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To: Rt. Hon. Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary

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Group Captain [redacted], Iraq Directorate [SSR] FCO
; United Nations Department FCO

Rt. Hon. David Blunkett, Home Secretary

Copy - Sir Keith Povey, HMCIC
Mr Peter Storr, HO
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Mr Chris Fox, President of ACPO

From: Mr Paul Kernaghan, Chief Constable, ACPO International Affairs Portfolio

Copy: Mr D L Clarke, Chief Constable MDP [for information]

Subject: Report on Second Visit to Iraq by Chief Constable Kernaghan - 11/11/03 - 14/11/03

1. Introduction

- 1.1 I first visited Iraq in May [13/5-20/5] and submitted my report to the Foreign and Home Secretaries on 23 May 2003. A copy of that report [and appendices] is attached at Appendix 'N1' for ease of reference.
- 1.2 The Iraq Directorate [Security Sector Reform] FCO requested that I undertake a second visit to Iraq and address the following points:

Terms and conditions of UK police officers in Iraq
Additional areas where UK could add value
Information on policing structures
Chief Officer arrangements in Baghdad, Basra and the other Governorates within CPA [South]
Viability of training plans and facilities in Basra
Issues that can be done better or differently, e.g. role of contractors?
Process of Iraqi ownership of policing especially in CPA [South], but also more widely in Iraq
General assessment re staff position in CPA [Baghdad]

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- 1.3 I am conscious that this report needs to address the needs of two very different communities of readers. The FCO has multiple specialist sources of information on Iraq, whereas Iraq is not core business within the Home Office. However, policing is equally not core business within the FCO, whilst the Home Office has a key role and responsibility in developing a professional police service. I felt it was appropriate to submit one report and trust that readers will realise that detail, which may appear superfluous for their purposes, may be extremely relevant to their colleagues in the other department.
- 1.4 I have sought to address the points raised by the Iraq Directorate but have once again commented on matters which I acknowledge strictly lie outside my remit as a member of ACPO. However, feedback indicates that my perspective as a non-departmental, professionally trained observer was felt to be of value to several recipients. In some cases I have merely highlighted issues which require attention at ministerial or senior official level. My visit owing to its duration means that my findings are necessarily based on a snapshot approach.
- 1.5 The views expressed in the report are my own and I take full responsibility for them. I have sought to reflect the views of my interviewees but have exercised my own judgement and on occasion I was faced with contradictory views.

2. Context

- 2.1 My visit programme changed repeatedly in the days before my departure and, indeed, even more once I was in Iraq. My scheduled meetings with Ambassador Bremmer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock were both cancelled as they had been recalled for separate consultations with their respective governments.
- 2.2 My Basra programme was totally disrupted by a security 'lockdown' coinciding with my arrival at Basra International Airport [BIA] on 13/11/03. The threat of a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device [VBIED] resulted in all movement by road being prohibited and at one stage even movement within the airport building was restricted. However, I was able to meet with both the GOC and Sir Hilary Synnott during my extended stay at BIA.
- 2.3 The absence of the ambassadors and the security 'scare' at BIA both perfectly illustrate the atmosphere and reality of Iraq during my visit. The future plans of the Coalition Powers [CP] for Iraq were in a state of flux and the senior officials remaining, acknowledged that meetings in Washington [and London] might well totally change existing plans. They were therefore somewhere reluctant to be definitive as to the CP's strategic plan. Equally, the security threat was the dominant theme of both discussions and CPA operational activity.

