

Telephone: VICTORIA 4066.

Mesopotamia Commission,  
28, Abingdon Street,  
Westminster.

CORRESPONDENCE

with

LT GENERAL SIR FENTON AYLMER. K.C.B., V.C.

---

Copy.

L/33.

3

July 6th., 1917.

Dear Sir,

The Chairman has directed me to send your letter and memorandum to Sir Neville Lyttelton as you seem anxious that this should be done; but at the same time he directs me to explain that the Commission cannot consent to enter into any discussion with persons affected as to the grounds on which they had arrived at their decisions.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant

Lt-General Sir Fenton Aylmer. K.C.B., V.C.

44  
24

Mesopotamia Commission,  
28, Abingdon Street,  
Westminster.

4  
2. 7. 17.

From Lt. Genl. Sir J. Aylmer K.C. K.C.B.  
To the Secretary Mesopotamia Commission

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose a statement regarding the analysis of the General the Hon. Sir N. Lytton on the operations of the 7<sup>th</sup> to 9<sup>th</sup> March 1916.

I feel deeply that a very serious error as regards facts has been made especially with reference to the length of the night march. I would ask that the matter may be laid before Gen. Lytton at once, if possible before the pending debate in the House of Commons.

I am,

Sir,

Yours obedient servant.

J. Aylmer  
Lt. Genl.

5

Note on the Analysis of Gen. the hon. Sir N. Lyttelton.

Before giving my evidence as regards the night march against the Ess-Sinn position, I was unable to obtain a copy of the orders issued by me for this operation. It must be remembered that I was removed from the Command of the Tigris Corps on the 11th March 1916 and had to leave the front at the shortest notice, without having the opportunity of getting copies of certain documents, which would have been most useful to be in defending my conduct of operations, documents which, as in the case of the above, do not appear in any of the Diaries which have been lent to me for reference.

As regards p.p. 32,33 & 34 of the report I maintain respectfully that a serious misunderstanding is probable from the analysis given by General Sir N. Lyttelton. This particularly refers to the distances to be marched by the Troops in the night march. I would invite attention to appendix XXIV K of my evidence where I endeavoured to make this clear. In para. 15 Sir N. Lyttelton says "This army was expected to march about 14 miles in rather less than 9 hours". He undoubtedly means here from the rendezvous starting at 9 pm. to the place of deployment which was to be reached at 5.30 am. or as he has given it at line 2, 5.45 a.m. The distance was slightly under  $10\frac{1}{4}$  miles as can be measured from the map. This is what Genl. Kenball's Force had to do. The march from their bivouacs to the rendezvous was to be performed previous to 9 p.m. Gen. Sir N. Lyttelton in para 19 speaks of my operations being a "gamble", in which the odds against success were high. A mistake of  $3\frac{1}{4}$  miles out of 14 miles is a very serious factor in estimating whether excessive risks were taken by me.

As

As regards para. 19 I would call attention to appendix XXV of my evidence which clearly shows that I had pushed forward as far as possible consistent with keeping my intentions secret from the Turks. I could not have shortened the length of my night march more than I did, viz to 10 $\frac{1}{4}$  miles, from Rendezvous to place of deployment and as will be seen severe fault was found with me by both Sir B. Duff and Sir P. Lake for having done as much in this direction as I did.

As regards para. 15 I desire to state that I did not complain of the "scrappy" nature of my staff on this occasion. I added, as will be seen, a special note to my answer to question 18168 to say that my answer only referred to Gen. Kemball's staff. Previous remarks as regards the "scrappy" nature of my own staff referred to the fighting in January. Please see appendix IX of my evidence.

As regards para. 16 General Sir N. Lyttelton, with a certain proviso, seems to agree with Gen. Kemball that I should have changed my plan. I would call attention to Appendix XVII of my evidence where my full reasons against doing so are given. Gen. Sir N. Lyttelton does not refer in any way to my explanation.

In Para. 10 line 15, there is an error of fact. The battle referred to should be that at Hannah, viz. the 3rd battle, not that "on the Wadi" which was the 2nd battle.

