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Fay's father from the

~~After a short adjournment~~ as to
 Commander Wedgwood, I am still not clear ~~about~~ ^{as to} the relative
 position of the General Staff and ~~what~~ ^{as to} the Commander in Chief
 in India ~~as regards the War which is going on in Mesopotamia~~
~~in India as regards the War which is going on in Mesopotamia~~
 in Mesopotamia. You have taken over the administrative control,
 but as I understand India still comes between you
 and the ~~Indian~~ ^{Mesopotamian} Campaign in certain respects

A Yes; as regards operations, instructions are sent -
 instructions approved by the War Committee are sent -
 to the Commander in Chief in India, and not direct
 to the General Officer Commanding Force D. The Commander
 in Chief in India issues the instructions to Force D,
 and the ~~same~~ ^{same} system applies as regards administrative
 control. The Commander in Chief in India now acts
 administratively under the instructions of the War Office,
 just as he has been doing as regards operations

5287 Q Everything has to go through India as regards the
 Mesopotamian campaign

A Yes

5288 Q Now take the East African force; is it the same
 as regards the East African force

A No, that is directly under the War Office ⁱⁿ ~~and~~ exactly
 the same ^{way} as France is. The Chief of General
 Staff communicates his instructions direct to General
 Smuts without any intermediary at all.

5289 Q How about Egypt

A Egypt is the same as regards operations ~~and~~ ⁱⁿ
 beyond the ~~delta~~ ^{delta, that is as} ~~the~~ ^{regards} Sir Archibald
~~Command Murray's command~~ ^{command} ~~the~~ ⁱⁿ the case of the
~~operations~~ ^{operations}, the operations of the Sirdar,
~~it is in the case~~ ^{there} you get an analogous
 situation to that which existed in the earlier
 part of the Mesopotamian Campaign. Instructions
 would go from the Foreign Office to Sir Henry ^{MacMahon}
 and

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and from him to the Sirdar.

5290 Q In regard to possible operations in the Sinai Peninsula, are they directly under you

A Yes

5291 Q Or ~~does~~ ^{under} Sir John Maxwell

A He has gone

5292 Q They are under you just as the operations in East Africa ^{are} under you

A Yes

5293 Q The only operations which are under the General Staff here are the operations in Mesopotamia

A That is so

5294 Q How about the operations in Persia for instance - General Dykes' operations

A Persia is still under the control of India

5295 Q There you have three different kinds of control, the Persian operations under the Government of India; the Mesopotamian operations, the Indian Government under your orders, and Mesopotamia under them.

A Yes

5296 Q And the other operations throughout the war, which are directly under you

A Yes.

5297 Q Is not that rather analogous to the arrangements in the early part of the war, when there was a little or no co-operation between the Germans and their allies - when the Austrian Army and the ^{Turkish} ~~German~~ Army and the Bulgarian Army were independent of the German control, ^{and have} ~~have~~ they not found it necessary to put them under the supreme control of the German

A Yes, Empire

A Yes, and

Q And there is no question about it, ~~that~~ ^{that} it ^{is}

is militarily an ~~important~~ ^{enormous} advantage to have all operations in all theatres of war under one central control which deals direct with the commanders in the field

5298 2 So that it would be an advantage now if you got the Mesopotamian operations put ^{directly} under the control of the War Office without the intermediary of the Commander in Chief in India

A I should be sorry to say that straight away, because there are many complications. India under the present system must necessarily be the base of operations ~~the~~ ^{the} Mesopotamian operations, not necessarily the complete base, because it cannot provide everything

5299 2 It is the base of the East African operations, is it not?

A To a very limited ^{extent} now, it was in the earlier days, but practically now India has ceased to supply anything

5300 2. All the railway stuff comes from India, does it not?
A Yes

5301 2 The arrangements ~~of~~ ^{at} the port-lighters
A Partly from India and partly from South Africa.

I think that the difficulty that arises in putting Mesopotamia directly under the War Office without any intermediary as regards the Commander in Chief is due to peace practice. I think if we could eliminate the separate control of the Government of India over the forces in India it would be an enormous advantage

5302 2 You have all the material; you know what the forces are in India; you are just as capable of saying what troops are to be sent I suppose as the Indian Government

A It is merely a question of equipping the General Staff with the requisite machinery, there is no difficulty

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in getting it

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2 If it were a question of relative risk on the frontier or in Mesopotamia, you would get their advice before you issued any orders presumably

A Yes

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2 You issue your orders, and then you have the difficulties ^{made} ~~up~~ I presume the troops cannot be shared or something

A There are two separate cases. As regards Mesopotamia the instructions are now formulated here in London by the General Staff, but as regards the North West Frontier of India they are not.

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Q You are in control of part of the Indian forces, and not of the other part

A That is so

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Q And there is bound to be some kind of friction between the demands of the two ^{real} authorities

A If a serious campaign arose ^{upon} ~~between~~ the North-west frontier of India I can foresee very great difficulties arising

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Q And the question of the police force in India I suppose is a source of possible difference — the garrison requirements which may be required

A I like so. It seems to me there the situation as it exists at present is illogical, because you are ~~are~~ asking India to speak from a limited and local knowledge of the general situation ^{namely} ~~up to~~ what is necessary for their conditions in India, and they answer that

that these questions entirely in view of their own interests. It seems to me where you are engaged in a world war of this kind all these questions should be referred to a central authority who ~~should be~~ ^{is} able to look at the whole picture

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Q What you feel then is that the General Staff here ought to have supreme control of all the military

resources of the Empire

A That is so. That has been borne in upon me very much in ^{the} comparatively short period I have had anything to do with the conduct of the war as a whole

5309 Q And that is so at present, except in the case of India

A No, it is still not the case as regards for instance the Sudan

5310 Q But it is the case as regards Colonial troops, is it not.

A It has worked out ^{so} in fact. Theoretically still the Colonial Office has control over the local force. In practice owing to good will they have turned it over to us as regards East Africa. There are many questions which arise in which you are personally interested, I know, raising coloured troops for operations ⁱⁿ various places; there are many ~~that~~ ^{diverse channels} ~~difficult channels~~ of communication to be dealt with owing to the fact that there are a number of interests involved, Colonial and other

5311 Q In fact the Colonial Office comes in here, as the India Office comes in between you and the Indian Army

A That is so.

5312 ^{Mr} Chairman. What is the arrangement as regards Mesopotamia?

I assume that the War Office undertakes to make good the deficiencies of ~~of~~ the drafts required in white brigades, and the Indian Government to make good the deficiencies as regards the coloured troops

A That is so.

5313 Q Is there any understanding that you are not to draw further from India by asking for more native troops

A No, there is no understanding. I have no doubt if we pressed India too hard, India would protest, and then it would be a question of the War Committee, as the supreme authority, deciding the rival claims of India and other theatres. That is a question which is continually arising in all theatres of war, we are always having

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to balance the requirements of various theatres and making
 the best use of the general resources

General Sir Neville Lytton England has overridden India in this particular
 matter. England took the whole responsibility and released the
 Viceroy and the Commander in Chief in India of all
 responsibility. They have always had control over the whole
 thing

A We have not had de facto control. I know when I first
 came into the War Office in December we had no
 power in the War Office to send instructions to India
 as to what was to be done in Mesopotamia

5315 Lord Hugh Cecil: The War Office had no power

A We ~~and~~ the War Office had no power

5316 Commander Wedgwood: At the present time you have no power
~~at all~~ ~~have you~~ to tell them to mobilise their battalions
 of volunteers, for instance.

A No.

5317 Q They ask for 12 garrison battalions to be sent to India in
 December.
 India. You have no power in those circumstances to say
 "Find your own garrison regiments"

A No; all the power we have in that case ^{is} we have
 the power of refusing to give anything, and of saying
 "We cannot spare ^{them} and you must do the best you can."

5318 Q ^{You} ~~you~~ cannot suggest to ^{them} ~~have~~ any other means of dealing with
 the problem
 a not authoritatively

5319 Q Can you deal with the question of equipment of machine
 guns — that they ought to raise the equipment of Indian
 regiments from 4 to 8 guns

A We would be within our rights to suggest it to the Indian
 Government, but we could ~~not order~~ ^{not order} ~~the~~ the Commander
 in Chief ~~with regard to that~~ to do it.

5320 Q As long as you have a house that Jack built, you can
 do it if everybody is agreeable and has good will toward the
 proposal

A Yes

5321 Q What you want is to be able to order the thing directly that you should control all the troops in the Empire

A That all the military troops in ^{the} Empire should be in one central control

5322 Q With regard to 6 pounder ammunition, whether it should be supplied from India, Egypt or from home, that sort of difficulty arises from divided control

A Certainly

5323 The Chairman You have no control over all the resources of the Colonies

A No

5324 Q So that as regards the Empire the Colonies are in a very independent ~~condition~~ position ~~as regards the Central Staff in India~~

A There are colonies and colonies. In the case of self governing colonies they are treated practically as allied Powers from a military point of view, but in the case of Crown Colonies there is a certain control

5325 ~~Commander~~ Wedgwood. Does the present system lead to delay owing to orders going through the Commander in Chief

A Yes; there must be delay whenever there is an additional channel. I think that is unavoidable. Whether the delay is sufficient to affect the operations materially I should doubt. The sort of instructions which are sent from what we call the General Headquarters of the Empire are very general. We ~~do~~ not issue detailed instructions. Those are issued naturally by the General on the spot. He is merely given general instructions for his guidance at comparatively long intervals and therefore it is not always the case that it is a matter of getting ^{instructions} to the man who is to receive them within a few hours. I should doubt that in this particular campaign there had been any case where a delay in receiving instructions had affected the operations

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Q There are always certain drawbacks and disadvantages in swapping horses when you are crossing a stream: are there any sufficient advantages in giving you now supreme control over the Indian Army, considering the drawbacks of making a change ^{it would be} ^{advantage if}

A. I think ~~they have~~ ^{it would be} a distinct ^{advantage if} difficulty if we had the same sort of general control which is exercised over France and Egypt and ^{other} theatres of war, as regards for example Persia. Of course when you once start dealing with Persia you would be coming to the North West Frontier of India. If there did happen to be a big campaign on the North West frontier of India involving Afghanistan, it would be a matter requiring very careful consideration as to how far ^{resources} ~~resources~~ were to be diverted from other theatres of war to meet that danger

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Q The Persian campaign does affect directly the Mesopotamian campaign

A. Quite. Also it directly affects the defence of the North West Frontier of India. The things are all interlocked

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Q. When we had Sir Arthur Hirtzel before us, he said that General Sykes was at present going to Shusan I think

A. Yes

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Q. And had been stopped. General Sykes has a force with him, of troops

A. Yes

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Q. Has he got into Shusan yet

A. No

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Q. So that all those operations are still under the India Office

A. Yes

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Q. Yet they directly affect the advance on Baghdad and the defence of the oil-fields

A. Yes

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Q. The Chairman. What is the object of telegraphing to the Commander in Chief? Would ~~not~~ ^{it} be better to telegraph to the General

Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia

Q. There are various categories of telegrams. We are in daily communication with the General Officer Commanding Force D who would repeat what we sent to the Commander in Chief in India. What I was considering was the sort of general instruction which issued on page 3 of my paper. That general instruction was issued on the 30th April and is still in force; that sort of general instructions ^{is} only changed when the military situation goes through some big development. They are not ~~issued~~ ^{issued} at frequent intervals. In a case of that kind it certainly is advisable that there should go through the Commander in Chief in India, because he is controlling the chief base from which Mesopotamia is supplied.