- 2.4 When I visited Iraq in May I commenced my 'assessment' with the following introduction:

'Iraq is currently in a state of confusion, uncertainty and anticipation. Confusion following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. Uncertainty as to what the future holds and anticipation that potentially the future is much brighter. My view is that the CP are on probation. Iraqis are delighted to be rid of Saddam but suspicious that the CP are motivated by a desire to seize oil resources as opposed to their declared war aims. However, at present suspicion has not turned to active dislike or resistance. There is a lot to play for, but the clock is ticking. The CP must deliver, not least in the field of internal security. I am concerned that what I call the 'bad luck factor' will become larger with each day that passes'

- 2.5 Sadly, the 'bad luck' factor has kicked in with a vengeance. The CPA Headquarters was mortared on my first day in Iraq, and the Italian Carabinieri sustained multiple fatalities as a result of a VBIED attack during my second day. Shortly after my departure the US Army lost seventeen soldiers when two helicopters crashed, the result it is believed of enemy fire. Security is a major factor in all CPA and Coalition Powers - Security Forces [CP-SF] discussions. The so-called 'Green Zone' in Baghdad resembles a massive building site with concrete walls and obstacles being erected everywhere.
- 2.6 I have no doubt those attacks on the CP and other manifestations of international involvement will continue, and will probably increase in tempo. I submit that the threat to the CP encompasses a wide range of potential attackers. There are undoubtedly former regime elements [FRE] but opinions differ amongst coalition officials as to whether they are seeking to restore a Ba'athist regime or merely to impose a heavy price on the CP for removing them from power. There is also the threat posed independently, or in a loose coalition of mutual self interest with FRE, by what I will designate as foreign radical islamists [FRI]. In addition to these two groups, I would submit that attacks may also be mounted by unemployed and alienated youth with universal access to firearms. To say nothing of traditional tribal based disputes and potentially activity associated with political groupings seeking influence in the new Iraq. Each group poses a specific threat ranging from serious to marginal, but they all require a response from the CP-SF. Infiltration and other classic CRW techniques may work against organised groupings but are irrelevant when the threat comes from local youths demonstrating their masculinity to each other.
- 2.7 The security situation is not good and will become worse, but the answer to many aspects of the problem is an effective Iraqi security infrastructure. I was provided with a helicopter tour of Baghdad and it confirmed my view that large parts of that city will never and should never see CP-SF patrol activity. Huge areas are composed of high-density housing and foreign security forces would merely become targets with no accompanying security benefit being gleaned from patrol activity. You will only 'police' 'Sadr City' for example, with indigenous forces, preferably police officers.

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3. Current UK Police Assistance

- 3.1 Currently, UK police support to Iraq consists of eight officers deployed in Baghdad with CPA [Headquarters] and three officers with CPA [South].

CPA [Headquarters, Baghdad]:

1 ACC [subsequently appointed as DCC] South Yorkshire
1 Dorset
6 MDP

CPA [South, Basra]:

1 ACC [local DCC] PSNI
2 MDP

- 3.2 A 'pool' of 200 officers has been created at the request of the Foreign Secretary with a view to sustaining a deployment of 100 officers in support of Iraqi operations. Plans are well advanced to support the Jordanian - Iraq Police Training Centre with up to 70/75 'trainers' drawn from the pool. Some 24 officers from the pool are undertaking firearms training, with a view to being deployed to a training facility at Basra.
- 3.3 The deployment to Jordan has been formally requested by the Foreign Secretary, endorsed by the Home Secretary, and is in hand. The deployment to Basra has not yet been formally requested and is subject to an appropriate security assessment. I will return to this issue later.

4. Assessment

- 4.1 I will specifically address the issues raised by the Iraq Directorate but feel an overview is essential. The pace of change in Iraq policy is quickening and the outcome of the consultations undertaken by Ambassador Bremmer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock are now filtering in to the public arena. It appears that the new timetable to which the CP are working is as follows:

Formal restoration of Iraqi sovereignty by June 2004 - Power being transferred to a 'provisional' Iraqi government. However the CP and specifically the CP-SF would remain in Iraq on a basis to be decided with the provisional government. Full elections in 2005 to establish a government with democratic legitimacy. It appears that elections will not take place until a government structure and security climate have been created to facilitate a genuine exercise in democracy. The provisional government will be selected by means of consultation with 'community groups'.