In para. 11 it is stated that the Dujailah redoubt was about the right centre of the Turkish lines. Though in a sense strictly accurate this is misleading. Till a couple of days before the night march the Dujailah redoubt was the extreme right of the Turkish entrenched line; there was no

entrenched

7

entrenched line between it and the Hai. Just before the night march the Turks had begun to entrench between the Dujailah Redoubt and the Hai, but their works were incomplete and according to reports did not seem formidable at the time of starting the night march. The Dujailah Redoubt thus continued to be the extreme right of the seriously entrenched Turkish Line.

With reference to para. 11 the Hon. Sir N. Lyttelton says that a statement of mine is "bewildering" in view of the evidence given by Gen. Gorringe. I consider an explanation is most necessary. My evidence on this point is given in answer to question 18171 et seq. and Gen. Gorringe's in answer to question 2774 et seq.

It was known from the intelligence I had received that the Turks were keeping a strong reserve at Megasis on the Tigris. This was a natural tactical disposition. It was central for the extended line of defence and was certainly convenient as regards water supply, as water away from the Tigris is always a difficulty. This difficulty, however, applied to the whole of the Turkish Defences, except where close to the river. I do not remember that we had any reliable intelligence to prove that the water supply for the Turkish Troops at the Dujailah Redoubt was a greater source of difficulty in keeping troops there than at other parts of the line of defence away from the river, for example at the Sinn Afdar Redoubt. On the contrary I remember that aerial reconnaissance photographs showed, what we thought were, waterholes specially prepared in the Dujailah Depression near the Redoubt, and there also appeared to be bivouacs in the vicinity. When I drew up my plans I expected to find as high a proportion of first line troops in the Dujailah Redoubt as elsewhere on the Turkish lines of defence, except on the partially completed portions between the Dujailah Redoubt and the Hai.

My

My reason for choosing the Dujailah Redoubt as the point of attack was not its particularly weak garrison but the fact that when my plan was drawn up the Dujailah Redoubt was the extreme right flank of the Turkish position and we had a far better chance of success there than elsewhere as we could attack it from two sides and possibly from the rear, outflanking it completely. Being on a mound it was also an easy mark for the artillery. Though works connecting it with the Hai had just been commenced previously to the attack I did not expect them to be at all strong or strongly held. I therefore considered that my original plan should hold good in spite of these new defences. The entrenchments and redoubts elsewhere on the Turkish line of defence from the Dujailah Redoubt (inclusive) to the Tigris were very strong.

Gen. Gorrings's evidence certainly may be read to mean that the particularly weak garrison of the Dujailah Redoubt, in comparison with those of other parts of the line, was the primary reason for choosing the Dujailah Redoubt as the first point of attack. I maintain that this was not so. My main reason I have already given. I always anticipated that we should have a tough fight for the Dujailah Redoubt. A particularly weak garrison, in comparison with those elsewhere would certainly have added to the advantages of choosing it as the point of attack.

(Sd.) F.J. Aylmer, Lt.-Genl.  
2.7.17.

N.B.—This Form must accompany any inquiry respecting this Telegram.

10



# POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS.

N.B.—This Form must accompany any inquiry respecting this Telegram.

# POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS.

... of half the

9

Office Stamp

If the Receiver of an Inland Telegram doubts its accuracy, he may have it repeated on payment of half the amount originally paid for its transmission, any fraction of 1d. less than 1/2d. being reckoned as 1/2d.; and if it be found that there was any inaccuracy, the amount paid for repetition will be refunded. Special conditions are applicable to the repetition of Foreign Telegrams.

Office Stamp



Office of Origin and Service Instructions.

*Bastbourne A.*

Charges } s. d.  
to pay }

Handed }  
in at } 10.9.11 M.

Received }  
here at } 11.25.11

**TO**

*Secretary Mesopotamia Commission  
28 Abingdon St - Wmrs Ldr  
Am coming to see you  
on most urgent matter this  
afternoon trust you will grant  
me interview there is most  
serious error of fact page  
thirty three para fifteen a*



N.B.—This Form must accompany any inquiry respecting this Telegram.

10



THE TELEGRAPH CO. LTD., Lond.