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Q Direct orders in the field - you communicate them

A. I cannot conceive a situation in which we would give direct orders. The man on the spot must be given a wide discretion; and therefore Sir Neville ^{Lyttelton} ~~Hamilton~~ knows the sort of general instructions which go out are purely general as to general military policy. The commander on the spot is given the widest latitude as to interpretation.

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Commander Wedgwood: Before I leave the question of the Persian expedition, have you heard suggestions that General Sykes is being starved as regards officers and equipment?

A. Yes. I hope things are satisfactory now, but there is no question he was starved, and it came to our notice, and we pressed the India Office very strongly on the question.

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Q So that you may get a repetition of the Mesopotamia campaign in Persia

A. It is ^{on} a very small scale

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Q ~~What~~ ^{So} ~~about~~ the Mesopotamian scale, ^{to} begin with

A. This is a matter of 500 or 600 men, but the situation

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is exactly analogous

The Earl of Donoughmore: Where is he

A: At the present moment he is at Sapsagan

5339 Commander Wedgwood: We have had it in evidence that the force has been stored of ^{many} ~~many~~, in fact I may say of ^{such as} most of the modern forms of military equipment, ~~and~~ ^{such as} ~~principally~~ bombs, ~~and~~ flares, ~~and~~ wire cutters, ~~and~~ mosquito nets and things of that sort, and we had it in evidence also from Sir Alfred Keogh that the normal arrangement would be that before an expedition like this was undertaken the General and the heads of departments, the Medical and the Engineering departments and the C. R. A. and the D. A. G. and the A. G. would meet direct and discuss what each department wanted for that particular campaign with the ~~the~~ heads of the Staff at Simla, ~~so~~ ^{Would} that in your opinion be a normal arrangement before an expedition was undertaken.

A: Do you mean an expedition undertaking ^{ex} ^{under} ~~the~~ the ^{regis} ^{of} the General Staff at home?

5340 Q: Yes

A: What would happen in that case is, that as far as possible plans of campaign would have been drawn up in peace time. Those plans of campaign, when the campaign became a practical possibility, would be drawn from their pigeon holes and handed to the General Officer Commanding ~~between~~ and his Staff who were going to conduct those operations. They would go through them, and they would see in them what the nature of the campaign was likely to be and the difficulties they were likely to ~~meet~~ ^{meet} with, and it was a complete plan; they would also see the statement of their ~~probable~~ requirements. That they would amplify or criticize in any way they liked with the various heads of departments who would provide their requirements.

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General Sir Neville Lyttelton: There is an establishment laid down on every branch of the Service

A. Yes. I was thinking of the case of a special expedition that required special equipment, like a Nile expedition as regards boats

5342 Q Anything outside ordinary establishment

A. Yes

5343 Commander Wedgwood: The heads of the different departments would come together and see the heads of the different departments of the War Office or whatever it may be about getting their special requirements

A. Yes

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Q That is exactly
what happened
when the East
African preparations
were made
A. Yes

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Q And that is ^{exactly} what one would expect to happen with regard to any expedition that was going to be well organized

A. Yes

5346 Chairman. Assuming an emergency ^{occurs} ~~arises~~ Suppose it is necessary to send an expedition suddenly, ^{as in} ~~like~~ the case of the Dardanelles and Salonika, those expeditions were not ~~not~~ anticipated, were they?

A. I am afraid I cannot say anything about the origin of either of them. I was in France at that time, and I do not know what was done in ^{those} ~~that~~ cases

5347 Commander Wedgwood: But no General would sail on an expedition without first having seen that the heads of the different branches knew what they were in for, and had made ~~the~~ arrangements for their own particular departments. The Engineers might want special bridging, or the Artillery might want heavy ~~and~~ artillery. ^{all} ~~all~~ these things he would expect ^{the staff} to see to, before he went out, and make the necessary arrangements

A. Yes

5348 Commander Wedgwood

Q This expedition started with General Delamain going out. Presumably General Delamain made ~~your~~ what

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 arrangements he thought fit for the original expedition?
 General Sir Neville Lyttelton: No, the ^{first} Sea Lord
 5350 Commander Wedgwood: As General Delamain was under
 sealed orders, he manifestly could not have made
 any arrangements for the expedition at all; but suppose
 the General is changed, and another General goes out, as
 Sir Arthur Barrett, or Sir John Nixon or Sir Percy
 Lake, would not you have again a fresh consultation
 with each new staff as it goes out, seeing they have
 what the heads of the different departments thought
 necessary

A: Whenever it is possible, certainly. A case might arise
 and I fancy it did ^{in this instance} where the General simply went
 out by himself

5351 Q: In which case was that

A: Did not General Barrett go out by himself?

5352 Lord Hugh Cecil: But Sir John Nixon went out with
 a fresh staff

5353 Commander Wedgwood: And so did Sir Percy Lake

A: I think the principle you mention would be carried
 out. It must be modified by special ^{conditions} ~~committees~~

5354 Q: That is the ideal principle

A: Yes

5355 Q: And the General Staff in India ^{in their duty} if
 they did not see that some such arrangement as that was
 made before the expedition started and before the changes
 in the expedition were made

A: Yes; that is part of the duty of the General Staff, to
 see that is done

5356 The Chairman: What are the duties of the General Staff

A: The General Staff is responsible for preparing all plans
 of campaign

5357 Q: If a Commander in Chief orders an officer to go to France,
 and there is no consultation between them?

Q The Commander in Chief is responsible. The organization as regards India is different, because the General Staff at Simla has no powers analogous to the General Staff at home. They are merely the Staff Officers of the Commander in Chief.

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Commander Wedgwood: The Commander in Chief is really commander of the General Staff there.

A: Yes.

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Chairman: I should like to understand that. Are they the ordinary officers who are associated with the Commander in Chief, or are they specially appointed? Are the Adjutant General ^{and} the Quartermaster General part of the ^{General Staff} ~~General Staff~~?
A They are not part of the General Staff. The General Staff would consist, in India, of the Chief of the General Staff with a certain number of General Staff Officers under his orders.

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Commander Wedgwood: ^{The} C. R. A. and C. R. E.

A. No.

Q. ~~They~~ would be Director of Operations, Director of Staff Duties and Director of Military Training, ~~that~~ with subordinates under them, but those Staff Officers are in exactly the same position as the other officers of Sir Archibald Murray's staff, or any others. The ~~position~~ position is not quite analogous to that of the General Staff at home which has certain general functions which are entrusted to it by the Government by Order in Council.

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Q Instead of saying the General Staff in India were responsible for ~~supply~~ ^{seeing} these consultations were held, really the responsibility rests with the Commander in Chief.

A That is so.

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Q. Can you tell me whether there is any system now of ^{letting} ~~telling~~ the people in Mesopotamia know about the experience with trench warfare or inventions that are

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are worked out in France

A: Yes

5363 Q. Is there any system of intercommunication on these subjects

A: Yes. As a matter of fact there are some officers from Mesopotamia at the present moment in France

5364 Q Who are acting as ^{Liaison} ~~Liaison~~ officers

A Yes. One of them is the Staff officer of the General Officer Commanding ~~XXXX~~ Artillery, and he, I think has just completed a tour of the front in France, and is on his way back to Marseilles this week

5365 Q. And they get those monthly ~~notes~~ notes on different subjects

A: Yes

5366 Q. Is that all new, or did they know all this a year ago

A. I do not think it occurred before the War Office took over control, but I should not like to say definitely

5367 Q General ~~Person~~ Younghusband, in his statement, says ^{in the case of} that the Divisions which were moved ^{from} ~~from~~ France ^{to} ~~to~~ Lahore and the Meerut Divisions, ^{with regard to one of them} ~~that~~ ^{one of them} the Divisional Command ~~it~~ remained in France and most of the Staff remained in France, and consequently the usefulness of the Division was very much impaired. Why did they stay there

A That was the Lahore, was it not?

5368 Q Either the Lahore or the Meerut

A. I think that is a matter I ^{should have} ~~ought to~~ go into

5369 Q. Would you be responsible for that, or would the Commander in chief in the field

A That was probably done by the Commander in Chief in France, but I am purely speaking from memory - it did not happen in my time at the War Office, and therefore I should have to go into it

5370 Q At page 16 of your paper you say ^{the} ~~The~~ Commander

in Chief says "I have chosen Forringe rather than Maude because I understand that the former already possesses the confidence of the troops". It was because ^{you} ~~he~~ thought General Aymer had lost the ~~conf~~ confidence of the troops rather than because ~~so~~

you thought he was a bad general ~~that~~ that he was superseded.

Q. We have no means of judging whether he was a bad general or not, but the operation had failed, and it was very important ^{that to let} ~~that~~ the next attempt be made under the best possible auspices, and the Chief of the General Staff advised the War Committee in those circumstances ^{that} it was better to remove the Commander who had failed and put in somebody else.

5371 Q It is a fact that it is no slur on the capacity of a General to be superseded, and that the General Staff did recognise that for the sake of the morale of the Troops you have to remove the unsuccessful General whether it is his fault or not.

A Quite.

5372 Q That is the general practice.

A Yes, certainly.

5373 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge: How does the army in Mesopotamia make known its wants regarding equipment, and how are those wants supplied? Do they still go to the India Office.

A. No, the demands would go in the first instance, through the Commander in Chief in India. If he ^{never} could not meet them in any respect he would ~~refuse~~ ^{refuse} them without referring to the War Office.

5374 Q I will mention a case in point. There is a demand from the army in Mesopotamia coming direct from them to the India Office for dial sights: that went to the storekeeper at the India Office.

A. Yes.

5375 Q Would they now come to the same department of the War Office.

A. If it was urgent. He would certainly write direct to the War Office because ~~that~~ they would know

46 India could not supply these things. They frequently wire to us for some special things which we are likely to have. In that case the telegram would come straight to the War Office.

5376 Chairman: Assuming there are demands made on India, the Commander in Chief would not have the right to refuse it, supposing he could comply with it.
A: No, he would be bound to refer it

5377 Mr Hodge: According not only to your statement, but other statements, the original force was very badly equipped with guns - they were out of date
A: Yes

5378 Q: Would you say that that was due to the policy of economy practised by the India Office

A: Well, it was due to the fact that India was preparing only I think, for operations on the North West Frontier of India against tribes ^{an} ~~the~~ enemy ^{who} had not modern guns at all and therefore they thought the out of date guns were good enough; and India did not possess modern weapons at all.