- 4.2 In the context of UK police assistance it is important that a clear timetable is established, which is compatible with the strategic plan. Do we have a date for the withdrawal of UK police support or, whatever the constitutional arrangements do we envisage a long-term police assistance mission? I deliberately use the term police assistance mission, as it suggests a move from a short-term crisis response to a more thought through medium term assistance package. The military have experience in providing training assistance support and it may be that Iraq marks the dawn of a similar

approach in respect of the police service. In any case, a clear statement of government policy in respect of the duration and depth of support we will provide to Iraq, would assist all concerned in producing options to support that policy.

- 4.3 It is quite clear that the current level of UK police assistance is unsustainable in that it is insufficient to deliver a coherent package of support and I suggest that HMG has to decide to either increase our assistance or withdraw our support altogether.
- 4.4 The DCC deployed in Baghdad is able to influence CPA policy centrally and during the absence of a senior US official was de facto heading the CPA Ministry of the Interior [MoI]. However, until recently he had no support staff and in addition to his MoI brief was also seeking to provide mentoring to the Iraqi Chief of Police for Baghdad. The recent arrival of additional officers [mainly drawn from the MDP] has eased the situation but security restrictions and the limited availability of Close Protection Teams [CPT] and vehicles, limits their ability to contribute.
- 4.5 The Joint Co-ordinating Centre [JCC] was not operating during my visit and I was advised that the original concept had not been properly resourced or thought through. The MDP officers originally earmarked for the JCC were being employed on general support duties with the DCC. However, work continues to revive the JCC concept.
- 4.6 The ACC in CPA [South] seeks to provide guidance to local IPS commanders and to support CPA [South] generally. The major project is the establishment of a police training centre. Currently, a team of Danish officers have developed, and are delivering, three management type courses based on their work with the 'Palestinian Police'. However, I anticipate problems with the continued delivery of this programme given the recent emphasis on basic training as decreed by the Commander of CJTF7 and disseminated by FRAGO [Fragmentary Order] 1018.
- 4.7 Overall my impression was that the UK police assistance effort was under-resourced and lacked a clear vision as to the way ahead. They had ideas but were uncertain as to their chain of command - CPA, CPA [South], Iraq Directorate or United Nations Department? I could set out the current position in greater depth but feel the correct approach is to focus on options for the future and also to highlight the factors which require addressing in connection with the options proposed.
- 4.8 I was somewhat surprised to learn that Ambassador Bremmer as CP Administrator did not have political control over the military but that the Commander CJTF7 had his own reporting line via CentCom back to Washington. On the one hand a matter of high policy and national style, but I believe that on occasions there is an information and co-ordination gap between CPA and CJTF7.

- 4.9 I feel I must comment on the divergence between UK media coverage of Iraq and my perception of the reality on the ground. The security threat is obvious and naturally incidents, which result in the loss of CP lives, generate great coverage. However, Iraq is making progress and I would suggest one aid I observed in Baghdad requires wider dissemination. Three photographs of Baghdad show 'light pollution', before the invasion, immediately after the invasion and now. They graphically demonstrate the strides made in recent months. I recognise that no government or agency can determine the media agenda but I was struck by the unrepresentative media coverage I am continuously exposed to. If one accepts that political will is a crucial factor in the Iraq situation, I must highlight the need to ensure some coverage in the UK of the positive work in Iraq and how life is getting better for many Iraqis. Most people form their views from media coverage and I am extremely concerned that UK coverage is extremely narrow and unbalanced.