# POST OFFICE TELEGRAPHS.

Office Name



If the Receiver of an Inland Telegram doubts its accuracy, he may have it repeated on payment of half the amount originally paid for its transmission, any fraction of 1d. less than 1/2d. being reckoned as 1/2d.; and if it be found that there was any inaccuracy, the amount paid for repetition will be refunded. Special conditions are applicable to the repetition of Foreign Telegrams.

Office of Origin and Service Instructions.

Charges }  
to pay }

s. d.

Handed }  
in at }

.M.,

Received }  
here at }

TO {

2

Reference to map will shew that fourteen miles is wrong it should be ten and a quarter there are other points shall arrive three pm General Aylmer Cavendish Hotel Eastbourne

Copy.

(25) 10A

121/3/620

Cavendish Hotel,  
Eastbourne.

2.7.17.

From:- Lt.Genl. Sir F.J. Aylmer, V.C., K.C.B.

To:- The Secretary, War Office.

Sir,

With reference to the Report of the Mesopotamian Commission, I have the honour to submit my remarks on certain points. I consider that these should be taken into immediate consideration for as it stands the report, as regards myself, is, in places, inaccurate as to absolute facts and, in others, somewhat misleading.

2. I would specially direct attention to p. 33 para 15 where the distance which the troops were supposed to march "in rather less than 9 hours" is given as 14 miles when it can be easily proved from the map that it was  $10\frac{1}{4}$  miles. In view of what is said at p. 34 para. 19 as regards the operation being in the nature of a "gamble", this error of  $3\frac{3}{4}$  miles is of the greatest importance.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) F.J. Aylmer

Lt. Genl.

11

Before giving my evidence as regards the night march against the Ess Sinn position I was unable to obtain a copy of the orders issued by me for this operation. It must be remembered that I was removed from the command of the Tiquis Corps on the 11<sup>th</sup> March 1916, and had to leave the front at the shortest notice without having the opportunity of getting copies of certain documents which would have been most useful to me in defending my conduct of operations, documents which, as in the case of the above, do not appear in any of the diaries, which have been lent to me for reference.

As regards p.p. 32, 33 & 34 of the report, I maintain respectfully that a serious misunderstanding is probable from the analysis of Gen. the Hon. Sir R. Lytton. This particularly refers to the distance to be marched by the troops in the night march. I would invite attention to Appx. ~~XXIV~~ K of my evidence where I endeavoured to make this clear. In para. 15 Gen. Lytton says "This army was expected to march about 14 miles in rather less than 9 hours." He undoubtedly means here from the Rendezvous, starting at 9 p.m., to the place of deployment which was to be reached at 5.30 a.m. or, as he has given it, at 5.45 a.m. The distance was slightly under  $10\frac{1}{4}$  miles as can be measured from the map. This is what Gen. Kemball's force had to do. The march from their bivouacs to the rendezvous was to be performed before 9 p.m. Gen. Lytton in para. 19 speaks of my operations being a "gamble" in which

The odds against success were high. A mistake of  $3\frac{3}{4}$  miles out of 14 miles is a very serious factor in estimating whether excessive risks were taken by me.

As regards para. 19. I would call attention to Appx XXV of my evidence, which clearly shows that I had pushed forward as far as possible consistent with keeping my intention secret from the Turks. I could not have shortened the length of my night march more than I did, viz to  $10\frac{1}{2}$  miles, from rendezvous to place of deployment, and as will be seen severe fault was found with me by Sir B. Duff & Sir P. Lake for my having done as much in this direction as I did.

As regards para 15 I desire to state that I did not complain of the "scrappy" nature of my staff on this occasion. I added, as will be seen, a special note to my answer to question 18168 to say that it referred to Gen. Kumball's staff. Previous remarks, as regards the "scrappy" nature of my staff, referred to the fighting in January. Please see appx. IX of my evidence.

As regards para. 16 Gen. Lytton, with a certain proviso, seems to agree with Gen. Kumball that I should have changed my plan. I would call attention to appx. XXVII of my evidence where my full reasons against doing so are given. Gen. Lytton does not refer in any way to my explanation.

In para 10. Line 15 There is an error of fact. The battle referred to was that at

Hammah, viz: the 3<sup>rd</sup> battle, not that "on the wadi" which was the 2<sup>nd</sup> battle.

