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From:

Date:

01 August 2003

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Reference:

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To:

Douglas Brand

SUBJECT: IRAQ POLICE REFORM: UK PRIORITIES

Now that you have been at post four weeks, I thought it would be useful to review UK
priorities for the reform of the Iraqi police, and your role in taking these priorities
forward.

Priorities

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- The CPA Strategy
- 2. We still need more detail from the Interior Ministry on its policing strategy and its implementation plan. The UK and other states will be reluctant to engage in the reform of the Iraqi police service unless we are shown that there is a clear strategy, including a structure and concept of operations, under which seconded personnel would operate and, crucially, a timetable.
- 3. We are concerned here that although training is under way, and ideas exist for the execution of further training, the current approach still appears to be ad hoc. If the CPA Interior ministry is genuinely considering the deployment of a significant mentoring mission, it will urgently need to address these issues and make its case to a wider audience. We fully appreciate the constraints of the operating environment, but we are keen to keep up momentum and build on progress made.
- Specific issues on which we need organt clarification are:
- the overarching strategy, including detailed benchmarks and objectives for progress;
- Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS);
- a generic agreement under which countries can contribute to the CPA;

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-	standard financ	al arrangements under which countries would deploy personnel.	
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privileges and immunities agreements;

Until these arrangements are in place, potential personnel contributors are unlikely to commit resources.

5.

Deployment of UK contingent

6. As you know, we are taking action to ensure that the UK is in a position to deploy a contingent of up to 100 police officers to Iraq (and possibly Hungary) once the conditions in theatre allow. This raises a number of questions. For example: what would the roles of these officers be, where would they be located, and if trainers, what course would they train? Without confirmation of strategy and objectives for police reform, we will not be able to commit officers to theatre.

7.

[signed]

Head of Peacekeeping Section UND

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