5. Future Police Assistance Options

- 5.1 I consulted with the Head of the MoI [Mr Steve Casteel] and he sketched out the development plan he is seeking to implement. Field Training Coordinators [FTC] will support Iraqi recruits trained in Jordan and at domestic training centres. These personnel will be supplied by 'Dyncorps' and the aim is to create a unit of 1,500 FTCs. Iraqi recruits will be subject to 1 years probation before they are confirmed in the Iraqi Police Service. He did not envisage UK officers being deployed on the streets of Iraq as FTCs. He saw the UK supporting the training centre[s] effort and suggested that over time UK personnel might deliver some areas of specialist training.
- 5.2 It should be noted that with the exception of the Basra training centre, military personnel are delivering all police training in Iraq. This emphasis on training was also reflected by several interviewees in Baghdad.
- 5.3 I detected the lack of a clear vision and was also concerned that we appeared to be creating a hybrid US City department/UK police service. I see the need for a service with the ability to routinely demonstrate the capability to utilise force, somewhere higher on the 'continuum of force' than is the norm in the USA and the UK. I am aware that Police Support Units [PSUs] are being trained but none of my hosts briefed me on this development and I fear it is not being properly integrated into a national plan. Currently this PSU training is being provided by CP military and gendarmerie type formations. I endorse the use of gendarmerie type units and feel the IPS needs such a capability within the clear democratic and human rights culture which European units of this type demonstrate. It should be noted that of the FIEP grouping [France, Italy, Spain and Portugal] and their potential latest member Romania, all bar France are present in Iraq.

6. Police Assistance Recommendations

6.1 Baghdad

[a] Maintain a senior UK officer in Baghdad with the CPA, to ensure appropriate influence. DCC Brand has indicated that he will serve for a full year [July 2003-04].

[b] Provide a small staff to support that senior officer.

[c] DCC Brand is, I believe, keen to introduce a civilian police presence to the Baghdad Police Training Centre [aka the Baghdad Police Academy]. He may utilise one of his MDP staff with a strong training background. However, the Baghdad Training Centre should be developed in line with CPA directives and I do not envisage it becoming a distinctly UK sponsored project.

[d] The future of the JCC is unclear and the question of UK support should await updated proposals from DCC Brand.

6.2 CPA [South]

[a] The current staffing level of three is insufficient to deliver anything meaningful. Therefore, I recommend that we should increase our support to CPA [South].

[b] Basra Training Centre - deploy 24 officers as trainers as provisionally planned. They together with other personnel, be they international police officers, RMP or other military assets would deliver transitional training to existing officers of the IPS.

[c] Maintain a senior UK officer post within CPA [South]. ACC White is seeking to return to the UK by 14 January 2004.

[d] Provide the senior officer with a small support staff. It was suggested that senior CID and SB officers would be particularly helpful. I recommend no action on the SB appointment until CPA promulgates a clear picture as to what internal Iraqi security structures will be. I can see some merit in providing an officer with CID experience, but in the absence of a brief on the restored Iraqi CS, I am reluctant to endorse such an imprecise suggestion at this stage.

[e] There are four governorates within the remit of CPA [South] and I recommend that we appoint an advisor [Chief Superintendent] to each of the governorate's Chiefs of Police. I envisage the advisors mentoring the IPS personnel and showing them how a professional senior officer performs. In addition, I feel there would be merit in the advisors 'talent spotting' the future leaders of the IPS, with a view to the UK providing a 'senior command course' for such personnel, at some stage in the future. Identification of the future leaders will require diplomatic skills and diplomatic guidance. I am concerned that at present nepotism and political sponsorship might determine who we had to train on a senior command course. I would prefer that we monitor and select good officers but equally I recognise the goal is to provide a

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professional force to serve the Iraqi nation and any provisional government will need to be consulted on the way ahead. However, I see real potential in eventually providing a suitable course for new generation of IPS commanders. I recognise that such a strong UK presence is subject to it being compatible with the overall coalition mosaic which is CPA [South].