In para 11 it is stated that the Dujailah Redoubt was about the right center of the Turkish Line. Though, in a sense, strictly accurate, this is misleading. Till a couple of days before the night march the Dujailah Redoubt was the extreme Right of the Turkish entrenched line; there was no entrenched line between it and the Hai. Just before the night march the Turks had begun to entrench between the Dujailah Redoubt and the Hai but their work was incomplete & according to reports, did not seem formidable at the time of starting the night march. The Dujailah Redoubt thus continued to be the extreme right of the seriously entrenched Turkish Line

With reference to para 11, Gen Lytton says that a statement of mine is "bewildering" in view of the evidence given by Gen Forry. I consider that an explanation is most necessary. My evidence on this point is given in the answer to question 18171 et seq: & Gen Forry's in answer to question 2774 et seq: It was known from the intelligence I had received that the Turks were keeping a strong reserve at Meqais on the Tigris. This was a natural tactical disposition. It was central for the extended line of defense, and was certainly convenient as regards water supply, as water away from the Tigris is always difficult. This difficulty, however, applied to the whole of the Turkish

defence except where close to the river. I do not remember that we had any reliable intelligence to prove that the water supply for the Turkish Troops at the Dujailah Redoubt was a greater source of difficulty in keeping them than at other parts of the line of

defence away from the River, for example at the Sinn Aftar Redoubt. On the contrary I remember the aerial photographs showed what we thought were specially prepared water holes in the Dujailah Depression near the Redoubt and there also appeared to be bivouacs in the vicinity. When I drew

up my plans I expected to find as high a proportion of 1st line troops in the Dujailah Redoubt as elsewhere on the Turkish line of defence, except on the partially completed portion between the Dujailah Redoubt and

the Hai. My reason for choosing the Dujailah Redoubt as the point of attack was, not its particularly weak position but; the fact that when my plan was drawn up it was the extreme right flank of the Turkish position and we had a far better chance of success there than elsewhere as we could attack it from two sides and

possibly from the rear, outflanking it completely. Being on a mound, it was

also an easy mark for the artillery.

Though works connecting it with the Hai had just been commenced before the attack,

I did not expect them to be at all strong or strongly held. I therefore considered that my original plan should hold good

in spite of their new defenses. The entrenchments & redoubts elsewhere on the Turkish line of defense, from the Dujailah Redoubt (inclusive) & the Tapis were very strong. Gen Jomier's evidence may be read to mean that the particularly weak garrison of the Dujailah Redoubt, in comparison with those of other parts of the line, was the primary reason for choosing the Dujailah Redoubt as the first point of attack. I maintain that this was not so. My main reason was as I have already stated. I always anticipated that we should have a tough fight for the Dujailah Redoubt. A particularly weak garrison, in comparison with those elsewhere, would certainly have added to the advantage of choosing it as the point of attack.

L. P. Hyman.

St Paul.

3. 7. 17

Stuart Hotel.  
163 Cromwell Road S.W.

14-2-17.

Dear Sir,

As requested I have corrected and signed the proof of my evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission.

2 - I would call attention to the fact that the appendices to my written evidence are not with the papers which you sent to me for signature. They were correct the last time I saw them and I have since agreed to appendix XXIV K, with two slight alterations

3. - I notice that all my corrections to the verbal cross examination, as suggested by me, have not been inserted. I have not got a copy of them but I can remember the following:-

17886 - The question still remains uncorrected.

17896 - The question and answer should be between brackets [...]. It is an interpretation.

18143. My proposed answer has not been inserted for some reason.

18178. My proposed alteration or addition has not been inserted. This should be done as the matter is important. My point was that Jenkinson's words "and we had information before" by no means necessarily refers to the 2<sup>nd</sup> sentence beginning "They had..."

NOTE

4 - Question 18321. I deny that the wording of my finding in the case amounts to what



17

Lord Denning says "not guilty but, do not do it again". I would like a note added to this effect. I personally cannot understand how such a meaning can be assigned to my words.

I would be much obliged if a complete copy of my evidence written and verbal, with appendices, could be sent to me when ready.

I remain,

your obedient servant

J. J. L. L.

St. Paul.

To the Secretary  
Mesopotamia Commission.

J/72

Stuart Hotel  
163 Cromwell Road

March 29th 1917.

Dear Mr. Duff.

