question of communication. I heard the possibility of growing vegetables discussed but only in an academic way. It would take a great deal of organisation to get Arabs to grow them in a large quantity. The ~~onions~~ things can be got at Basra but <sup>is</sup> not much good

- 21 if you cannot get them up. They can bring them from India
- 2 Is there land suitable for growing vegetables  
A Yes I think so, but I should thought it simpler on the whole to get them mainly from India, anti-scorbutics and so on
- 3702 Commander Wedgwood They will not keep  
A Onions well - not potatoes
- 3703 Sir Archibald Williamson Was anything done to get dried vegetables  
A I do not know
- 3704 General Sir Neville Lyttelton Was any attempt made at all to separate the castes on board the steamer that you ~~saw~~ saw  
A I cannot say; they were not separated
- 3705 Castes  
2 Was it very much crowded  
A There was not a great deal of over crowding I should say
- 3706 2 There was an impossibility of getting medical attendance  
A I contended that men as sick as that should be put on ships with greater facilities for comfort and medical attendance
- 3707 2 They were not convalescents you think  
A They were not in my judgment or in <sup>the</sup> judgment of any doctor's judgment, convalescents in the proper meaning of the term. They were men very ill; I do not think any need as a matter of fact but the conditions were very bad
- 3708 General Sir Cyriax Bridge When you said that no ocean steamer went up to Kaura was that because of the draught or were the banks of the river too ~~sharp~~ <sup>sharp</sup> or the channels too narrow  
A They do not habitually go there to unload.

I did not mean to leave the impression that none went to Kurna

3709 2 Do they ~~not~~ habitually <sup>not</sup> go because of the question of drought

A I should say that the authorities have realized rather late the possibility of ocean going steamers going to Kurna and there is not much point in their discharging at Kurna if there is no railway from Kurna. The point of their discharge <sup>from a</sup> Kurna becomes operative if <sup>to be</sup> you have a railway from Kurna

3710 2 It would obviate the river transport & if you had a roadway from Kurna and could take an ocean going steamer along side a wharf at Kurna then you would save not loading and unloading. That is what one seeks to avoid from a labour point of view

3711 2 You mentioned amongst the cases of ~~apposed~~ cannibalism on board the steamer that you returned to India in case of scurvy. Was scurvy prevalent amongst the inhabitants generally before we went there from your knowledge of the country

A No I do not think so

3712 2 Scurvy in the case of the British Army in Mesopotamia is preventable then

A It is merely a question of giving fresh meat and vegetables, I should judge, ~~any~~

3713 2 Or any anti scurbutics that can be given

A Yes always -

3714 2 An officer commanding ~~in~~ regiment I think at Alamein I am not quite sure - said that he had been a year in the country and had never known what it was to be ~~case~~ short of <sup>short</sup> ~~case~~ of proper food

food and that he had only eating ~~beef~~, <sup>but</sup> beef 12 or 14 times in the whole of his stay there. Does it occur to you that there is no insufficiency of supplies <sup>but</sup> imperfect distribution of supplies?

<sup>a2</sup>  
1 I cannot speak of the feeding conditions of the troops at the front with any certainty because I was not myself ~~so~~ there. The complaints were wide and general as to improper feeding. Scurvy cases were very numerous. You cannot get scurvy from anything, I am told by doctors except improper diet. Therefore whether there was sufficient or insufficient food, to that extent it is obvious that the food which reached the troops was not of the proper character. With regard to supply I do not think it <sup>the amount</sup> was very lavish.

<sup>3</sup>  
2 We have evidence that 250 tons daily can be sent from Bassar up river, and the ~~central~~ Supply and Transport officer at the front reported that his requirements were 350 tons a day. He was therefore 100 tons a day short. He goes on to say that the situation was saved by the fact that they could obtain provisions from the country round. From your knowledge of the country would <sup>it</sup> generally be the case. — where our troops are, & that there is an adequate supply.

<sup>37</sup>  
3 I From my general knowledge of the country I have found it difficult to understand why fresh meat in greater quantity could not be given to the troops. There is generally a pretty large herd of cattle in those areas and unless the Arabs have driven them all away which

I do not think they have, I have never been quite able to understand why we should not have been able to get hold of more cattle for the troops. But I have not been in the greatest this time so my evidence is not perhaps of much use with regard to that.

3716

Chairman General Farriye told us he made his troops <sup>as</sup> self supporting, but the conditions are more favorable ~~than~~ at ~~Moskowat~~

1 Yes I should say so. There are fewer troops. The ground has not been fought over so much and the villages are more settled, and more milk comes in

3717

Br. Mclelland Williamson Do the natives bring in stuff from the district  
+ Not in quantities sufficient for an army. We make certain purchases from them  
district

The natives withdraw

Adhered for a short time

Scratches

Lient