7. Implications of Recommendations.

- 7.1 The CP will continue to sustain casualties in Iraq and I have already formally advised both the President of ACPO and the Home Office that UK police officers deployed to Iraq may be killed. I reiterate my view that that possibility does not mean we should not provide assistance, but rather that government and the service needs to be prepared for such a tragic eventuality. Officers deployed to Iraq are volunteers and that crucial fact should not be overlooked.
- 7.2 If HMG agrees that we should proceed as recommended it is imperative that appropriate security measures are implemented. Each governate advisor would require a dedicated CPT with appropriate transport. The advisors and their CPT support would work in local Police Headquarters, but live with other members of the governate support teams in secure CP facilities. Civil servants already operate in the governates and I feel that the risk to UK police officers would be acceptable and reasonable given the security measures specified.
- 7.3 In relation to the Basra Training Centre, opinions differ as to whether or not UK trainers should reside at the centre or commute daily from other CPA accommodation. The Danish officers currently commute. It has also been suggested that the UK officers could alternate their living accommodation between the centre and the CPA [South] Headquarters. I recognise that all concerned are anxious to protect the officers concerned. My advice is that they should work and reside at the training centre. Routine transportation constitutes a real risk and the advantages of residing at the BTC with access to co-located military units appears to provide the best option.

8. Commitment of the UK Police Service

- 8.1 The creation of the pool of officers for service in connection with Iraq highlighted problems with our current service structure and the approach adopted by individual forces. 27 [+ 6 ACPOS] forces nominated officers, whilst 16 forces declined to do so. I recognise that some chief officers feel Iraq does not feature on their own list of priorities and/or they believe, that notwithstanding officers' own decisions to volunteer, they have a duty to protect officers from themselves. I reiterate that I recognise my colleagues' sincerity. However, the result of this disparate response to the Foreign Secretary's request is that the burden effectively shifts to the willing and they are faced with losing operational personnel and potentially with managing the impact of fatalities. Whereas the unwilling see no downside to their stance. It should also be noted that forces which indicated support are wavering in the face of adverse media coverage of the security situation in Iraq.

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- 8.2 I recommend that forces should be encouraged to advertise international missions and required to allow officers to volunteer. The Home Secretary should write to all Chief Officers highlighting the importance he attributes to supporting HMG initiatives overseas. He could also direct HMIC to include an assessment of force support for international missions as part of the inspection regime. Ultimately, the Home Secretary could direct support under the provisions of the Police Reform Act 2002. None of these measures would detract from the fundamental principle that individual officers must volunteer for such missions. However, the current ad hoc arrangements which allow chief officers to opt out and block volunteers is inappropriate in the modern world and detracts from the ability of the service to respond in a professional manner.
- 8.3 An Indicative target for forces in relation to participation in all overseas missions should also be set.
- 8.4 The issue of attracting suitable volunteers for overseas missions, particularly senior officers, was thrown in to stark relief during my visit to Iraq. Working in Iraq is challenging and we should aim to utilise that challenge as a developmental tool for officers with real command potential. I am delighted to note that Mr Stephen Rimmer [HO] and a Foreign Office counterpart have convened a meeting to discuss this particular issue. It would be helpful if overseas missions could form part of the Home Secretary's agenda to strengthen police leadership. However, I would highlight that at present all officers regardless of rank require police authority permission to serve overseas. The Home Office may wish to consider changing the legislation, or in the short term seeking an APA endorsement for overseas missions.

9. The UK/PSNI Dimension

- 9.1 The FCO decided that the Iraqi pool would be drawn solely from Home Office and Scottish Executive forces. The FCO consulted with ACPOS direct, as opposed to incorporating them with consent within the main ACPO trawling exercise. PSNI were not targeted, as I believe the FCO were cognisant that the Policing Board of Northern Ireland had publicly indicated that their priority was domestic policing and that they were withdrawing from their commitment to Kosovo.
- 9.2 The ACC deployed in Basra was selected on the basis of an ACPO recruiting exercise, which treated all forces equally. However, it appears that media coverage in Northern Ireland led to an unsolicited offer of support from the Chief Constable PSNI and also to discussions between ministers [NIO/FCO/MOD/HO].
- 9.3 The Chief Constable PSNI has offered to supply 6-10 officers of Chief Inspector/Superintendent rank for service in Iraq. I received this offer by telephone and formally advised the FCO [Iraq Directorate] of it at a meeting on 29/10/03. Subsequently, I have had sight of correspondence from Jane Kennedy [MoS NIO] to the Foreign Secretary dated 6/11/03. Her letter indicates that there is an appetite within the NIO and PSNI to fully contribute