Dear Sir:-

*My return to India depends on the findings of the Commission. My hope is to return to India in the next few days & to accept the post of Director of the Tigris Corps.*

In reply to your letter to Mr. Duff of the 23rd inst. I am directed to enclose herewith a copy of your evidence as requested; Mr. Duff also asked me to say that he cannot tell you for certain when the report of the Commission will be published, but it will probably be in about a month's time.

Please find also enclosed your book giving the names of all the Staff of the Tigris Corps for February.

I beg to remain,

Your obedient Servant,

*Could you very kindly give me any idea as to when the Commission's report will be ready to lay before Parliament or the Minister?*

Assistant Secretary.

Lt. General Sir F. Aylmer

*Could you kindly return the books I lent to the Commission the names of all the Staff etc. of the Tigris Corps in February if it is not wanted any more?*

163, Cromwell Road,

- (1) Cannot say for certain  
 but if it is about a month  
 if it is before  
 (2) Yes  
 (3) Certainty: send him  
 copy of Mts  
 28/3

20

Stuart Hotel.  
 163 Cromwell Road.  
 23. 3. 17

Dear Mr. Duff.

My return to India depends on the  
 finding of the Mesopotamia Commission. My  
 wife is ill and in no case will she be allowed  
 to accompany me to India as women are  
 prohibited from doing so on account of  
 submarines. I have consequently got to make  
 a great many arrangements which depend  
 on whether I return or not, and until I  
 know I cannot make them.

Could you very kindly give me any idea  
 (1) as to when the Commission's report will be  
 ready to lay before Parliament or H. M's  
 Minister?

Could you very kindly return the book I lent  
 (2) to the Commission giving the names of all  
 the staff, etc., of the Tigris Corps in February  
 1916, if it is not wanted any more?

21

I would also very much like a copy of my own evidence. I do not know what the case is on the subject but it seems to me not reasonable that a witness should be allowed a copy of his own evidence.

I am sorry to trouble you.

Yours sincerely,

J. J. Hyman.

---

Stuart Hotel

163 Cromwell Road

12 - 2 - 17

From Lt. Genl. Sir J. J. Aylmer  
To the Secretary Mesopotamia Commission.

Sir.

I have received the typed copy with  
map of Appx. XXIV. K.

I have to bring to notice that this is  
not correct:-

Line 12. Y to Z should be " $4\frac{1}{4}$ " not " $4\frac{1}{2}$ "  
miles.

Line 16. for "1 - 2 miles per hour", read  
"1.2 miles per hour"

I have the honour to be,  
Yours obedient servant

J. J. Aylmer.  
Lt Genl.

Stuart Hotel

163 Cromwell Road, S.W.

12.2.1917

16-1-17

J/16

*Gen. Aylmer has supplied a copy of the attached in the Day after tomorrow.*

*From Lt. Gen. Sir J. J. Aylmer.*

Dear Sir:- *To the Secretary, Mesopotamia Commission.*

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter

of the 12th. I note corrections to Appendix XXIV K, which *with reference to your Memorandum* shall be inserted in all future copies. *I have the honor to*

*reply as follows:-*

Your obedient servant,

*I have made corrections on the proof of evidence written & verbal. I do not think that any of these alter the signification.*

Assistant Secretary

*I have added a written statement marked X. In this I have:-*

Lt. Gen. Sir Fenton Aylmer  
Stuart Hotel  
163, Cromwell Road  
Kensington

*suggestions as regards slight corrections in the questions, which may assist you.*

(2). I have brought forward certain corrections which may be considered to alter the signification to some extent in my answer.

(3). I have suggested certain additions to my evidence, so as to make matters clear, where there appeared to be considerable misunderstanding.

Stuart Hotel.  
163 Cromwell Road.  
S.W.

Gen Aylmer has supplied a map & notes  
on the altar on the Dayirah Pedoult.

16-1-17.

From Lt. Genl. Sir J. J. Aylmer.  
To the Secretary, Mesopotamia Commission.

Sir. With reference to your Memorandum  
of the 11th inst. I have the honor to  
reply as follows:-

I have made corrections on the proofs  
of evidence written & verbal. I do not  
think that any of these alter the signi-  
fication.