5379 Q: You would call that a short sighted policy

A: I am afraid I should want to know a little bit more of the conditions under which India did not get newer ~~guns~~ ^{guns}. If they are only dealing with, say people like the Afghans who have no heavy artillery at all, they might conceivably consider it extravagant to equip guns which were, at least, some good, and get the most modern ones

5380 Q: Under these circumstances the better the guns the easier the task of the British Soldier

A: Yes, but there again you have to consider the country which India was preparing to fight. It is quite possible - I do not know - that ^{they} may only have been considering campaigns in the Himalayas in which

it would have been impossible to use heavy artillery at all

5381 Q: But even then the latest type of gun, even for that kind of campaign, would be the best

A: Oh, certainly - I mean the better your equipment is the easier your operations are

5382 Q And you would consequently say, that they ought always to be up to date, ~~the~~ the latest military devices, for easy victory, and saving the lives of troops, should always be adopted

5383 A As a soldier I should certainly say that, most certainly General Sir Neville Lyttelton: On the North West Frontier they use mountain artillery to a large extent

A: Yes

5384 Q: ~~but~~ ^{which we} should not think of using ~~any~~ in France.

A: Yes

5385 Q: It is quite sufficient for the purpose there

A: Yes

5386 Lord Hugh Cecil: Is it fitted for the task it has to perform?

& That is the question

A: Yes. I do not know the tasks which were put before India. ^{naturally} ~~I think~~ they would consider the question in the light of those ~~old~~ tasks

5387 General Sir Neville Lyttelton: Their preparations were made for campaigns on the North West Frontier of India

A I think the Government of India would then be justified in saying ~~that~~ ^{was} the old pattern of ~~that~~ ordnance & they had ~~had~~ enough

5388 Mr Hodge: I observe, on page 53 of your memorandum you say "Lake reports that the enemy's artillery, evidently German, cannot be knocked out without the aid of aeroplanes able to deal with the ^{topper} ~~topper~~". That is the 14th June this year

A: Yes

Q Can you tell us as to whether your aeroplanes are now of the latest type in Mesopotamia

A. I think that is a question which had better be addressed to Sir David Henderson. He would know a great deal better than I do. The type changes so quickly. I should be sorry to make a statement ~~such~~ as to that.

5390 Q. But you would go so far as to say we ought to have aeroplanes there capable of dealing with the Fokkers.

A. In all these matters we have to be guided by the decision of the War Committee that France is the chief theatre of war, and therefore Mesopotamia is a minor theatre of operations, and therefore all ^{demands} ~~attempts~~ have to be considered in the light of the requirements in France. If there ~~are~~ ^{is} a limited number of aeroplanes, France naturally takes precedence. But of course our object is to equip every force in every theatre of war as well as it is possible to do.

5391 Q. In connection with Basra I think you said the lack of ~~facilities~~ ^{facilities} caused a great deal of delay and hampered things in general. Would you say that the officer in charge of transport ^{port} is responsible that nothing very substantial was done in that direction?

A. Certainly. That is a matter for which the Commander of the force is responsible. He is responsible that his immediate base is adequately equipped in every way.

5392 Q. You also said in answer to Lord George Hamilton that in your opinion those responsible for the advance on Baghdad were too optimistic. Is that opinion based on the fact that there was no proper transport arrangements?

A. No. What I had in mind was that they underestimated the numbers of the enemy by whom they would be opposed.

5393 Q. Was the question of transport at all in your mind?

A. No; when I was answering that question, no.

5394 Q You think the General Officer Commanding is blamable for making that advance without knowing what was before him

A Certainly I would say this, that the inferences which we drew from the information about the Turks were very much less favourable than the inferences which Sir John Nixon drew

5395 Q As a matter of fact your information here was superior to the information that he, on the spot, had been able to obtain

A. All our information was repeated to him, and therefore he had it, but it was the deductions from the information which I am supposed to criticize.

5396 Lord Hugh Cecil: But as a matter of fact your ^{information} ~~opinion~~ was more correct than his

5397 Mr Hodge: It did not say much for his Intelligence System

A. There are ways and ways of obtaining intelligence, and it is very often easier to obtain intelligence as to what is going on, say between Constantinople and Baghdad in the way of movements of troops, in London than it is up the Tigris. He would certainly be to blame if he had not complete and accurate information or at any rate the best possible information about troops by which he was immediately opposed, but it is very often easier to get information here in London about what is going on in Asia Minor. In this case it was movement of troops ~~and~~ ^{and} ~~and~~ ^{of troops} the numbers the Turks could assemble in the neighbourhood of Baghdad, ^{and} ~~all~~ those troops were coming from Asia Minor. I should not like to attribute any blame to Sir John Nixon for not finding out exactly what was going on between say, Asia Minor and Baghdad and the Upper Valley of the Tigris without knowing exactly how far

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Lord Hugh Cecil: In Sir William Robertson's Memorandum in the paragraph which has been so frequently quoted to you there is this phrase "The Committee is aware that India declines sanctioning certain proposals for railway construction" Do you know anything about the circumstances of that refusal

A No, we only know the fact

5404 Q That they did decline

A Yes

5405 Q At the ~~top~~ bottom of page 77 and the top of page 78 there is ^a quotation from Sir Percy Lake. ~~as~~ He stated in the same telegram that General Nixon had applied in August 1915 for permission to construct the former line — that is the Nasiriyah line, but the Indian Government refused to sanction it on the score of expense

A Yes

5406 Q Is that quotation all that the War Office know about the matter

A That was the thing which immediately ^{attracted} ~~called~~ our attention. We were looking about for methods of improving ^{the} communications and we discussed the question with what knowledge we had in the War Office of the possibility of making railways, and then we addressed certain enquiries to Lake, and ~~that~~ ^{this} was the answer, and that was the first knowledge we had that the question had been ~~settled~~ ^{considered} at all before

5407 Q The question then considered was the Nasiriyah line

A Yes

5408 Q So far as the information before our Commission ^{goes} ~~nothing~~ was ever said about the Tigris. We have no indication of any

A ~~That~~ ^{naturally} the war ~~what~~ suggested it

~~Q Yes, you do not know anything to the contrary of that~~

~~A No~~

5409

2 If you were a General commanding in the field making a recommendation, or if you were Chief of a General Staff making a recommendation to the Government, you would think it your duty to consider the whole circumstances of the expedition you were recommending or the military step you were recommending, ~~the~~ not only particular aspects of it.

A Certainly

5410

Q In this case you would think yourself bound to have looked into the transport and supply, and not only the strategic and political ^{advantages} ~~conditions~~

A That is elementary

5411

Q And any General Staff or any General officer commanding in the field who neglected those aspects of the matter would be guilty of gross dereliction of reasonable care

A Certainly

5412

2 The Chairman has asked you to furnish ^{us} with ~~the~~ copies of the ^{quotations} ~~evidence~~ ^{Report} relating to Baghdad. I should like you to look at the records about the three critical decisions. One of course is the Baghdad decision; the discussion was begun about the 5th October and ended about the 23rd October, and I think we should be interested in seeing any written papers of the War Office of that date. Another is the much less ~~but~~ ^{still} important but still interesting advance ^{to} Kut-^{el-Amara}. The critical days are those ^{just before} ~~the~~ ^{the} 6th August when ^{the} decision seems to have been taken ^{earlier} ~~is the early days of a~~ ^{advance to Amara} the critical days of which are the days before the 23rd May when the decision was taken; but about that I think it is clear the War Office could not have been consulted

A My recollection is that the War Office was

not consulted before the 6th August, but I will look it up and make certain ^{the advance}
 5413 Q And let us have any paper with ^{regards} ~~the advance~~ to Amara or to Kut-el-Amara

A Certainly

5414 The Chairman: Do you think that they were not consulted except as ~~far as~~ ^{regards} the advance to Baghdad

A That is my recollection

5415 Lord Hugh Cecil You have no doubt heard that the medical units of ^{the} divisions that were sent ~~from~~ ^{to from} France were ^{left} behind at Marseilles. Do you know how that happened at all

A I heard of the fact, but I do not know how it happened

5416 Q ~~It is~~ About Baghdad it would be particularly interesting if there is anything indicating the opinion of Lord Kitchener at the time, because as he ~~is~~ ^{to get} is no longer alive it is difficult ^{to get} at his opinion except by records

A Yes

5417 The Earl of Donoughmore: One question ^{which} I should like to ask you ~~as~~ ^{is} a matter of opinion. In all the papers that are before us after the battle of Kut-~~el-Amara~~ ^{el-Amara}, when it was being discussed whether we should advance to Baghdad or not, the attitude of mind seems to be this in London, in India and in Mesopotamia: "There is no doubt we can get to Baghdad, but we must have two divisions to enable us to hold Baghdad after we have got there." It is not straining the point to say it would have been more prudent to wait until those divisions had arrived before the advance was made?

A Certainly No

5418 Q The point I take it being that we were so to

on
speak, gambling ~~off~~ having superiority in numbers at
the moment which would take us into Baghdad at once

50/ A Yes

5419 Q Being satisfied that if we had two extra divisions we
could hold it if we got there.

A I take it that the situation at that time was one
of following up ^{an} unexpectedly complete victory,
and the result of the victory may have been a
little intoxicating perhaps. I think that is more or
less the position

5420 Q And so to speak, the flood of the victory which was
still flowing would carry us into Baghdad with smaller
numbers than the normal you would ^{have} expected to use

A Yes

5421 Q Only one or two ^{very} small points. I do not know whether
it is in your précis, but it is in the War Office
telegrams. There is some correspondence very early
in Nov 17 is one of them — in which the troops in
Mesopotamia are offered some ^{mountain} ~~amount~~ of artillery,
and accepted ^{it} with pleasure

A Yes

5422 Q Of what possible value could mountain artillery ~~could~~
be in Mesopotamia

A ^{It was} ~~There is~~ of very little value on the Tigris, but of
considerable value in ^{the} Nasiriyah area, because there
were Arab tribes ^{which} ~~who~~ were very disaffected, and it
means making small raids and excursions out
into the desert, ^{where you} ~~we should~~ want ^{particularly} mobile
light artillery

5423 Q And a few light guns are useful

A Yes

5424 Q Again in the same document ^{numbers} ~~pages~~ 96 and 111, I see
that fears are expressed as to the unpopularity of the war
with Mohammedan soldiers. In No. 111 there is the

story that the ~~men~~ ^{who} ~~Lancers~~ ^{refused to march} from Basra

A Yes.

5425 Q Are those only isolated instances or have you had more trouble
A They were only isolated instances. Whenever possible we have been very careful about the type of regiment which has been sent, and they sent ~~the~~ ^{the} regiments if at any rate big ^{Mohammedans} ~~big~~ ^{big} ~~ones~~ ^{ones} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~Mesopotamia~~ ^{Mesopotamia}. We have been watching that very carefully.

5426 General Sir Neville Lytton: Two regiments were sent to East Africa in preference

A Yes.

5427 The Earl of Donoughmore: The railways are being built

A Yes.

5428 Q Are any exceptional difficulties being met
A As regards the ~~Kurna~~ ^{Nasiriyah} line none; as regards the Kurna line the difficulty is I understand not so much of construction as of getting the material up; it has to come up a good deal by boat at the same time as the requirements of the troops at the front have to be met.