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to the UK police assistance mission in Iraq. I strongly welcome this development but would advise that any PSNI contribution be managed in the context of a unified UK police service response. In other words they should be treated as an ACPO force and not as a separate entity.

- 9.4 I would ban UK officials in Iraq from seeking to draw comparisons between Iraq and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland has without doubt made our armed forces more familiar with internal security issues than those of our coalition allies. Having made that point, I would argue that comparing NI with Iraq is analagous to comparing the 'Bay of Pigs' with 'Operation Overlord'. In that the latter were both amphibious operations but the analogy breaks down at that point.
- 9.5 It may be felt that the PSNI [Inheriting the human capital of the Royal Ulster Constabulary] is particularly well suited to operate in Iraq. However, other than familiarity with military tactics in NI, I am not aware of any special skills possessed by that force alone. Police advisors will not be engaged in executive policing and will act solely as trainers and advisors. All UK police personnel deployed to Iraq will be armed for their own protection.
- 9.6 The deployment of personnel from the PSNI, outside the mainstream arrangements, could potentially be misrepresented as suggesting they are more suited to risking their lives abroad. I feel that would be morally and professionally wrong. However, if PSNI personnel applied for advertised vacancies and were selected, that would be in keeping with ACPO's commitment to equal opportunities.
- 9.7 It should be noted that I met former members of the RUC/PSNI in Iraq and they were employed on contracts by CRG and other security companies. The FCO may wish to consider the use of contract staff, either directly employed or via a commercial undertaking, in relation to various aspects of the police assistance programme in Iraq. However, it would be my hope that the service encouraged by the home departments would be in a position to provide serving career officers.

10. Specific Points Raised by the Iraq Directorate

- 10.1 I have provided specific answers to all the points raised by the Iraq Directorate at Appendix N2.

11. General Observations

- 11.1 I have documented observations which did not fall within the above headings at Appendix N3. However, I would like to address one issue in the main body of the report. It has been suggested that the deployment of UK 'trainers' to the Basra Training Centre has been unduly delayed. This is not my understanding of the situation and I trust that officials within the Iraq Directorate (SSR) will be given due credit for proceeding in a professional and timely manner. The question of deployment is subject to an up to date risk assessment and that is linked to appropriate logistical and security

arrangements being in place. Basra is not in a position to receive the officers before mid/late December. The contingent will be trained before that date. The firearms training programme to which those officers are subject, may appear unduly long and I share that view, but they are a pilot course and I have no doubt that their views allied to experience may convince appropriate officials that we can safely shorten the course in the future. However, its length was not arbitrarily chosen and it reflects professional advice.

12. Conclusions

- 12.1 In essence, I do not believe that our current level of assistance is appropriate. I believe we should increase the number of officers deployed on specific tasks identified within the report. However, clear guidance to the service from HMG is required, as the risks to personnel are obvious. Equally, Iraq merely illustrates some wider dilemmas facing the service and I hope the Home Office will feel able to address those career management issues. I first submitted an RCDS paper on the subject of police missions abroad in 1997. I suggest that the time has now come for a government sponsored re-assessment of how the UK provides such support, with a view to improving our approach for the future.
- 12.2 I will separately provide feedback to Chief Constables on the performance of individual members deployed in Iraq and Base with the Iraq Directorate in relation to recognition of their service.
- 12.3 This report has been 'rushed' as I am aware of a desire by the Iraq Directorate to have sight of it prior to drafting papers for meetings this week.