I have added a written statement  
marked X. In this I have:-

- (1). Made suggestions as regards slight  
corrections in the questions, which  
may assist you.
- (2). I have brought forward certain  
corrections which may be considered  
to alter the signification to some  
extent. ~~in~~ my answers.
- (3). I have suggested certain additions  
to my evidence, so as to make matters  
clearer, where there appeared to be  
considerable misunderstanding.

If necessary I would attend at any time  
before the Commission to take oath to  
these corrections and additions. I submit  
that they <sup>are</sup> of material importance as far  
as I am concerned. -

2- I would call attention to two obvious errors in Genl. Goring's evidence. They are probably printer's mistakes:-

(a) 2726. Gen. Goring accepts the statement that he took over the duties of Chief of my staff on the 1st January. As a matter of fact it was on the 29th or 30th of January that he did so.

(b) 2776. Gen. Goring states that dawn was at "a quarter to five". I think he must have said or intended "a quarter to six". I maintain that dawn in the latitude of the Ess. from position on the 8th March at 4.45 a.m. is a physical impossibility. General Keenball in his Diary says it was at 5.30 a.m. and I think that is correct. The matter is of the greatest importance in a consideration of the timings of the night march.

I consider that the above discrepancies should be laid before the Commission and I would request that this may be done.

I have the honor, &c.  
Sir,  
Your obedient servant  
J. P. O'Byrne  
St. Paul.

- Enclosures.
- written statement as regards corrections
  - Corrected proof of written evidence.
  - Corrected proof of verbal evidence
  - Corrected proof of appendix & written evidence.



Appendix XXIV K. log with map  
to Gen. Ceylan. 26

A & B. - Infantry divisions of Gen. Kumbhatti's Force.

C & D - Artillery " " " " " "

X - place of assembly of whole force.

Y - (33.0.55) place of deployment.

Z (41.0.30) - ~~the~~ Starting place of Gen. Kumbhatti's attack.

A & B to X - average about 2 miles

C to X - about  $5\frac{1}{2}$  miles

D to X - under 7 miles.

X to Y - 6 miles (whole force marched together).

Y to Z -  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles (Gen. Kumbhatti's force marched separately).

Therefore total X to Z =  $10\frac{1}{4}$  miles.

\* Gen. Kumbhatti's own estimate in his Diary.

Dawn was at 5.30 am. \* hence original orders allowed  $8\frac{1}{2}$  hours from X to Z, i.e. 1.2 ms. per hour.

Owing to delay in start from X (1 hr. 22 mins) & delay owing to Column C losing touch (say 1 hour).

Y was only reached at 2.30. Gen. Kumbhatti had still 3 hrs to do  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles.

If he had started within half an hour which should have been enough for anything he had to do there was no reason to believe that he would necessarily arrive late at Z, he would still have had  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hours. As a matter of fact he went from Y to Z in 2 hours 35 mins.

J.H.

- 12 - 16

27

Received from Lt. Genl. Sir F. J. Aymer  
the following documents: -

Serial No.	Description
✓ 57.	War Diary Tigris Camp 9 <sup>th</sup> to 31 <sup>st</sup> Dec-15
✓ 75	" " " " January 16
✓ 75	" " " " February 16
✓ 75	" " " " March 1 <sup>st</sup> to 14 <sup>th</sup> /16
✓ 47	" " " " Part LXXIII
✓ 47	" " " " XCVIII
✓ 47	" " " " LXXIV
✓ 47	" " " " LXX
✓ 47	" " " " CLVI
✓ 36	" " " " CXLIII.
✓ 7	" " " " A.H.Q. India 1 <sup>st</sup> to 15 <sup>th</sup> March 16

*[Signature]*

28 Abingdon St.  
Westminster.

Secretary.  
Mesopotamia Commission

G/97

28

2.1.1917

Dear Sir:-

We are in receipt of a corrected copy of your Statement, and I am directed by Mr. Duff to say that ~~he~~ is very sorry that it would be impossible to circulate the corrected proof of your Statement to the Commission before your evidence is heard, as your Statement has already been in the hands of the Commissioners some days: but, of course, all the corrections will be embodied in the final copy.

The Commission would like to hear your evidence on January 9th, and I am sending to you to-day a formal notice to this effect.