5429 Q It is possible I take it to build a railway as you go along. It can ^{cut} ~~gather~~ its own materials to a certain extent

A But the stuff has ~~to~~ to be got to Kurna. It is competing with the requirements of the troops. That is why that is rather slower than the other. The other line runs from Basra, ~~where~~ where the big ships come up

5430 Lord Hugh Cecil: A certain tonnage can go as far as Kurna

A Yes, but only a limited number. I think

5431 The Earl of Donoughmore: If any ^{great} ~~big~~ difficulties have not been met within 1916 it is a fair deduction that there might not have been great difficulties

~~I have been~~ rather struck reading the documents all through this campaign that the Commander in Chief has not been a fighting General as a rule. In Sir George ^{John} Nixon's time General Townshend did most of the fighting. I think General Goringe did some more, and here we know General Lake had employed General Sylmer to do the fighting.

A Yes.

5433 Q That is not quite usual, is it

A No.

5434 Q It is more ~~easy~~ ^{usual} for the Commander in Chief

A Yes, to be in the position where he can really control the operations

5435 Commander Wedgwood: We have operations ^{when} ~~up the~~ General Lake ^{was} at the front, but he did not take command

5436 The Earl of Donoughmore: Exactly. It is not usual for the Commander in Chief to be in the front line and not running the show himself.

A The natural position that a Commander in Chief would select is a position where he could best direct the military operations. Of course it is a matter of opinion I suppose as to whether they could be best controlled at Basra, ^{which is} ~~what~~ Sir Percy Lake thought, or nearer the fighting troops. Personally my own opinion is the nearer the front you are under normal circumstances the better. General Maude is now making preparations to go up much nearer the front. He is only waiting at Basra to get himself thoroughly an fait with all the military arrangements, and then he is going to establish the advanced G.H.Q. nearer to the front ~~relying on the I.G.C.~~

5437 Q Relying on the I.G.C. to keep him safe

A Yes

5438 Lord Hugh Cecil: One question as to Baghdad. It is I ^{think} ~~think~~ ^{Barrow} said by Sir Edward ^{mund} ~~Lertell~~ that Baghdad is in a position of considerable strategic usefulness

because

because the advance from the Turkish side to Baghdad is along two routes, and therefore ~~if the~~ ^{if the} army had got to Baghdad they would have been able to ~~take~~ ^{attack} the Turkish reinforcements separately and might have been more successful than they were at the battle of ~~Ctesiphon~~ Ctesiphon

A That presupposes that you are in Baghdad in sufficient force. That was the crux of the whole thing

5439

Q I put ~~to~~ this point to Sir Edmund Barron and I put it to you. Supposing we had got through, might it not have ended worse than it did? Might not the army of Sir John Nixon then have been attacked by an overwhelming Turkish force and forced to surrender? He answered, no not necessarily, because if he had got to Baghdad even without the two extra divisions he would have been able to defeat the Turks in detail as they came up. He would not have had to face the whole Turkish Army together

5440

A ~~I do not~~ ^{I agree} with Sir ~~Edmund~~ ^{Edmund} Barron ~~for~~ ^{General} Neville Lytton I asked him whether it was not rather ~~not an~~ optimistic to assume that with 30,000 men he could meet the Turkish Army ~~with~~ ^{with} 60,000, and he said, no because they would come by two ~~roads~~ ^{routes}, and he might deal first with one and then with the other, but ~~at the same time~~ ^{it seems to me} he did not consider the possibility of their coming up together.

A I agree with that.

5441

Chairman: It might be considered to be a strategical disadvantage to be attacked on two sides

A Yes; it would be courting disaster to go into Baghdad in insufficient force, and you have to consider what ~~an~~ ^{an} insufficient force was, and I do not agree that 30,000 men was sufficient

5442

General Sir Neville Lytton: This is ~~the~~ in the "War ~~the~~ Establishments for India". ~~That is the first one.~~

"The organization of the ~~the~~ field Army is drawn up on the basis of a campaign fought on or beyond the North West Frontier of India, under normal conditions. When a force is to be mobilised for a campaign to be fought under different conditions certain modifications of organization may become necessary, and these will be notified by Army Headquarters to all concerned."

Was that put in by the General Staff here

A No, it was probably on the basis of the present war, I should say

5443 Lord Hugh Cecil: It would be interesting to see the previous ~~edition~~ of the same ~~edit~~ paper

5444 Sir Archibald Williamson I daresay you have heard that the troops ^{are very} ~~were~~ badly off for vegetables

A Yes

5445 Q It ~~has~~ ^{is} ~~occurred~~ ^{agreed} that more might ~~have been~~ done by growing vegetables on the spot. Does that come under it?

A No, but I can investigate it. I understand it is being done. I have letters passing to and fro every week with the Chief of the Staff in Mesopotamia and as a matter of fact he mentioned to me quite a short time ago that they had been growing vegetables with considerable success

5446 I We are told ~~that~~ they did not keep

A They cannot get them up the river. I believe fresh vegetables from Basra arrive ~~uncatable~~ at Amara

~~Q. Was any attempt to get supplies~~

A ~~I do not know you can obtain them from the Director of Supplies~~

5447 Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge: It is the case that India has been frequently called upon to send considerable forces beyond the frontier of India

A Oh yes, Egypt certainly, and China and ~~Abyssinia~~ ^{Abyssinia}

The Chairman

Q Have you ^{the} list of documents we asked you for

A Yes. I think so.

5449

Q There ~~are~~ ^{was} a number of telegrams which Lord Crewe ~~told us~~ ^{has} of. We should like to have any telegrams which have passed between Lord Crewe and Lord Kitchen~~er~~ that have any reference to Mesopotamia

A Very well

The Witness withdrew

Smith's

Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Donegan, R.A.M.C., sworn and examined

The Chairman. We have your statement which we will take as your evidence in chief

Yes.

5451 I There is also a written statement furnished by you to the Vincent Bingley Commission

Yes

The Chairman. We will also have that put on the Notes

63

Mem to printer

insert documents
here with
marked D1

to D8
(except where
crossed out)

5452 The

Chairman:

What was your position in Mesopotamia, and how long were you there.

I arrived in Mesopotamia with the 17th Brigade, and I think we disembarked on the ^{1st} or ^{2nd} December 1914. I was invalided out of the country on the 23rd March 1916.

I was there about a year and four months

5453

During the whole of that time were you performing the same duties

Yes. Originally I was commanding No. 16 British Field Ambulance. Then there was a redistribution of medical units, and instead of having British Field Ambulances and Indian Field Ambulances they amalgamated both and they increased the strength by one section; that is, the unit consists of five sections instead of four. That change took place about February 14th 1915, and from that date I became the commanding officer of the 1st Field Ambulance, which was originally No. 16 British Field Ambulance amalgamated with No. 127 Indian Field Ambulance

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27.9.16.

MESOPOTAMIA COMMISSION.

STATEMENTS BY LT.-COLONEL J. F. DONEGAN, R.A.M.C.

NOTES ON MOBILISATION

1. Any statement which I make on this subject I am prepared to swear to and to support with the evidence of others.

2. Speaking with previous experience and without, I hope, being considered egotistical, as I have had more experience in the command of field medical units than, perhaps, any other officer of the Army Medical Service, I have no hesitation in saying that the mobilisation system (medical) adopted and approved of in India previous to the war was defective, and even antagonistic to efficiency. There were numerous schemes on paper, and mobilisation forms; clerically, matters were attended to down to the minutest detail, but otherwise they were neglected.

3. *Errors detected.*—General Hospitals: Though schedules of equipment were carefully drawn up to equip the first general hospital for service, nearly everything in the way of furniture had to be borrowed from the ordinary stationary hospitals. In Secunderabad I received orders to give up the beds from my hospital for this purpose, which would mean that men seriously ill in Secunderabad would have to be laid on the floor. I may add that I hesitated to comply with this order, and did not deliver beds from my hospital until barrack cots were substituted.

4. *Ignorance of personnel.*—On mobilisation at Poona the men of the Army Bearer Company Army Hospital Corps supplied to the different field medical units were absolutely and totally ignorant of everything. Though each field ambulance remained there nearly two months, with the exception of one field ambulance, no form of training was adopted, except, perhaps, some complicated stretcher drill on a parade ground. Assistant-surgeons and sub-assistant surgeons were totally devoid of any form of military training likely to be of use. Efforts made to train men in trench digging, road-repairing, or anything else providing safety and comfort for the wounded, were considered by the medical authorities to be a harmless variety of lunacy on the part of the Field Ambulance Commander.

As such matters were not alluded to in the R.A.M.C. Corps Manual, such precautions were considered quite unnecessary.

5. *Equipment.*—As regards equipment of field ambulances, all I can say here is that it was continually being changed in accordance with telegraphic orders. It contained numerous intrinsically valuable but otherwise useless articles in multiples of four (one set per section), and that it lacked many articles of practical use. It was stored (packed up) so that it could be taken over in half an hour. No medical unit could mobilise as rapidly as that, and, as the result of storage in packages and boxes year in, year out, blankets and tents deteriorated and even the corks of brandy bottles got rotten. One field ambulance commander succeeded in getting hold of the equipment to train his men, but he found so many articles defective that other units were not supplied with their equipment until they were entraining to proceed on service.

6. *Personnel.*—An authorised establishment was laid down in the regulations, including tailors, carpenters, washer men, storekeepers and assistant storekeepers.

In the year 1899, when I mobilised the 18th British Field Ambulance for service in South Africa, a similar system was in vogue. It must be remembered that the officials referred to only existed on paper, when they were wanted they were supposed to be picked up in the local bazaar. In 1899, when men would not come for the authorised rate of wages, I was authorized by the G.O.C., Bangalore, to employ them if considered essential. I employed a carpenter, who refused to come at Rs. 8 per month (10s. 8d.), at Rs. 30 (£2), and Government paid.

7. On the new system of mobilisation in 1914, when everything was done from Simla, as well as I could make out, if a man refused to come at the rate of wages which Government wish to give him the difficulty was got over by striking him out of the authorised scale. In that way tailors and other useful individuals were disallowed, and the whole charm of an Indian field ambulance—viz.,

its power of being able to do everything for itself without outside assistance—was interfered with. As regards the supply and transport officials, anything appeared to do. Regimental sergeants, who knew nothing about transport work or supplies, were detailed as supply and transport sergeants to field ambulances, and I even saw a native of India who could neither speak or write English detailed as an assistant storekeeper. Many of the men of the A.B.C. who came from Peshawar, came in boots completely worn out. I reported the matter to the A.D.M.S., Poona, and he simply alluded to the date of issue and said these boots were issued on such a date and should not be worn out. He said the men wore out their boots stamping their feet in the train coming down from Peshawar.

8. At a later date the A.D.M.S., Poona, told me not to parade any men with bad boots at the general's inspection. I expostulated, as my unit was going on service whereupon, he authorised his D.A.M.S. to issue on loan for the general's inspection, I think, 87 pairs of boots. Captain Gordon Wilson, M.C., R.A.M.C., at present in Poona, may remember the exact number, as he was adjutant at the time.