Paul Kernaghan
Chief Constable
ACPO International Affairs Portfolio

18 November 2003

Appendix 'N2'**Terms and conditions of UK police officers in Iraq**

In general I found the officers deployed to be satisfied with their terms and conditions. The facility to enjoy breaks outside Iraq was particularly appreciated. However, one or two issues emerged which I feel should be addressed by the FCO.

It is strongly recommended that officers deployed should be provided with multiple entry visas for Kuwait. I was advised that as travel is mainly via Kuwait, such documentation is essential. In the absence of such a visa, additional charges are made and crucially officers are inconvenienced and flights may be missed. It appears multiple entry visas are obtainable at marginal cost and their provision would be a positive step forward.

Similar considerations may also apply in relation to Jordan, however, I am aware that alternative provisions may be incorporated within the JIPTC protocol/MoU.

Accommodation in Baghdad is at a premium and the recent closure of a hotel, owing to the security situation, has merely exacerbated the pressure on accommodation at the CPA Headquarters Palace. However, at present more than 130 officials [of both genders] are sleeping in one large room. Air conditioning is now provided and given the overall security threat it might be considered acceptable accommodation. However, two related issues are impacting on morale. I was advised that no coherent or published accommodation policy exists. Some newly arrived officials are allocated superior accommodation without any obvious linkage to duration of postings. The police officers feel waiting time for superior accommodation linked to the anticipated duration of postings should be the factors which determine allocation, in all cases, other than those of senior officials. I was also advised that some newcomers have contracts which specify the accommodation to be allocated i.e. single rooms. The lack of a clear policy means that such matters take on real importance and are a source of dissatisfaction. The police officers are making the best of things but the FCO may wish to make representations to CPA [Baghdad] and also review their own procedures in relation to terms offered to different groups of UK personnel being posted to Baghdad.

Additional areas where UK police could add value

I address this issue in the main body of the report.

Information on policing structures

I remain unclear as to the overall CPA [Iraq 'model'] and whether or not a single tier national service is being created. There was some discussion in relation to local and federal forces/responsibilities. I recognise that the police structure may be affected by constitutional arrangements. I reiterate my view that a hybrid US/UK service may not be appropriate and I still have not seen a single policy document setting out the structure of the IPS.

Chief Officer arrangements in Baghdad, Basra and the other Governorates within CPA [South]

I had marginal contact with IPS senior officers, namely participation in a graduation ceremony at the Baghdad Police Academy. I deal with the issue of UK support in the main body of the report. I would maintain the DCC post in Baghdad and ensure a continued ACC posting at CPA [South], subject to that option being diplomatically viable.

Viability of training plans and facilities in Basra

I am unable to comment on the Basra TC, as I was unable to visit it owing to the security regime in operation. I think it is important that CPA MoJ and CJTF7 are both working to the one common plan.

Issues that can be done better or differently, e.g. role of contractors?

I address the issue of using contractors for the provision of police assistance elsewhere. However, I was conscious of some general concern related to contractors with CPA operations. The quality of service provided by contractors appeared to vary widely and poor service was delivered by both US and UK contractors – the view was clearly expressed that giving a contract to a UK company might look good and make us all feel patriotic but if they failed to deliver, the staff in the field were the ones to suffer. One UK governorate official in CPA [South] claimed not to have had a hot meal in several months owing to poor performance by contractors. It was claimed at senior level that all contracts are awarded by officials back in the US and the UK and that personnel on the ground have limited input. The need for probity and audit trails was accepted but I detected a genuine feeling that the views of personnel with experience on the ground was not being fully recognised in Washington and London.

Process of Iraqi ownership of policing especially in CPA [South].