I enclose herewith a spare copy of your Statement for use before the Commission.

I beg to remain,  
Your obedient Servant,

Assistant Secretary.

Lt. General Sir F. Aylmer  
Stuart Hotel  
163, Cromwell Road

31  
Shant. Hotel. 29  
163 Cromwell Road, W.  
30-12-16

From St. Paul. In J. J. Lyman.  
To Secretary Mesopotamia Commission

Sir,  
I enclose a corrected proof of  
my evidence. I would be much obliged  
if corrected versions could be circulated  
as some of the corrections are rather  
important. Please send me one of  
the new corrected versions, as soon as  
possible.

Can you kindly inform me when  
I am likely to be examined?

I am,

Your obedt. servant.

J. J. Lyman.  
to find

lay  
iving  
would  
cretary.

to improve the readers for war of the  
supply them as

F/74

29.11.1916

Dear Sir:-

I have to thank you for your letter of the  
28th inst.

I should esteem it a great favour if you  
would be so kind as to call at these offices on Friday  
next, the 1st. December, to discuss the subject of giving  
evidence before the Commission.

Perhaps you would let me know if 2.45 p.m. would  
be a convenient time for you?

I Beg to remain,

Your obedient Servant,

Assistant Secretary.

Lt. General Sir F. Aylmer V.C., K.C.B.  
163, Cromwell Road.

J. J. Aylmer

34

33 Cambridge Terrace  
Hyde Park.

23. 11. 16

From Lieut. General Sir J. J. Aylmer. VC. K.C.B.  
To the Secretary, Mesopotamia Commission

Sir, I have the honor to report that, in accordance with orders received from the Secretary of State for India, I have arrived in London for the purpose of giving evidence before the Mesopotamia Commission.

My temporary address is as above.

I would be much obliged if I could be informed as regards the date or dates on which I shall have to appear to give evidence and if I could be furnished as soon as possible with the outline of the principal questions which I shall be required to answer.

I am,  
Sir,

Your obedient servant

J. J. Aylmer  
Lt. Genl.

to improve the readiness for war of the

35

Stuart Hotel  
163 Cromwell Road.  
23. 12. 16

Dear Sir,

I enclose a letter just received from  
you, which is for Sir B. Duff.

As it is probable that the wrong letter  
was placed in the envelope, would you kindly  
send me the letter which was intended  
for me, as mine may have gone to  
Sir B. Duff.

Yours truly

J. A. G. L.  
J. A. G. L.

this  
re on  
d as  
a fact  
but  
nt at  
able to  
se and  
nter  
is ther  
will

G/69

36

22.12.1916

Dear Sir:-

I have to thank you for your letter to Mr. Duff enclosing a Statement, which shall be added to your other Statements, and circulated to the Commissioners.

I beg to remain,

Your obedient Servant,

Assistant Secretary.

Lt. General Sir F. Aylmer V.C.

Stuart Hotel

163, Cromwell Road

S.W.



22.12.16

Stuart Hotel<sup>37</sup>  
163 Cromwell Road Sw.

20-12-16

Dear Mr. Duff.

Many thanks for the second extract from evidence on the point that an order was issued at the battle of Es-Sim for the abandonment of the wounded.

I enclose a statement on the subject which might be added to my other statements and printed for the information of the Commission

Yours sincerely,

F. G. H. G.  
Stuart.

G/57

38

18.12.1916.

Dear Sir:-

With reference to your letter of the 14th of this month and mine of the 16th I enclose herewith another portion of the evidence in which the order to abandon the wounded as remarked on.

I have sent you the only other mention of this fact that I have been able to turn up: per

I regret to say that Mr. Duff is still laid up, but I am having your notes on the incident of Major Murphy put at the end of your Statement so that the Commission may be able to go into it when you come before them.

With reference to papers concerned in this case and used by the Vincent Bingley Committee, I will place the matter before Mr. Duff as soon as he comes back, and if he thinks there are any papers which might be useful to you, I expect he will be only too pleased to let you see them.

I beg to remain,  
Your obedient Servant,

Assistant Secretary

Lt. General Sir F. Aylmer V.C.

Stuart Hotel

163, Cromwell Road S.W.