The A.D.M.S. said we would get everything wherever we were going. From my previous war experience I very much doubted our so doing, as I considered an army in the field should only make good deficiencies the result of fair wear and tear, and not equip in the first instance. Iron tent pegs were supplied for ambulance tents. They happened to be made of cast iron and broke the minute they were hammered into the ground. Fact notified and pegs shown to A.D.M.S., when I told him they were made of cast iron, he said that I was no authority on quality; that was the duty of the Ordnance Department. As a solution of the difficulty, he said I should issue orders that the men were not to strike the pegs too hard when tent-pitching. Captain Wilson and Major Bennett, to the best of my belief, heard the conversation.

9. *Movement by rail.*—As well as I remember, three field ambulances, a general hospital, stationary hospital, and other medical units proceeded on one train from Poona to Bombay. On arrival at Bombay with over 800 men and tons of equipment, no staff officer of any sort met the train, there were no orders and consequently endless confusion. It was late in the evening and personally I slept on the railway line at a crossing. The next day I reported the matter, and I was told that the embarkation authorities were only advised by the medical authorities from Simla of the arrival of medical details without any reference to units or numbers and that they only expected to see a few Indian followers with their pugarees and puttees falling off.

10. *Movements by sea.*—To the best of my belief, medical units at Bombay were embarked and disembarked from at least three different ships. The embarkation authorities simply wanted to get them away anyhow and to break up the units as much as possible. Personally I did not mind putting the unit under my command on board ship and off again as often as desired, but I objected to have it broken up and sent on different ships in the interests of efficiency, and I succeeded in gaining my point with the result that the unit came intact on one ship to Basra and disembarked in a few hours.

11. No. 17 B.F.A. leaving at the same time was dispatched as follows: Officers on one ship, British personnel on another, Indian personnel on another, equipment on another, horses on another, tentage and stores on another. On arrival at Basra, to the best of my belief, it took nearly three weeks to collect the unit together.

12. There may be other details which I have forgotten to allude to, but to the best of my belief I have referred to the most important items. As I said to start with, that it was the system which was so defective. Practical suggestions were not wanted by the local mobilisation authorities and to palpable faults brought to notice there was always the stock expression: "It is all done from Simla, you know, it can't be corrected now, manage as best you can."

slow in complying. I realise that there is a shortage in India, but I have a great deal of heavy constructional work in hand and unless my overworked staff is increased, the officers here will break-down in health, especially as the hot weather advances. Delay in hospital and hut construction here will seriously impair the health of the troops, and this hot weather we shall have to accommodate a wholly British division (the 13th) in addition to 4 mixed divisions, excluding the 6th in Kut.

A. H. BINGLEY, — 16-4-16.

II

Written statement furnished by Lieut.-Col.

F. F. Donegan, R. A. M. C., dated Bombay, 16th April, 1916. *to The Viceroy*

Bingley Comm.

At the request of the Commission, conveyed to me by the A.D.M.S., I make this statement regarding the medical arrangements in Mesopotamia as, being invalided from the country, I was unable to give evidence personally. The statements are extracts from my War Diary and records in my possession, and I confine myself as far as possible to matter relative to the comforts of the sick and wounded.

Magill Convalescent Hospital. 11th December 1914. Received numerous orders about opening Convalescent Hospital on this and subsequent dates. I was asked by A.D.M.S. Force when the Convalescent Hospital Magill would be ready to take in wounded, but applications made by me to him for personnel equipment, cooking appliances, etc., etc., were not referred to at all, by him.

Magill. 14th December 1914. Party of sick and wounded arrived at Convalescent Hospital without previous notification of their coming. They had neither blankets nor food. Placed Major Murphy, I.M.S., in command and did all I could for the institution.

15th December 1914. Rode into Basrah and informed A.D.M.S. that I could not submit the numerous returns called for, as no forms were available for so doing either in his office or mine. Visited Medical Stores where I found Rs. 25 worth of alum, which I had originally bought and paid for in Bombay myself. Informed by Medical Store Keeper that although packages were marked Officer Commanding No. 16, British Field Ambulance, it had all been commandeered by order of A.D.M.S. as there was no other alum in the country and that it was urgently required. Wrote A.D.M.S. on the subject.

17th December 1914. Inspected troops in camp. Found that no milk was supplied to troops and that men were drinking milk got in filthy villages bought from Arabs.

Milk for troops. Saw General Officer Commanding, 17th Brigade, General Dobbie, C.B., and got authority for issue of tinned milk to British troops. At a later date the issue was stopped by order of higher authority.

20th December 1914. Inspected equipment of unit. Found all the Brandy bottles half empty, the result of defective corking, fact notified to A.D.M.S.

26th December 1914. Red Cross boxes arrived for patients. They contained very little of use beyond an odd tin of cigarettes or box of biscuits. They mostly contained pneumonia jackets, cover for bed screens, packets of tow, pillow cases, dressing gowns, enema syringes and flea powder. A.D.M.S. informed me they were ten bed unit boxes made up at Simla. Pointed out that the contents though valuable intrinsically, were useless to field medical units. Suggested other things, but A.D.M.S. said the 10 bed unit system could not be altered.

Red Cross Ten Bed Boxes.

6th January 1915. Wrote A.D.M.S. requesting that some arrangements may be made for river transport of sick and wounded and pointing out the faults of the present system. Made an appeal for a *mahaila* and said I would fit one up myself so as to render it suitable for removal of sick if I could only get the boat.

8th January 1915. Informed verbally by A.D.M.S. that a *mahaila* could not be supplied, as the hire of same would cost Rs. 85 per month and that the special sanction of the Government of India would be required.

10th January 1915. Orders came for unit to move up river to Kurnah with brigade. Had to make my own local arrangements for the evacuation of 39 sick to Basrah, which necessitated my making personal application to Marine transport officials. No assistance was given from Basrah, when orders were received nothing was said about the evacuation of sick.

20th January 1915. Mazera. Made all medical arrangements for the force operating under Sir Arthur Barrett, K.C.B., and accompanied the Divisional Staff. This force eventually retired with a loss of 83 killed, and wounded. Our medical transport consisted of stretchers and

Blanket Stretchers. riding mules only: we could get no carts. The riding mules bolted back to camp early in the day, as a few shells burst near them. All wounded removed by hand and carried a distance of five miles. Alluded to this in my official report and also pointed out how frightfully conspicuous red blankets supplied to field ambulance were in the field. Brigadier-General Dobbie also called my attention to the regimental stretchers in the firing line, made of black or brown blankets and poles, they certainly were a good mark for enemy also. The dandie stretchers used by No. 10 British Field Ambulance, and consisting of an ordinary stretcher carried on a pole, was infinitely superior to carrying the wounded on the shoulders of natives of India under shell fire. Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Barrett remarked on the difference. Any stretcher

Medical Transport in the field.

could be carried in this manner provided an ordinary doolie pole (value one anna and four pies) could be obtained. At a later date, G.O.C., 17th Brigade applied to A.Q.M.G. for 30 doolie poles; but application was refused as the poles could not be got without the sanction of the Government of India.

21st January 1915. All wounded evacuated to Basrah. Men made as comfortable as possible

Discomfort of wounded on ships.

on ship with blankets and stretchers, food, etc. The O.C. of the clearing hospital at Kurnah informed me that he had discontinued sending stretchers and blankets with wounded, as articles of equipment were never returned from the Basrah General Hospitals. As the wounded had been made comfortable over night in 16 British Field Ambulance, I could not see why they should be made uncomfortable on board ship. Arranged that this should not occur again.

22nd January 1915. Had a long conversation River transport of with G. O. C. (General Dobbie) about the absolute necessity for some proper means of removing sick and wounded by river and also wrote A. D. M. S. on the subject. General Dobbie told me that he had seen Sir Arthur Barrett and that something would be done in this matter if A. D. M. S. would approve.

27th January 1915. A. D. M. S. arrived from Request for Ambu- Basrah to inspect. He lance *Mahailas*. said G. O. C. was very pleased with the medical arrangements for operations on 20th. (No sanitary errors detected in camp. Spoke to him about the necessity for ambulance *mahaila* and said clearing a foot of horse dung off a ship's deck and putting on wounded afterwards, was disgraceful. I also pointed out that ships were in a most septic condition and could not be cleaned. He refused to sanction the hire of *mahailas*.

28th January 1915. Brought to the notice of Deaths amongst A. D. M. S. the wretched slaughter cattle. condition of slaughter cattle, stating that over one hundred animals died in the pens every night for the last week. I asked him to look at the cattle as I suspected anthrax. He told me, before every officer of No. 16 B. F. A. and No. 127 I. F. A., that he would not do so, that I should not do so either, as there was an Army Order that no medical officer should look at live cattle before slaughter; but that after death I could order an officer to inspect the meat to see if it was good.

29th. Saw G. O. C. relative to deaths amongst cattle. Analysis showed fluke worms and tubercle but no anthrax. Informed by Supply Officer that Government did not sanction food for animals purchased locally in the country, and as these animals had been some days on barges without food, it accounted for the large number of deaths. Told G. O. C. who took the matter in hand.

8th February 1915. The M. O., 90th Punjabis reported to me that malaria was starting in his regiment on account of dampness and that his object was to keep men fit and out of hospital. Authorised O. C. No. 127 to issue to this battalion two pounds of quinine for prophylactic treatment. Wired to A. D. M. S. and suggested

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prophylactic doses of quinine in this battalion as other troops at Mazera were not particularly healthy. The A. D. M. S. wired and refused the issue of quinine. To S. M. O., Mazera sender's

Prophylactic Treatment refused: further reference Pages 7-8. number 451-medical, 8th February 1915, your 79 today. The issue of prophylactic quinine to 90th Punjabis is not sanctioned by A. D. M. S., Force. On this date the sickness in camp exclusive of the 90th Punjabis was as follows :-

British Troops one man	
with Sciatica.	
Five Battalions of Indian	
Troops	... 15
Followers	... 6
Total	... 21

9th February 1915. Following wires received :-

Healthy condition of garrison. To G. O. C., Mazera. In reply to your No. 70, 8th G. O. C. congratulates you and your medical staff on satisfactory health results of your force as represented.

From General Staff. 7-40 P.M. To S. M. O.

Forwarded for information. G. O. C. recognises that the excellent health results in this post, so appreciated by the L.G.C. Division, is entirely due to your unceasing and skilful supervision.

JOHN LLOYD, Bde.-Major.

Message sent by me to all battalion commanders and to medical officers with the following memorandum :-

The G. O. C. most graciously attributes the present low sick rate to my energies, but I consider it as the more due to the assistance rendered by medical officers and subordinates of each service and to the loyal support rendered by all unit commanders.

11th. M. O. of 90th Punjabis reported to me the improvement of health in his battalion under prophylactic doses of quinine. I am sorry it cannot be continued. The M.O. of the Royal West Kent Regiment, which has just joined from India, asked me if prophylactic doses of quinine could be given in his battalion. As the 12th Bde. appears to be outside my jurisdiction, and as A. D. M. S. refused sanction for issue to 90th Punjabis, I could not do much in the matter.

12th February 1916. Case of Erysipelas admitted to ambulance. Wire Deficiency of Drugs. Further reference, Pages 14-15. to Base Medical Stores for anti stripto-coccus serum.