I was unable to meet any IPS personnel in CPA [South]. I am aware that at least one senior officer has been assassinated and I detected some factionalism during my visit to the Baghdad Academy. However, I recognise that policing does not operate in a vacuum and progress on local police ownership must be related to strategic political developments. I deal with the development of future leaders within the main body of the report.

General Assessment re CPA Staff

Personnel serving with the CPA range from the idealistic and altruistic to those with very clear and obvious personal career or financial agendas. However, most are committed and hard working. Some are past their prime, while the suitability of others was always questionable. UK police officers and other officials all openly expressed reservations about Bernard Kerik's period in charge and his manner of leaving most certainly did nothing to foster good CP/Iraq Police Service relationships.

Having made those points I found most staff were doing their best. However, personnel in Baghdad are tired; their living conditions, allied to the security restrictions under which they operate, make that perfectly understandable. I was advised that occasionally tempers fray but all concerned believe this is due to the tiredness which is clearly present. Continuity of staffing may well be desirable but there is a limit to personal effectiveness in the current working environment that is Baghdad.

*declassified*Appendix 'N3'**General Observations**

RMP Investigation - I was delighted to learn that the National Crime and Operations Faculty [NCOF] at Bramshill was providing useful support to the RMP SIO investigating possible war crimes and the disappearance of reporters. However, I was disappointed to learn that she had still not been provided with authoritative guidance in relation to the mode of trial and associated prosecutorial procedures. I recognise that this matter is being progressed via the military chain of command but uncertainty, six months on, does not inspire confidence in the overall development of a coherent Criminal Justice System within Iraq. [Paragraph 7.9 of my report 23/5.03 refers]

Vehicles - It was suggested to me in Baghdad, that UK personnel are under resourced in terms of vehicles in comparison with other countries and agencies.

Close Protection Teams - Personnel in Baghdad cannot leave the CPA Headquarters Palace without protection and there are only 4 CRG teams available. This capability will either have to be increased or, in respect of police personnel, new security rules agreed.

Iraq Civil Defense Corps [ICDC] - police advisors saw this body as a pool of future police and army recruits, whilst military commanders saw it very clearly as an army recruitment pool. I tend to agree with the military commanders. In any event it is important that a medium term strategy for this body is agreed and that it is compatible with the long term Iraqi security infrastructure which will incorporate both the IPS and the New Iraqi Army [NIA].

JIPTC [Security] - It appears that personnel posted to the JIPTC at present lack a source of updated security assessments. I suggest the Iraq Directorate should ensure [via Rin Shadforth] that personnel in Jordan are provided with a weekly updated security assessment.

JIPTC [Transport] - Concern was expressed that transport arrangements for Iraqi recruits to and from Jordan was not shaping up in an appropriate manner. Concern re airlift capability.

CPA Staffing - It was claimed that the staffing of the CPA compares unfavourably with the resources allocated to East Timor. If this is an urban myth it should be dispelled rapidly, if not, it suggests one or both countries are inappropriately resourced.

Baghdad/Basra Communication - I noted that six months on there is still a feeling in CPA [South] that they are not fully in the loop with CPA [Headquarters]. This may not be true but it is a widely held perception.

Briefing - Several personnel highlighted that in their view there was a lack of proper briefing for personnel being deployed and that there is no authoritative audit trail for policy proposals and deliverables. Bernard Kerik endorsed information supplied by a junior FCO official that an international police force of 6,500 officers would be deployed to Iraq. However, in practice we are now still planning for the deployment

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of only 1,500 FICs. I recognise as one interviewee commented that 'Iraq is a fast moving and untidy situation', but the need for accurate briefing and updates is vital in retaining staff confidence.

CPA (South) Law & Order Directorate - I was advised that whilst ACC White is nominally the Director, of L&O within CPA [South] the organogram 'boxes' showing customs and Immigration service units for example, are merely empty shells. Sir Hilary Synnott also indicated that he was under staffed in respect of the L&O portfolio.