Mesopotamia Commission,  
28, Abingdon Street,  
Westminster.

39

2

16. 12. 16.

Dear Sir,

I have to acknowledge your letter of the 14<sup>th</sup> inst., enclosing a statement about Major Murphy. Mr Duff is not in Town to-day, but he shall have this statement on Monday, when ~~you~~ we shall will communicate with you further.

As far as I know the evidence given was not that you gave the order to abandon <sup>the wounded</sup>, but that such an order was given by a subordinate officer. We are cutting out this evidence & enclose a copy.

Yours faithfully,

J. U. Fitzwilliam  
pp D. S. S.

Assistant Secretary.

The enclosed receipt is a copy of the original given to me to improve the readability for was of the

Stewart Hotel 40  
163 Cornwell Row, N.Y.

14. 12-16

Dear Mr. Duff.

I enclose a statement about Major  
Kinney's case as far as I can remember it.

I know the Vincent-Burghy Committee engaged  
into it as they told me that they had done  
so. & seen all the papers.

I would be much obliged, if that Committee  
has attached any of these papers to their  
report, that if I might have a copy of them  
as it would certainly assist me, if I am  
cross-examined by the Commission about it.

I have been informed that a witness or witness  
stated before the Commission that I had ordered  
the wounded to be abandoned at the battle  
of Prosim on the 8/9th March. As no order  
which I gave & which I can remember  
could possibly bear such an interpretation

G/32

42

*163 Cromwell Road*

13.12.1916

*7-12-16*

*Dear Sir,*

Dear General Aylmer,

I think I ought to let you know that the Commission will probably want to hear something from you on the question of the charges made against Major Murphy, in regard to which I believe you ~~will~~ are in a position to give some special information. If you desire to add anything on this subject, will you kindly forward the draft to me, and I will have it printed and circulated to the Commission with your Statement.

*quite a number*

*The Secretary*

*Messopotamia Commission*

Lt. Gen. Sir F. Aylmer V.C., K.C.B.

Stuart Hotel

163, Cromwell Road

South Kensington.

*enclosed are the  
 of the Adjutant General*

File

163 Cromwell Road. 44  
Kensington  
6.12.16

From  
Lieut. General Sir. J. J. Aylmer V.C. - K.C.B.  
To  
The Secretary Mesopotamia Commission

Sir,

With reference to our conversation of the 13<sup>th</sup> December, I have the honour to submit certain statements in connection with the operations in Mesopotamia.

These are in two parts:-

Part I. General Defence.

Part II. Points of General Interest.

2. With these statements I have been compelled to submit a considerable number of the printed charges referring to the operations in Mesopotamia. These documents are secret and I am responsible for their custody. I would therefore ask that you will kindly sign the enclosed receipt for them.
3. If the Commission requires any proof of how I, as Adjutant General, attempted to improve the readiness for war of the Army in India, I can supply them with copies of my evidence before the Army in India Committee and the "Recommendations by H.E. the C-in-C, A.I.C 1912-3 (A.I.C. Branch)."
4. If the papers I am now submitting are printed, I would request that a copy of them may be sent to me.

45

I have had no time to make copies and I think it only right that I should have a record in the event of certain possible references hereafter.

5. Please return the Secret Diaries to me when no longer required by the Commission.

6. As regards Part I I have particularly given explanations as regards certain points which I consider important, but I am ready to do so on any others.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant.

J. P. Rymer.

Lieut. General.

~~Friday~~  
11.30

47  
Stuart Hotel.  
163 Cromwell Road.  
Kensington.  
5. 12. 16

Dear Mr. Duff.

My papers for the Mesopotamia Commission are ready. I would be much obliged if you could let me know when I could bring them to you. I would like then to make a few remarks as regards the manner in which they are presented. I have not been told as regards the points about which there are doubts as to my efficiency, so in submitting explanations on certain points it is possible that these <sup>may be looked on as</sup> ~~are~~ my weak ones, on the principle of "qui s'excuse s'accuse." I trust that the Commission will not take this view but give due consideration <sup>to the fact</sup> that it is a difficult matter for the accused to put



48

forward his defense before the charges  
have been seen by him.

Yours sincerely,

J. H. Limer.



101  
102  
103  
104  
105

106