Informed by wire that there was none in the Medical Stores. Wired A. D. M. S. and suggested sending this case to Basrah in *mahaila* so as to keep ships clear of infection. No *mahaila* was supplied: at a subsequent date the man was sent down on a coal barge.

Received orders from A. D. M. S. that none except dangerous cases were to be sent to Basrah and that all others were to be treated in each field ambulance.

Using Field Ambulance as General Hospital. Pointed out that field units would soon be full of sick and that these units were not equipped for the continued treatment of disease.

15th February 1914. Field ambulance system altered: No. 16 British Field Ambulance done away with, the unit is now No. 1

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Field Ambulance consisting of two sections
16 British Field Ambulance and three sections
No. 1 Field Ambulance from Kurnah.

17th February 1915. A. D. M. S. inspected
Prophylactic Qui- camp. He admitted that my
nine. reports on the floods to him
were not exaggerated. As men are, practically
speaking, sleeping in water, I advocated prophylactic
doses of quinine. He said quinine could
not be administered prophylactically unless the
admissions to hospital exceeded 3 per cent. He
also spoke of the expense of my suggestion.

Kurnah, 17th April 1915. Received message
No chlorine appa- from A.D.M.S. regarding the
ratus. chlorinating of water of unit.
Replied and said I had no apparatus. Received
message from A.D.M.S. regretting that no
chlorine apparatus was available. Captain Barry
reported to me the admission of five cases of a
peculiar variety of fever which I directed to be
watched.

20th April 1915. Fever increasing in British
Fever amongst and Indian troops.
Troops.

23rd. Wired to A. D. M. S. for authority to
Prophylactic Qui- issue quinine to British and
nine sanctioned. Indian troops prophylactically
as malaria was so prevalent. Application sanctioned
although twice previously refused on
8th February 1915 and 17th February 1915.

May 3rd. Malaria appears to be diminishing
though prophylactic doses have only been issued
for it for about a week.

May 20th. Surgeon-General Hathaway in-
Inspection of Kur- spected Kurnah and expressed
nah by D. D. M. S. his satisfaction with the con-
dition of affairs, especially the complete absence
of flies and mosquitoes. He informed me that
he had heard most flattering accounts of the
place from his D. D. M. S. (Sanitation), who
inspected on 16th instant.

22nd May 1915. Reported to A.D.M.S. that
Scurvy starts. three cases of scurvy had
been detected amongst Indian
troops also that I could not evacuate sick and
wounded to Basrah without ships suitable for
the purpose. Was informed
Evacuation of sick. that ship coming up can only
take two lying down cases and I have at least
50 for transfer. Notified A. D. M. S. that one
case (British) had died of scurvy.

26th May 1915. A.D.M.S. inspected ambu-
lance. Have been appointed S.M.O. of Force
proceeding through reeds in country boats.
A.D.M.S. agreed with me that the medical
arrangements under such circumstances were
difficult as there was no precedent.

27th. Got permission to evacuate sick and
wounded from field ambulance previous to its
departure to take part in actual operation, up
to date it has been a form of general hospital.

28th. Loaded a convoy of sick on boat to go
down river. Before she left, A. D. M. S. inspected
her and sent back ten cases to field ambu-
lance. He never said anything to me. It makes
matters difficult for an ambulance commander
if the cases he puts on board for evacuation are
immediately sent back to him by higher authority
when his ambulance is required for duty with
troops in active operations.

29th. Many cases of heat stroke admitted.
Temperature 116° F.

30th. Received operation orders from A. D.
M. S. which were mostly wrong. Amongst
other things I was told to establish a dressing
station on Norfolk Hill then in the hands of
the enemy and commanded by their guns on
three other positions. Saw G. O. C. of Brigade
who authorised me to use my own judgment in
this matter and not to do as ordered by A. D.
M. S. if I did not approve. Many cases of
heat stroke admitted. Received orders to leave
at Kurnah two sections to receive the wounded.
My unit therefore became a combined field
ambulance and general hospital. The ice so
urgently required and so often asked for arrived
from Basrah on the "P.-4"; but the boat anchored
500 yards down river and did not come along
side. At midnight as nothing was done in the
matter, I got hold of a tug from Lieutenant Boltby,
R.I.M., and got down to the "P.-4". By 2 A.M. the
ice was in camp. The sick were supplied and all
bellums of the field ambulance had a supply on
board, stored in ammunition boxes in case of
sunstroke occurring during operations. Saw an
ample supply of medical comforts loaded and
packed on the 17th Brigade. Supply barge
working in conjunction with supply officer, 17th
Brigade.

31st May 1915. Norfolk Hill, Tower Hill and
one Tree Hill captured medical units in bellums
kept up well with fighting force and were on
to positions dressing and evacuating wounded
(mostly enemy) within twenty minutes of capture.
During the day the A. D. M. S. wired
the O. C., 103rd Regiment from Tower Hill and
altered the line of evacuation of wounded, but
as neither brigade commander nor myself were
informed, the order was not complied with.
11-45 received orders from A. D. M. S. to stand
still at Tower Hill until reinforced by two sections
No. 2 F. A.

June 1st. Brigade moved off at 5-45 A.M.
poling and paddling in the direction of Baran.
Reinforcements of A. D. M. S. not yet arrived.
Sent on some medical bellums and remained at
Tower Hill waiting for reinforcements and
orders.

7 A.M. Moved off without either orders or
reinforcements and picked up brigade.

2-30 P.M. Arrived Baran. Brigade got orders
to embark on ships and go up river. No orders
for medical unit from A. D. M. S. Reported to
Brigade Commander that I had made my way
so far without orders from A. D. M. S. was told
to continue doing the same. Embarked unit on
"P.-1".

June 2. Arrived at Ezra's Tomb. Met by
A. D. M. S. Received four contradictory verbal
orders in about 5 minutes. Captain Crookshank,
I.M.S., was present at that time.

Numerous cases of sun stroke as British
Sick and troops on troops were on iron decked
open barges. barges without head cover.
Received orders to transfer from "P.-1" to an
open barge all personnel, equipment and sick.
No boat could be got to tow barge to the right
bank of river where ambulance was ordered to
disembark. In the interest of sick I made fre-
quent applications to A.D.M.S. for tug.

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6 P.M. Nothing done, field ambulance with sick is the only unit left on barges. All others have been disembarked.

3rd. Ambulance staff working all night on cases of heat stroke. Made efforts from day-break to A.D.M.S. to get a tug. He appears to have no influence with any department. A.Q.M.G.'s department prepared to shift anyone before sick, even Turkish prisoners.

9 A.M. I could not in the interests of those under remain any longer on barge. As I could not get towed to right bank, I disembarked on left bank without orders and also pitched camp without orders.

10 A.M. Received orders from A.D.M.S. to get sick and equipment into *bellums* and bring them across to right bank. It was impossible to comply with this order as there were but few *bellums* available and a cross passage with overloaded *bellums* with a five mile tide running would in all probability have resulted in many being drowned. As a *shumal* (a gale of wind) was blowing at the time, I had to refuse to obey his order.

10-45. Brigade Commander, Brigadier-Général Hill Climo, came to see me relative to the condition of affairs. He told me as regards further orders of the A.D.M.S. I was to obey them or not, just as I considered advisable. If I did not consider them to be for the benefit of sick and efficiency, I had his authority to refuse to obey them in his name.

11-30. A.D.M.S. visited ambulance. He was most affable and made no remark about my refusal to obey his order issued at 10 A.M. He spoke in the most flattering terms of the work done by the field ambulance with the *bellum* squadron during the attack, of which he said he had been informed by the Brigade Commander.

4th June. All sick were cleared off "P-4" acting as a clearing hospital and taken over by my unit. Sick and wounded evacuated to the front instead of rear. This was evacuating wounded from a clearing hospital to field ambulance. Took them over, operated on Turkish wounded, many cases of sun stroke treated. Later, received orders for unit to move up river and to take all sick with it. This meant evacuating from the lines of communication to the front, cases that had originally been taken over from a clearing hospital. Informed A.D.M.S. that in my previous experiences in war I had never seen worse medical arrangements and that I could not be responsible for lives of sick men so treated.

8th. Having waited for four days with everything packed up, unit at last embarked on "P-1" and proceeded to Amarah.

10th. Arrival at Amarah. Camped in an orange grove and before I had time to have the ground cleared, I got orders to take on large numbers of sick.

12th. Pitched camp and took in sick. Received telegram from my two sections in Kurnah asking for assistance as there were 198 cases under treatment. Forwarded wire to A.D.M.S. as I had no one to send.

13th. Received wire from sections in Kurnah saying that there were 287 cases now under treatment and that in spite of urgent wires to Basrah for

ice none had been received and that cases of heat-stroke were dying in consequence. All I could do was to repeat wire to A.D.M.S.

16th. Saw Supply Officer with reference to Failure of Hospital Food Supply. hospital supplies. Was informed that S. & T. were deficient of milk, bovril, in fact everything in the way of medical comforts, with the exception of beer, brandy and port wine which were no use in treatment of effects of the sun. As I had myself seen ample supplies loaded on Brigade Supply barge before leaving Kurnah on May 30th, I asked what had become of them and was informed that the A.D., S. & T. objected to brigade medical supplies being carried, that this should be done by the divisional supply authorities and that the hospital supplies had been left behind in error.

18th. Practically no food suitable for patients under treatment. Wrote Shortage of Food for patients. and wired S. & T. who did not answer letters or wires, but came and apologised verbally for shortage. On this date, including my sections at Kurnah, there were 650 cases under continued treatment in No. 1 Field Ambulance with an authorised holding capacity of only 125 and with a considerably reduced staff. Informed by A.D.M.S. that D.D. M.S. had decided that no cases were to be transferred from Amarah. Wrote A.D.M.S. as follows privately:—

Dear Colonel, June 16th, 1915.

When the 22nd move out that leaves a regiment here without any medical officer. I shall do as best I can, but it is a pretty good example of what happens when field medical units are denuded of their staff. There are a few patients that I do not think *will live under present conditions* and who I would like to send down country, if the embargo of D.D.M.S. can be lifted. It is hard to test urine without even a bit of litmus paper but we will do our best.

P.S.—If there are any inquiries after this campaign as there were after South Africa, you will no doubt support me in my statement that I did all I could in the interests of the sick. To the best of my belief three of the cases which I wished to transfer from Amarah to Basrah died some short time afterwards from what was considered to be want of proper food and medicines.

19th. Saw S. & T. Corps with reference to a local supply of fresh milk, Milk Supply. A. D. M. S. visited in the afternoon. I told him that the fresh milk supplied formed a clot on boiling, and that, as well as I could make out, it was adulterated with cows urine (a custom amongst Arabs). He did not appear interested in the matter and changed the subject. All my officers were present. Saw Engineers and asked them as a personal favour to build a few more huts for sick. They are very busy and doing their utmost. 140 cases of fever and dysentery admitted from 103rd Mahratta Light Infantry.

20th. Still trouble over supply of fresh milk. 240 pints had out of 430 Bad milk. supplied. Notified A. D. M. S. and asked him to get cows milked under

proper supervision. A. D. M. S. replied to Brigade Headquarters saying I had informed him of the fact, that it had nothing to do with him that it was purely a matter for the Brigade Supply Officer. He also requested that I may be informed of his decision. G. O. C. Brig.-General Gamble, D. S. O., C. B., wired that he thoroughly disagreed with A. D. M. S., that it was not a matter for Brigade Supply Officer and that something should be done immediately. Wrote Staff Captain regarding the want of sweepers, 277 cases in hospital and only three sweepers. Asked him to inform A. D. M. S. as I would be held to be causing trouble if I did so.

21st. Ice supplied for use of sick for the first time.

23rd. D. D. M. S. inspected ambulance. No error of any sort brought to my notice. With the greatest difficulty tins for latrine purposes were obtained from S. and T.

24th. Wired Brigade Supply Depot on the inferior quality of milk supplied, as it was invariably adulterated and sour.

Wrote Staff Captain 17th Bde.

The attached telegrams forwarded for information. Failure of Drug Supply. I regret to have to state that my officers complain that they have not the wherewithal to treat their patients and that as far as drugs are concerned that statement is correct. I am willing to adopt any procedure which may be suggested and I consider this is a matter which should be brought to the notice of the G. O. C. as proof at any subsequent inquiry that I did my best in the interests of the sick. There appears to be a shortage of drugs required for the treatment of sick and owing to the unprecedented number of sick the drugs of my three sections have been used up. There was no shortage of authorised drugs with my field ambulance when it left Kurnah.

July 2. Reported to A. D. M. S. that there was a suspicious case of enteric (British) and asked if man could be sent to Basrah in his own interests and the interests of the force, as man was fit to travel. A. D. M. S. replied that he could not be sent till his temperature was normal. A. D. M. S. came to hospital and I again asked to be let transfer enteric case, as man could not be properly treated. A. D. M. S. said "whoever heard of a man with suspected enteric being sent back to lines of communication." I replied that during my service I had sent at least fifteen or twenty thousand and that I had never before been called on to treat such cases practically in the firing line for fear of infecting the lines of communication.

Note.—I have no official record, but to the best of my belief this case was sent to Basrah without authority. No. 9274 Pte. Scott, 1st O. and B. Regiment, died at 9.45 p.m., of acute septic infection.

8th. Sent in indent for medicines which could not be complied with except in a few instances and in small quantities. No emitine or quinine available for issue. No. 9716 Pte. Reynolds, 1st

O. and B. Regiment died in hospital of dysentery.

13th. Received orders to move up river with striking force. Orders countermanded.

31st. Started up river as S. M. O. of 16th Brigade.

From this date to 11th of September, the Tigris Force under Brigadier-General Delamain was detached from Division, being located at Ali-al-Gharbi. As S. M. O., with such a capable commander and staff, I got everything I wanted done in the interests of the sick as I was in a position to go direct to my General which I could not do if A. D. M. S. was present.

September 11th. A. D. M. S. arrived with Divisional Staff. Received operation orders, medical.

No marine transport for ambulances row up river. The orders were wrong. A. D. M. S. lost sight of four sections. I do not mind wrong orders, but in this case it meant the allotment of sections to ships and barges for transport and without authority, naturally I could not get accommodation: up to 7-20 p.m. I had received no less than four contradictory orders from A. D. M. S. and D. A. D. M. S. Eventually the A. D. M. S. left, leaving no definite orders or instructions.

12th. Force moved off at dawn. Lieutenant-Colonel Hennesy, O.C., No. 2 Field Ambulance reported to me that he had made frantic efforts to get on ships with his two sections but was only thrown off again. My unit was waiting to embark from daybreak. At 12-30, I had a heated discussion with the Marine Transport Officer and finally ordered him to provide transport for the medical units, taking full responsibility for my action. Finally, I got both medical units away on the "Mosul" otherwise, with the exception of the two sections marching by land, there would have been no medical units up with fighting force.

5 P. M. Arrived at Kol Bug and picked up fighting force. Reported to A. D. M. S. how his medical units were nearly left behind. A. Q. M. G. came on board and accused me before A. D. M. S. of delaying ships, taking ships without authority and some other offences. There was some talk about reference to the G. O. C. on the subject, but I heard no more about it and as there were 70 cases of heat stroke to be attended to I had other matters to occupy my attention. Had the medical units not come up, these cases would have had but poor medical treatment.

26th. Received numerous orders from A. D. Contradictory M. S. Saw Brigade-Major Orders. Force "A" Lieutenant-Colonel

Holdich and told him of my former experiences as regards orders by A. D. M. S. in action. Pointed out what was likely to occur if, while on the spot, I was to be obliged to obey orders from elsewhere which may be impossible to comply with. At a later hour the Brigade-Major informed me that the G. O. C. had insisted that I should act as S. M. O. in the field and that I was not obliged to comply with any orders from the A. D. M. S. unless they came through the Force "A" Commander, and that A. D. M. S. had been so informed.

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20th. 2-30 A. M. Force moved off from clearing post into action.

5-30 A. M. Seeing that A. D. M. S. had made no provision for carts I sent forward Captain Wilson, R. A. M. C., with 26 baggage carts.

9-30 A. M. Message came from O. C. Bearer Division asking for more carts, so sent forward 20 more.

20. These carts were not provided officially. I just took them from other units of 2nd line transport and off loaded their contents on the ground. Instead of objecting, the 2nd line transport officers were only too willing to help. During the day I got many more carts in this manner. 2 30 P. M. A. D. M. S. came to post and ordered my tent divisions to move forward to position. I obeyed, as I could not get into communication with G. O. C. When I got up I found the ground under heavy shell fire, there was no water; place was quite unsuitable for a tent division. G. O. C. ordered tent division to retire. I myself was slightly wounded but not enough to interfere with my doing my duty. All wounded that could be found were collected and sent in by carts. The want of water was frightful for both wounded and troops. Fighting continued till after 8 P. M. Bearer sub-divisions could not rejoin.

29th. Moved forward without orders and got up to 17th Brigade collecting numerous wounded that had been out all night. Met my bearer divisions and brought them on. The men were in an awful state. But we had to keep advancing. Arrived at 17th Brigade Headquarters at dark with about 30 cart loads of wounded. Met by A. D. M. S., who wanted to know how many lying down and sitting up cases I had brought. I had to tell him that I had not been able even to count the cart loads of wounded much less classify wounded men into sitting up and lying down.

30th. Left all wounded with A. D. M. S. at 17th Brigade Headquarters and marched to Kut. Met by General Delamain on arrival who spoke in flattering terms of the work done by No. 1 Field Ambulance in action: he said he was exceedingly pleased at the medical arrangements in the field itself.

October 2. Wrote despatches and sent in the names of deserving officers and others.

3rd. No less than 198 wounded left by me on river bank to be evacuated by A. D. M. S. were sent up river back to the field to be treated regimentally and in field ambulances.

8th. Brigade moved off to Aziziyah. Remained behind with two sections forming a sort of general hospital. Collected many more British wounded found in the town of Kut. Staff very busy doing many operations.

18th. D. D. M. S. arrived at Kut and authorised the transfer of all cases from Kut to Amarah, so men wounded on the 28th of September at the Battle of Es-Sinn and afterwards sent back to the field for treatment, were at last evacuated.

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20th. D. D. M. S. spoke to me about this engagement relative to the A. D. M. S. making no provision for carts. Contradictory orders, etc. He directed me to send in to him all operation orders received, maps, etc., with my remarks. I did so and at a later date I got them back being told by D. A. D. M. S. Headquarters that the D. D. M. S. realised the difficulty, but that he did not care to interfere with the A. D. M. S. of a division.

No doubt there are many capable of giving evidence of the medical arrangements at the Battle of Ctesiphon who are as well informed as I am. I can say without hesitation that the arrangements were far superior to those at Es-Sinn. Nearly four thousand wounded were evacuated from the field to the river bank and there appeared to be some accommodation for them at Amarah and Basrah and on ocean going ships, so they were not sent back to be treated in the field. As regards the A. D. M. S., 6th Division, he issued no voluminous written orders before the engagement, leaving the matter more in the hands of officers on the spot. Unfortunately, during the counter attack on the 23rd of October, he ordered me and my bearer division commander to retire, to save the medical equipment, and leave the helpless wounded officers and men behind with a sub-assistant surgeon. This order was not complied with, the wounded at my tent division were not left alone and neglected over night and all were saved. I attach the war diaries of two officers of my unit who were detached from headquarters at different periods and they go to prove that the medical administration was not all it could be. As can be seen from the entries made by Captain Stevenson, R. A. M. C., he did infinitely more himself in the interests of the wounded than two administrative medical officers could do for them. The medical administration at Amarah, the last place I was at, is not all it could be, but no doubt other evidence can be obtained on that point also.

War Diary of Major Wright, I. M. S., No. 1
F. A. (T).

30th May 1915. Kurnah. 2-30 P. M. Reported my arrival at Kurnah to A. D. M. S., 6th Division. Received orders to take over charge "C" Section, No. 1 Field Ambulance, which with "B" section was to remain at Kurnah during the advance on Amarah. Instructed to inform Captain Hislop, I. M. S., to report to O. C., 22nd Punjab, for duty with the regiment and to inform Captain Hendy, R. A. M. C., to remain on "P.4" in command two sections C. C. H.

3-30 P. M. Reported my arrival in accordance with above orders to O. C. No. 1 Field Ambulance.

31st May 1915. 4-30 A. M. "A", "D", "E" sections No. 1 Field Ambulance left Kurnah. Took over charge of remaining sections. Captain Wilson, R. A. M. C., O. C. "B" section No. 1 Field Ambulance, taken off sick list. Made detailed inspection of ambulance accommodation with view to taking in casualties from British Officers 6, British ranks 101, wounded Indian officer 1, Indian ranks 55. Received message in

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afternoon from Captain Cruickshank, I. M. S., that "Bahrein" was bringing down from front 6 Indian ranks wounded and 1 dead.

4-30 P.M. "Bahrein" arrived with following sick and wounded: British officers 1, British ranks 1, Indian ranks 6, Indian dead 1, Enemy 1.

7 P.M. Seventeen sepoy 48th Pioneers received from front effects of sun.

9-30 P.M. A. D. M. S. 6th Division called at ambulance. Gave permission to use "P. 6" on her way to Basrah for evacuation of sick. O. C. 117th furnished fatigue parties for ambulance work. 1st June 1915. 5-30 A.M. ambulance *mahailas* arrived at Lanyon with following sick and wounded: British officers 2, British ranks 11, Indian ranks 6, Indian dead 1, Enemy 37 wounded, 3 dead.

1st June 1915. Kurnah 11-30 A.M. "P. 6" arrived off Fort Fry. Only enough space on board for about 30 sick. M. L. O. informed me that she could not come alongside wharf. Captain Wilson put on board for Basrah. British officers 3, British ranks 24 (12 stretcher cases). Soda put on board for sick. D. D. M. S. on board could not send medical attendant as numbers remaining in ambulance were as follows: British officers 5, wounded officer 1, British ranks 141, Indian ranks 104, Enemy 21. Only one case requiring sick attendant put on board. "P. 6" left at 1 P.M.

12 Noon. Major Cook, I. M. S., Captains Fraser, I. M. S., and McCreary, R. A. M. C., left Kurnah in ambulance *mahailas* (all three officers not very fit) taking ice and sodas for O. C. No. 1 and No. 2 Field Ambulances.

6 P.M. "P. 5" arrived with following sick: British officer 1 (Captain Fraser, I. M. S.), British ranks 11, Indian ranks 11. Got permission from O. C. 117th, to utilise a large hut in his lines for extension of ambulance. O. C. 117th furnished fatigue parties for the day.

2nd June 1915. Considerable time spent in redressing and operating on enemy wounded. Number in ambulance 378. Wired A. D. M. S. 6th Division, for boat to clear ambulance. Received message to act in communication with I. G. C.

5-0 P.M. "P. 4" arrived with following sick: British officer 1, British ranks 28, several cases showing marked effects of heat with hyperpyrexia requiring ice-packing.

3rd June 1915. Kurnah. 7-30 A.M. "Salimi" arrived at Fort Fry. Put on board for Basrah: British officers 2, British ranks 58, wounded officer 1, Indian ranks 38, Enemy 37. "Salimi" left at 1 P.M.

3rd June 1915. Kurnah. 2-30 P.M. *mahaila* arrived at Lanyon with following sick: British ranks 26 Indian officers 1, Indian ranks 48, several bad cases with hyper-pyrexia requiring ice packs. S. A. S. Russool Shah came down with the sick and got left behind as the "Shehab" went off immediately; the other bringing the *mahaila* to Lanyon. O. C. 117th furnished fatigue parties for the day.

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4th June 1915. Had 12 punkhas put in hospital and entertained coolies to pull same. Informed by M. L. O. that "P. 7" had called stopping for about 15 minutes. Some sick on board in charge S. A. S. Shede not allowed to disembark as General Officer on board wished to push on to Basrah.

5th June 1915 3 P.M. "Salimi" arrived en route Amarah. Sent S. A. S. Shede and Russool Shah forward. Despatched 18 dozen soda 1 case and 4 blocks of ice for use of No. 1 and No. 2 Field Ambulances. Discharged 5 men to "Espiegle". Major Cook Young, I. M. S., arrived with staff of nursing orderlies to superintend the embarkation of sick and wounded from Kurnah.

5-30 P.M. "P. 6" arrived from Ezza's Tomb with sick. Had telegraphic orders to disembark them at Kurnah. Received subsequent orders from Major Cook Young, E. M. O., to leave these cases on board and to embark any other sick which were ready at 5-30 A.M. on 6th June 1915. Captain Wilson, R. A. M. C., placed on sick list. O. C. 117th furnished fatigue parties.

6th June 1915. 5-30 A.M. Sent following sick to wharf and handed them over to E. M. O.: British ranks 4, Indian ranks 5, Enemy 1.

6th June 1915. Kurnah. 4 P.M. Orders received from E. M. O. to send sick for Basrah on board the "Muzuffri" between 5-30 and 7-30 P.M. Had 85 cases for transfer. Sent some stretcher cases and most of sitting cases to wharf in charge of nursing orderly. Some of these cases had to come back as S. M. O. found that there was not room for all to sleep on board. Received orders to put remainder on at 4 A.M. on 7th June 1915. Gave E. M. O. soda, ice, medicines for the night. O. C. 117th, furnished fatigue parties.

7th June 1915. 4 A.M. Got remaining cases on board "Muzuffri." Numbers of sick were: British officers 4, British ranks 54, Indian officers 2, Indian ranks and followers 25. Handed over 8 dozen soda and ice to S. O. for use of sick.

6 A.M. "Muzuffri" left for Basrah.

5 P.M. Removed 18 Turkish sick and 1 dead from steel barge in river, in which they were much over crowded and suffering from effects of heat.

8th June 1915. "T 2" arrived from front with Turkish prisoners. No room for sick. "P. 6" arrived from Basrah with ice for ambulances, could not send any forward to Amarah as no boat going. One sepoy and one Turk died hyper-pyrexia. O. C. 117th furnished necessary fatigues.

9th June 1915. 6-30 A.M. Put 12 Indian ranks, 2 followers, 17 Turkish sick on board. "Blosse Lynch" in charge ward orderly, with soda. She left at 7-30 A.M.

1 P.M. "Salimi" arrived from front with 1 section C. C. H. under Captain Hendry and sick. Put ice and soda on board. No ice received from Basrah.

5454

2 After that amalgamation was it on the recognized ~~standard~~ ^{standard} as regards the number of troops
 1 It is a very difficult thing to answer that, because it was a standard that was made up there all of a sudden. It would really take hours to explain to you. As regards what the authorized strength should be I could not tell you. I understood the reason of this sudden and drastic change from the British Field Ambulance to the combined unit was simply because troops were coming from Egypt who had no medical arrangements. To the best of my belief this re-distribution was made to meet their requirements, because of course it set free a certain number of sections of these field ambulances by mixing them up together.

5455 2 What was the division to which you were attached

1 The Sixth, General Townshend's. In addition to that I generally did the administrative work as regards removing the wounded from the battle field and getting them as best I could to the rear side. I did that in all the engagements starting with the attack on Norfolk Hill up to the battle of Ctesiphon

5456 2 Have you the dates of the actions you were in

1 I think I remember them. The first was the operation of the 20th January from Kurna under General Barrett. Then I was in the advance from Kurna to the capture of Amara and Norfolk Hill. They would be the operations in May. The next was what you describe as the first battle of Kut; that was in September. Then there was

the battle of Ctesiphon and the subsequent retirement

5457

I got out of Kut I suppose
 A I got out in a very funny way. I ~~started~~ ^{started} off with the last boat from a place called Aziziyah. That was our advanced base. I had 500 wounded on board the boat. I had 30 able bodied men, and General Townshend was very dubious about what we should do, because there was an ~~escort~~ ^{escort} of gun boats, and he was thinking of keeping this last boat load of wounded to go down with the gunboat escort. He was talking over the thing with me and he said "I have a mind to let you go by yourself". I got away and the Arabs got on to us; we fought during the night, and every one on board the boat did very well indeed, and we got through that mess and got down to Kut, and at that we met all the other boats which had started off six days in front of us, because they were all held up. They tried to get out at Kut, and had been beaten back by parties of Arabs, and then all the troops got together - we brought troops down - and cleared the banks and got through. I got straight down to Basra. The majority of my unit had been subdivided in going with the escorts and so on. There were two companies left behind in Kut and we got down to Basra. We had lost all our equipment and I started to get new equipment. By the time the new equipment had come we never were at

5457 ~~to reform again~~ because I never could get back again to Kut-el-Amara where the remainder of my unit was
 5458 I ~~for the~~^{were} practically the whole time with your ambulance unit until it was broken up
 A Yes

5459 I Then you tried to reorganise a fresh one
 A Yes

5460 I We have had a great deal of evidence which your valuable statement confirms, so that I do not think I need put very many questions to you. I will take you through each heading. As regards equipment you say nearly all equipment had to be borrowed from the ordinary stationary hospital
 A Yes

5461 I That was in making good the equipment before you started

A Yes, it was the way of making the equipment up for those general hospitals for service. As well as I can understand the general hospital for service only existed in a mobilisation schedule. Operating tables, disinfectors, and all that kind of thing, were down in the schedule, but they really had not got them, and when they wanted them the only way to get them was to borrow them from the existing stationary hospitals in India.

5462 I I suppose that, applied to furniture and other things. They had to borrow ice chest and disinfectors for disinfecting the ~~green~~ linen. It also

applied to furniture, as you say. I remember coming in and sitting in the general office and making ^{out} a list of what we could give and lend in the way of furniture. I cannot remember the things now. I think none of the medical equipment itself in the way of appliances and bandages and instruments and that kind of thing was borrowed from stationary hospitals. The beds were withdrawn from the hospitals because the order came to hand them out. Orders had come to take up all the beds in the Secunderabad Hospital and send them away. That was to form the first general hospitals that mobilised for Mesopotamia. They had to take the beds from the stationary hospitals in the region in which they mobilised.

5463 Q There was no equipment of this kind except such as was taken from the general hospitals
A That is the case I believe

5464 Q And that denuded the general hospitals
A Yes

5465 Q As regards the personnel there were no reserves of personnel
A No.

5466 Q And all the lower branches of the personnel had to be collected

A Yes, collected in the bazaar and put to any duty to which they were sent. And understands caste prejudice in India, but men were sent as dhobies who had never washed anything in their lives. They simply got hold of natives and put them on a ship

185
Ship and sent them off

7 Lord Hugh Cecil: What is a dhobie

A washerman

5468 The Chairman: As regards the equipment there is the practice of ^{packing} picking it up

It is kept in a store. You can walk into that store and take over the equipment in half an hour. It is left stored year in and year out. I called the attention of General Dobbie to the fact that there were something like 12 ^{dozen} dozen bottles of the most beautiful brandy, Hennessy's brandy, the corks of which had become absolutely atrophied and undergone degeneration, so that when they were packed on the side of a mule the brandy was wasted. I remember seeing brandy which had just arrived which without any question of misappropriation, had all disappeared owing to the condition of the corks

5469 2 Have you had any previous experience of hospital mobilisation?

185. It may be considered egotistical, but my record is that I have commanded field ambulances in the field for almost exactly three years and six months.

I was two years and two months commanding the 18th Brigade Field Ambulance in South Africa. That is the maximum time. I do not think there is anybody else who has had that experience of the command of field ambulances

5470 2 What is the contrast which you make between the so called Indian mobilisation and the English

I I was always with an English unit
 71 2 was the mobilisation in South Africa
 better than that in Mesopotamia

I I am sorry to say it was

5472 I It had gone back

A Ys

5473 Q How do you account for that ^{days'}

A All I can say is I ~~have~~ got three ~~months~~ ^{days'}
 notice to mobilise the 8th British Field
 hospital, which was a synonym ~~you~~ was
 term for "field ambulance". I got three
~~or~~ four days' notice and in four
 days I was on board the ship and
 sailing away to South Africa. On
 the new system I was over two months
 detained at Poona. Of course they were
~~collecting~~ ^{equipping} a much larger force. But,
 as I have pointed out, I equipped that
 unit myself; I simply got orders from
 Simla. I was the junior Major at the time
 and in conjunction with the General Officer
 commanding at Bangalore I could get
 anything I wanted. There is an example
 given of a carpenter. The carpenter's rate of
 pay was 8/6 a month but I could not get
 one for that. I got one for £2 a month

5474 Lord Hugh Cecil That was the South African mobilisation

A Ys

5475 The Chairman Then the scheme of mobilisation had
 gone backwards. Can you give any tangible
 reason for that

A I think it was that things were so
 well done as regards book reading
 and theory that the practical element

had been neglected. Many books and documents were written and ~~read~~ everybody appeared to desire to have the thing right according to the different mobilisation schemes. They said "This is authorised" or "That is not authorised" and that sort of business.

But the training of the men had not been attended to at all

I do